A new Friedman’s model for evolutionary game problem

Ganikhodjaev, Nasir and Ftameh, Kalid and Pah, Chin Hee (2021) A new Friedman’s model for evolutionary game problem. In: IConTech 2021: International Conference on Technology, 4-7 November 2021, Turkey.

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Abstract

The term game in game theory means a problem, where some of the people or groups (players) share a set of rules and regulations that create the conditions and events that make up the beginning of the game. For instance, in the trade market, the buyers and sellers of some commodities interact in a random way. The reputation of sellers effects on increasing of selling. e.g., honest sellers are more attractive than cheaters for the buyers and the buyers can examine the products or unexamined. In this paper, a non-linear discrete dynamical system of Friedman model was considered. Also, we proposed a new model of interaction between these two populations (buyers and sellers). investigate its limit run behavior where we found the limit converges to a fixed point (0,0) i.e., the sellers will always cheat and the sellers will not examine according to Friedman’s model which is denoted by the fixed point (0.0).

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Plenary Papers)
Additional Information:	4430/96135
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Discrete dynamical system, Evolutionary game, Friedman’s godel, Simplex
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics
Kulliyyahs/Centres/Divisions/Institutes (Can select more than one option. Press CONTROL button):	Kulliyyah of Science > Department of Computational and Theoretical Sciences
Depositing User:	DR. CHIN HEE PAH
Date Deposited:	10 Jan 2022 16:03
Last Modified:	10 Jan 2022 16:03
URI:	http://irep.iium.edu.my/id/eprint/96135

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