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PAS's Evolving International Engagement: From Islamism to Development Diplomacy?

*Syaza Shukri and Norshahril Saat**

Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) on Facebook. Accessed 28 August 2026.

* *Syaza Shukri is Visiting Senior Fellow with the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Program ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Associate Professor at the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM). Norshahril Saat is Principal Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Program at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.*

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Parti Islam Se-Malaysia's (PAS) foreign policy outlook has evolved rather than fundamentally changed. While the party continues to prioritise global Islamic solidarity, governing experience has expanded its international engagement from ideological networks to state-led economic diplomacy.

- Earlier PAS leaders relied primarily on transnational Islamic movements and religious networks ("movement diplomacy") to build international relationships. However, younger leaders, such as Perikatan Nasional (PN) Chairman Dr Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar, increasingly emphasise investment, technology partnerships and infrastructure cooperation ("development diplomacy") in speeches, particularly through PAS-led state governments.

- The prospect of a PAS-led federal government would likely reinforce, rather than overturn, Malaysia's existing foreign policy. It would probably place greater emphasis on Islamic diplomacy and relations with Muslim-majority countries while maintaining pragmatic economic engagement with them. Its views on the recent US-Israel-Iran war are no different from Anwar Ibrahim's government.

- Southeast Asian states' engagement with PAS should be guided by pragmatism rather than assumptions about the party's ideological isolation. Not only has it downplayed its push for an Islamic state, but it has also avoided the Darul Islam-Darul Harbi dichotomy in its international conduct. PAS-led states have demonstrated a willingness to pursue foreign investment and cooperate with non-Muslim partners where economic interests align.

INTRODUCTION

In Malaysia, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia's (PAS) electoral performance has gained momentum since the 1990s. Since the 2022 General Election, it has held the largest number of seats in the federal parliament. It now also controls three states: Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu. Rather than viewing PAS as a regional party,[1] policymakers both within and outside Malaysia are beginning to prepare for the possibility of a PAS-led, or at least PAS-dominated, federal government. PAS was part of the federal government in two instances in the past: in Barisan Nasional (BN, 1974-1977) and Perikatan Nasional (PN, 2020-2022), but as a minor party in the coalitions. Currently, there is an electoral pact between BN and PN, which successfully defeated Pakatan Harapan (PH) in the August 2026 Negeri Sembilan state election, thereby forming the new state government. Consequently, it is no longer merely an academic exercise to ask what policy direction Malaysia might take in the eventuality of PAS forming the federal government.[2]

This article moves beyond PAS's domestic politics to examine what the party's outlook on international engagement would be if it were to come to power. It does so by tracing PAS leadership's views beginning in the 1980s, when the party combined an Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood mass-based movement with Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution as an alternative model of governance. PAS remained firmly in the opposition then and was controlled by Muslim clerics (ulama). These influences shaped PAS's foreign policy outlook rhetoric, and not as a concrete blueprint for foreign policy.[3] Here, foreign policy outlook refers to the party's worldview of international affairs, whereas foreign policy refers to the formal policies and actions of the Malaysian government. Although PAS has participated in the federal government, it has never controlled the foreign affairs portfolio and has not been the principal driver of Malaysia's foreign policy. The question, therefore, is what this foreign policy outlook looks like when PAS moves from opposition activism into government, and what this might tell us about Malaysian foreign policy under a future PAS-led government? PAS has not only experienced federal power but also governed Kelantan continuously since 1990 and Terengganu intermittently since 1999, including its current clean sweep of the state assembly. It also governs Kedah and is dominant in Perlis. These experiences allow us to trace how PAS has expanded its diplomatic repertoire. To be sure, PAS's ability to separate doctrinal disapproval from political collaboration explains its pragmatism in engaging both Sunni and Shia (especially Iran) states and in addressing diverse global issues relating to the Islamic world.

PAS FOREIGN POLICY OUTLOOK DURING THE ISLAMIC RESURGENCE

The ulama officially took over the PAS leadership in 1987. At the 28th Muktamar, the party endorsed constitutional changes, realising the "leadership of the ulama" ideology.[4] In 1987, the party officially enacted the office of *Murshidul Am (*general guide), led by the senior ulama, who also led the Shura Council, separate from the office of the president.[5] The ulama's influence in the party was now absolute; though most of their discourse was directed at domestic politics given PAS's opposition role. After the ulama takeover of the party in the 1980s up to the 2020s, PAS established ties with Islamic movements and parties in other parts of the world. PAS utilised the leader-to-leader exchange with the Pakistan-based Jamaat-e-Islami, Tunisian-based Ennahda Party, and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, although it remains unclear whether any memorandum of understanding was established between these parties, beyond exchanging ideas by attending each other's conferences.

However, PAS's foreign policy outlook—including its understanding of Malaysia's role in the Muslim world, its positions on major international conflicts, attitudes towards great powers, preferred international partners, and approaches to diplomacy and economic engagement—could be traced to the ulama's publications and sermons, not to mention the party's official documents. In 2003, PAS tabled its *Islamic State Document,* which the spiritual leader Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat declared to be based on the Quran and Sunnah. The document, in essence, argued that the first Islamic constitution is the Medina Constitution, which was guided by the belief in God and based on sharia law. Soon after, PAS president, Abdul Hadi Awang, published several books that sought to differentiate Islam from Western ideologies such as capitalism, communism, socialism and freemasonry.[6] Abdul Hadi also divided countries into three broad categories: Islamic states (Darul Islam), Darul Ahdi (non-Muslim states that establish relations with Muslim states), and Darul Harbi (antagonistic non-Muslim states).[7] Haron Din, who was the PAS *Murshidul Am* after Nik Aziz, also spoke about the need for Muslims to defend their homeland through jihad if the religion of Islam is threatened.[8]

Besides dividing world politics into Muslim nations and differentiating non-Muslim nations between Islamic-friendly or non-friendly, PAS leaders also believed that an Islamic state must protect the *dhimmis* (minorities) in accordance with the Medina Constitution. The *dhimmis* are accorded rights but are required to pay the jizyah or tax to Muslim rulers. Ultimately, underlying PAS ulama's thinking was the division between engaging Muslims versus non-Muslims. Faith became the basis of interactions, rather than equal citizenship or, in international relations terms, equality of state rights under international law.

On foreign policy outlook, Nik Aziz, as *Murshidul Am*, unequivocally declared that Malaysia should not recognise the state of Israel. In 2012, he openly rebuked Anwar Ibrahim for a report in the *Wall Street Journal* that allegedly claimed Anwar, then the leader of the opposition, was asking for Israel's security to be respected. Nik Aziz also rejected any forms of economic relations between Malaysia and Israel, even though no diplomatic relations had ever been established.[9] Nik Aziz also clearly supported the Palestinian resistance and the restoration of Palestinian rights.

GOVERNING EXPERIENCE

In 2020, PAS joined the government following the Sheraton Move and the collapse of the PH government. It was a remarkable political moment because PAS and BN, particularly UMNO, had been bitter political rivals for decades. At one point, PAS leaders declared UMNO members to be *kafir* (infidels) for supporting a secular political system;[10] this resulted in deep social divisions as some supporters refused to pray together or participate in each other's religious ceremonies. Yet political necessity eventually overrode these differences. Following BN's defeat in the 2018 General Election, UMNO and PAS put aside decades of hostility to establish the loose political pact known as Muafakat Nasional (MN). This cooperation subsequently paved the way for PAS to enter the federal government alongside Bersatu and BN under the PN administration. Interestingly, PAS president Abdul Hadi, who in 1981 stirred controversy over his disapproval of Muslims working with UMNO through the infamous *Amanat Haji Hadi,* had in 2020 published a book*, Islam dan Kebangsaan,* emphasising the nexus between Islam, nation, and race. The book also reiterated the importance of respecting other races and religions, as Islamic civilisations had in the past.[11] The 2020 publication shows that Abdul Hadi has toned down his 1981 rhetoric

on Muslims collaborating with non-Muslims, and today, he has even endorsed PAS forging alliances with UMNO.

Once in government, it was no longer sufficient for PAS to focus solely on longstanding ideological objectives such as expanding the jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts through the proposed amendments to Act 355, popularly referred to as the "Hudud Bill." Governing fundamentally changed the party's incentives to demonstrate its capacity to deliver material and developmental outcomes. PAS leaders had to grapple with practical questions of statecraft: how to create jobs, attract investment, finance development and, during the COVID-19 pandemic, protect public health while sustaining the economy. PAS consequently assumed responsibility for several important ministerial portfolios. Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man served as Minister of Environment and Water, Takiyuddin Hassan was Minister in the Prime Minister's Department (Parliament and Law) before becoming Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Mohd Khairuddin Aman Razali was Minister of Plantation Industries and Commodities, while Idris Ahmad became Minister in the Prime Minister's Department (Religious Affairs). Beyond the Cabinet, PAS president Abdul Hadi was appointed by Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin as Special Envoy to the Middle East with ministerial status. Together, these appointments provided PAS with its first sustained opportunity to move beyond opposition politics and engage directly in the responsibilities of governing during the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. Their performance, however, generated questions about the party's readiness for federal governance.[12] Most notably, Takiyuddin's handling of the revocation of the Emergency Ordinances in 2021 resulted in a rare public rebuke from the Palace.[13]

LAJNAH HAL EHWAL ANTARABANGSA DAN HUBUNGAN LUAR (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE)

PAS's foreign policy outlook is articulated institutionally through its *Lajnah Hal Ehwal Antarabangsa dan Hubungan Luar* (International Affairs and External Relations Committee), currently chaired by Muhammad Khalil Abdul Hadi, the PAS President's eldest son. Its statements reveal considerable continuity with PAS's older Islamist-internationalist worldview: Palestine remains central, Muslim-majority states are repeatedly encouraged to act collectively, and international politics is frequently interpreted through opposition to the West, particularly US hegemony. The Lajnah consistently opposed normalisation with Israel and supported Malaysia's rejection of the Abraham Accords.[14] While such positions could potentially complicate PAS's relations with Arab governments that normalised relations with Israel, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) which the Lajnah accused of betraying the Muslim ummah and Palestine in 2020,[15] there is little evidence that this rhetoric prevented pragmatic engagement. Abdul Hadi subsequently met the UAE ambassador as Special Envoy, suggesting that PAS itself could compartmentalise ideological disagreement and practical diplomatic relations.[16]

Its approach is nevertheless not confined to the Middle East. On the Rohingya crisis, Khalil simultaneously called for action by ASEAN, the OIC and the United Nations, combining Muslim solidarity with regional and multilateral diplomacy.[17]

The Lajnah's activities also demonstrate a wider diplomatic repertoire. The 2022 delegation to Turkey participated in an international conference on Palestine while meeting the ruling AK Party, Saadet Party, Islamic NGOs and representatives from several countries.[18] At the same time, the Lajnah has cultivated relations beyond the Muslim world, including

engagement with the Australian High Commission [19] and the Japanese Embassy, where discussions covered economic cooperation, education, and technology. [20] The Lajnah, therefore, provides the clearest indication of PAS's party-level foreign-policy thinking anchored in Islamic solidarity and Palestine, but increasingly willing to employ conventional bilateral, multilateral, economic and party-to-party diplomacy beyond the Muslim world.

DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMACY: PRAGMATISM OVER IDENTITY

Abdul Hadi's appointment as the prime minister's special envoy to the Middle East in April 2020 marked PAS's most direct involvement in Malaysian foreign policy. He was appointed with ministerial status by Muhyiddin Yassin and retained by Ismail Sabri Yaakob in September 2021, "as he is fluent in Arabic and was vice-president of the influential World Union of Muslim Scholars whose members include prominent Egyptian-born, Qatari-based scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi." [21] His background gave him forms of access that were not readily available to conventional diplomats.

There were some tangible diplomatic activities. During the pandemic, Abdul Hadi held discussions with Wisma Putra (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and received representatives from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, Oman, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and Bahrain. [22] His most substantive overseas engagement was a January–February 2022 visit to Qatar, where he met Qatari officials responsible for commerce and industry and discussed trade and investment cooperation. [23] He also met Taliban representative Suhail Shaheen to discuss humanitarian assistance and Malaysia's possible contribution to Afghanistan's reconstruction. [24] Abdul Hadi's subsequent "report card" presented his office as building foundations for cooperation in education, technology, investment and trade, while strengthening Malaysia's role in promoting unity in the Muslim world. [25] The appointment consequently illustrates how PAS's movement-based relationships could potentially be converted into government-level diplomatic channels.

Nevertheless, the office attracted substantial criticism. Its mandate overlapped with those of the foreign minister, Malaysian embassies and existing agencies, while parliamentary answers initially listed meetings without demonstrating completed investments or measurable policy outcomes. An assessment characterised Abdul Hadi's early role as largely ceremonial and argued that his close associations with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and the International Union of Muslim Scholars potentially limited his influence with Saudi Arabia and some Gulf governments. [26] His criticism of the incoming Joe Biden administration for "Zionist-influenced policies" also prompted concern that partisan ideological statements could complicate Malaysia's wider diplomatic relationships. [27] His tenure, therefore, demonstrated both the usefulness and limitations of translating Islamist networks into state diplomacy.

Nevertheless, Abdul Hadi's experience during this period offers clues as to how Malaysia's foreign policy might look under PAS. His ideological rhetoric did not translate into a distinct diplomatic doctrine. Instead, contemporary PAS's blend of assertive Muslim solidarity and pragmatic engagement with major powers more closely resembles the foreign-policy posture of Turkey and Pakistan, where Islamic identity coexists with strategic autonomy and national-interest calculations, than that of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states or Egypt.

Abdul Hadi's former political secretary, Ahmad Samsuri, has been more successful in portraying and implementing a more "moderate" foreign policy outlook for his state,

Terengganu. Since becoming chief minister in 2018, Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar has placed investment promotion at the centre of Terengganu's external engagement. Unlike the predominantly movement-based networks associated with earlier PAS leaders, Samsuri's diplomacy has involved foreign companies, ambassadors, investment agencies and neighbouring governments, with discussions framed around technology transfer, industrialisation, renewable energy and employment. This approach reflects his direct responsibility for the state's economy, finance and investment portfolios.

Samsuri's efforts have increasingly focused on East Asian partners. Terengganu held repeated discussions with the South Korean ambassador and investors concerning hydrogen energy, floating solar technology, education and language cooperation.[28] In March 2024, Samsuri led a delegation to South Korea and signed memoranda of understanding with Star Group Industries and other industry participants on green hydrogen and rare-earth downstream processing. Star Group subsequently discussed a potential US$200 million investment to manufacture "super magnets" in Malaysia, while the state identified land near Kemaman Port for a proposed processing facility.[29] These initiatives sought not merely to extract Terengganu's mineral resources but to develop higher-value downstream industries and reduce the state's dependence on petroleum revenue. Interestingly, in the same year, PAS appointed former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad as its informal economics advisor for the four PAS dominant states—Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis, and Kedah— collectively known as SG4. [30] However, the SG4 states continue to lag behind other Malaysian states on multiple measures, including GDP per capita, foreign direct investment, and broader development indicators.[31]

Singapore Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong's May 2026 visit further demonstrated Samsuri's pragmatic outreach. Their discussions covered renewable energy, tourism, environmental sustainability, silica processing, the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) and Kemaman Port rather than religious or ideological concerns.[32] The engagement showed that a PAS-led government could cultivate functional relations with a secular, non-Muslim-majority neighbour when economic interests converged.

Nevertheless, important qualifications remain. Announced investment values and memoranda do not necessarily translate into completed facilities, jobs or state revenue. Terengganu's economic growth remained below the national rate for several consecutive years, while its contribution to national GDP declined from 2.6 per cent in 2015 to 2.4 per cent in 2024.[33] Hence, Samsuri's record demonstrates increasingly sophisticated investment diplomacy, but its ultimate success will need to be assessed by implementation and economic diversification rather than by announcements alone

Terengganu is not the only PAS-led state to have pursued external engagement, although its efforts have been the most visibly oriented towards investment diplomacy. Kelantan has traditionally adopted a more modest approach, constrained by its weaker fiscal position and industrial base. Nevertheless, the state has continued to cultivate diplomatic and commercial links with foreign embassies and investors. For example, the June 2026 courtesy visit by the French Ambassador to Kelantan focused explicitly on exploring new investment opportunities and expanding bilateral economic cooperation. [34] Similarly, under Chief Minister Muhammad Sanusi Md Nor, Kedah has actively promoted itself as an investment destination, particularly in high-technology manufacturing centred on Kulim. Sanusi has personally engaged prospective investors from China, including Henan Airport Group, regarding the proposed Kulim International Airport.[35] Singapore is beginning to have some

exposure to Kedah's industrial economy,[36] apart from Kelantan's.[37] However, its investment footprint in PAS-led states remains relatively modest compared to the other parts of Malaysia. Strategically, such engagement could provide Singapore with both economic opportunities and working relationships with an increasingly important group of Malaysian political leaders, even if it is, for now, commercially driven state-to-state engagement. Although differing in scale and sectoral focus, these cases reinforce the broader argument that PAS-led governments increasingly view international engagement through the lens of economic development and investment attraction. Terengganu represents the most developed example of this trend, but it is not an isolated case.

CONTINUITY THROUGH NEW INSTRUMENTS

The comparison between PAS's earlier and contemporary leadership suggests that the party's foreign policy outlook has evolved rather than transformed. While earlier leaders such as Fadzil Noor, Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat and Abdul Hadi (before 2020) framed international engagement primarily through religious identity (Muslims versus non-Muslims), transnational Islamic movements, religious scholars, and solidarity with Muslim causes, the latest development has increasingly utilised (state) government institutions to pursue external engagement. This represents an expansion of the instruments through which those objectives are pursued.

This evolution has important implications for assessing how a PAS-led federal government might approach Malaysian foreign policy. The evidence suggests a nuanced possibility. A PAS-led government would emphasise Islamic diplomacy, deepen engagement with Muslim-majority countries, and continue to foreground issues such as Palestine in international forums. Likewise, PAS has consistently advocated closer cooperation among Muslim-majority countries and has viewed Malaysia as having a responsibility to contribute to the welfare of the broader ummah, including with the Taliban, despite protestations.[38] These commitments have shown remarkable resilience despite changes in leadership and governing responsibilities. However, these priorities would coexist with a pragmatic recognition of Malaysia's economic imperatives. Investment from ASEAN partners, China, Japan, South Korea and the Gulf states would remain essential to national development.

What has changed is the way PAS seeks to operationalise these commitments from international movement-building to the practical demands of governing. Earlier leaders' engagement with Islamic movements and organisations reflected PAS's position as an opposition party with limited access to the machinery of government. By contrast, leaders with executive experience, particularly in Terengganu and during PAS's participation in the federal government between 2020 and 2022, have increasingly practised development diplomacy. International engagement is now conducted through investment promotion, technology partnerships, renewable energy cooperation, infrastructure development and official government-to-government exchanges. If PAS were to attain federal power, it would likely draw lessons from its governing experience in Terengganu.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF PAS-LED FOREIGN ENGAGEMENT

In this respect, the distinction between a PAS-led government and the current administration may be less pronounced than commonly assumed. Under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia has already adopted one of the region's strongest diplomatic positions in support of Palestine while maintaining robust economic engagement with China, ASEAN partners, the

Gulf states and Western investors. A future PAS administration would therefore be more likely to evolve rather than fundamentally change Malaysia's foreign policy. The principal differences would lie in rhetorical framing and the prioritisation of Islamic solidarity, rather than in a wholesale reorientation of Malaysia's longstanding commitment.

For other countries, including Singapore, engagement with PAS should not be viewed solely through the lens of ideology. The party's old guards, the byproduct of the Islamic resurgence movement of the 1980s, are slowly phasing out, with the prominent last man standing being Abdul Hadi. As much as PAS has toned down its push for an Islamic state and implementation of hudud laws on the domestic front—mainly due to push back from non-Muslim parties in the current PN coalition, as well as East Malaysian politicians whom the party wishes to court—PAS has also downplayed its Darul Islam versus Darul Harbi dichotomy of the world. Abdul Hadi's 2020 *Islam dan Kebangsaan* attests to this omission. Beyond Abdul Hadi, PAS currently does not have any comparable religious clerics of similar standing to Yusuf Rawa, Nik Aziz, Fadzil Noor, and Harun Din. Remarkably, even the children of this generation of the ulama have left the party, such as Mujahid *Yusof Rawa*, Nik Omar *Nik Abdul Aziz*, and Faiz *Fadzil* (emphasis on their father's names).

The ulama faction nevertheless remains institutionally influential. *Murshidul Am* Hashim Jasin, who studied in Baghdad and was exposed to Muslim Brotherhood networks there, represents continuity with PAS's older Islamist generation,[39] while the Dewan Ulama chief Ahmad Yahaya, who studied Islamic Studies (Dakwah) at Universitas Islam Riau,[40] has risen through PAS's religious and state leadership structures. However, neither possesses the international stature once associated with figures such as Yusuf Rawa, Nik Aziz, Haron Din or Abdul Hadi. Their public interventions are predominantly domestic, focusing on sharia institutions, Islamic education and moral regulation. This suggests that although *Kepimpinan Ulama* remains structurally important within PAS, the party's more substantive international engagement is increasingly being carried by its International Affairs Committee and executive leaders.

As PAS continues to govern strategically important states, maintaining pragmatic channels of communication is likely to yield greater dividends than isolation. The greater concern for foreign governments and investors may therefore not be PAS's conservatism per se, but whether a PAS-led administration would prioritise governance reform and economic competitiveness over ideology.

ENDNOTES

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[2] Existing scholarship has begun to address this question. For example, Yilmaz and Shukri argue that PAS's brief tenure in the federal government (2020–2022) demonstrated that it was largely a pragmatic governing party with little intention of introducing radical policy changes, except in areas relating to entertainment and moral policy. See Yilmaz, I. & Shukri, S. (2024). Seven Decades of PAS in Malaysian Politics. In: Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-4343-8_3. Others, however, would argue that these forms of moral policing are themselves radical, particularly where they affect non-Muslim Malaysians. Terengganu's recent sharia policies have prioritised public morality through measures regulating gender interaction, dress, entertainment, and personal conduct. Sisters in Islam. (2025, May 15). What Is the Real Intention Behind Terengganu's Morality Policies? Call for Reflection and

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[3] PAS did articulate a clearer blueprint in its 2018 general election manifesto, which set out positions on Malaysia's international relations, including strengthening engagement with ASEAN and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), maintaining relations with major powers, and advancing the interests of the Muslim world. See Abdul Muein Abadi, "Kuasa Negara dalam Manifesto PAS," 1Media.my, 20 March 2018, https://www.1media.my/2018/03/kuasa-negara-dalam-manifesto-pas.html

[4] The ulama takeover of the party could have been inspired by the Iranian revolution of 1979, led by the Shia' ulama Ayatollah Khomeini, overthrowing the Shah of Iran. See Iqbal Siddiqui, "Introduction: Imam Khomeini in contemporary Muslim history," in *Imam Khomeini: Life, Thought and Legacy,* ed. Abdar Rahman Koya, 1-19, (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2009), 11

[5] The way the party is organised bears some resemblance to that of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which has a Shura General Committee to advise the Guidance Office, headed by the Supreme Guide See Eric Trager, *Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 53-54

[6] Abdul Hadi Awang, *Fahaman & Ideologi Umat Islam* (PTS, 2008)

[7] Abdul Hadi Awang, *Bagaimana Islam Memerintah Negara* (PTS, 2009), 206-208

[8] See Norshahril Saat, *The Muslim Religious Elite in Contemporary Malaysia: A Study of Dominant Ideas and orientation of Prominent Religious Personalities and Their Impact*, (MA Thesis, NUS, 20102020)

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[10] This claim came from Hadi Awang's speech known as Amanat Haji Hadi, as further explained by former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad in 2017. http://lib.perdana.org.my/PLF/CheDet/Che%20Det_2017/December/07122017.pdf. In response, Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar as PAS' vice president denied that Hadi ever called Umno as kafir. See Abd Hadi Che Awang. (2019, September 12). Tiada keperluan tarik balik tuduhan UMNO parti kafir - Ahmad Samsuri. Astro Awani. https://www.astroawani.com/berita-politik/tiada-keperluan-tarik-balik-tuduhan-umno-parti-kafir-ahmad-samsuri-217350

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