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ABSTRACT

Consecutive terror attacks and the suicide bombings at the J.W. Marriott Hotel and Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Jakarta on July 17th, 2009, indicate that terrorism remains a serious security threat to the world’s biggest Muslim country, Indonesia. This study attempts to analyze the politics of the Indonesian government’s response to terrorism during the period 2001—2009. It asks three interrelated questions. Firstly, according to the government’s perspective, who was responsible for the major bomb attacks in Indonesia? Secondly, what sort of counterterrorism policies did the government make? Finally, what are the main factors that shaped the government’s counterterrorism policy during that period?

To explain the Indonesian government’s counterterrorism policy, this study adopts “the logic of two-level games” (Putnam, 1988) as the theoretical framework. The “two-level games” perspective suggests that government policy is a function of incentives and constraints both at the international and the domestic level. As gatekeepers between the two levels, governments simultaneously process these interdependent incentives and constraints in their policy decision-making. They balance between potentially conflicting international and domestic pressures and attempt to formulate and implement policies that satisfy both. The data used in this research are mostly derived from official documents, direct interviews with government officials and the secondary sources (books and journals) on terrorism and counterterrorism.

This study shows that, although it never banned Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah (AJAI) because of domestic considerations, the government believes that the AJAI is a terrorist network mostly responsible for the consecutive bombings in Indonesia. Secondly, different from policy of the previous regime, the government has mostly relied on a “law-enforcement approach” in denting the terrorist network which has been incrementally complemented with an “ideological approach” to fight religious extremism. Finally, the pathway of Indonesia’s counterterrorism policy was shaped by contradictory pressures originating from the Muslim community and human rights groups in the domestic political environment, on one hand, as well as international pressures originating from the United States and its allies, on the other hand. Societal pressures constrain the government’s freedom to manoeuvre in adopting policy, whereas international pressures bolster the government’s determination and capability to fight terrorism. The government seeks to achieve a balance between the two conflicting pressures and attempts to adopt and implement policies that satisfy both conflicting forces.

This study attempts to fill the gap in the existing works on terrorism and counterterrorism in Indonesia. It analyzes the core elements of the government’s counterterrorism policy and locates them within the context of contradictory pressures originating from societal/domestic political forces and international forces.
A. INTRODUCTION

A.1. The Rise of Terrorist Threat

_Terrorist Attacks_

This study investigates the course of the Indonesian government’s counterterrorism policy during the 2001—2009 period. Terrorism as security problem has not disappeared in Indonesia as indicated by the suicide bomb attacks against J.W. Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotel in Jakarta on July 17th, 2009, and previous consecutive major attacks in various cities in Indonesia. Major terrorist attacks from 2000 to 2009 can be seen in the table below (Sources: Kompas, Tempo, Jawa Pos).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Main Target</th>
<th>Victims</th>
<th>Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30/Dec/2000</td>
<td>Churches, priests, the residence of the Philippine Ambassador (11 cities)</td>
<td>9 dead, 120 wounded</td>
<td>Bombs attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/Oct/2002</td>
<td>Foreign Tourists at Paddy’s Bar and Sari’s Club and the US Consulate (Bali)</td>
<td>202 dead, 300 wounded</td>
<td>Car Bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/Aug/2003</td>
<td>Foreigners in the J.W. Marriott Hotel (Jakarta)</td>
<td>13 dead, 149 wounded</td>
<td>Suicide Car Bomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/Sep/2004</td>
<td>The Australian High Commission (Jakarta)</td>
<td>10 dead, 182 wounded</td>
<td>Suicide Car Bomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/Oct/2005</td>
<td>Foreign Tourists at Raja’s Restaurant and Jimbaran Beach (Bali)</td>
<td>22 dead, 135 wounded</td>
<td>Suicide Bomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/Jul/2009</td>
<td>Foreigners at the J.W. Marriott &amp; Ritz Carlton Hotels (Jakarta)</td>
<td>9 dead, 53 wounded</td>
<td>Suicide Bomb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Terrorism“ Defined_

The word “terrorism” is derived from the Latin word _terrere_, meaning to frighten, to terrify, to scare away, or to deter. “Terrorism” has no precise or widely accepted definition and is one of the most controversial concepts in social sciences (Kegley, 2003:16). To define it is intricate because the meaning has changed so frequently within social and historical contexts over the past two hundred years (Whitaker, 2001:5). The definition of the term also depends on political power, that is to say, government can increase their power when they label opponents as “terrorists.” (White, 2002:6).

It is noteworthy that most of the definitions agree that acts of terrorism are “immoral and abhorred.” However, the controversies have emerged on this point since
the definers seek to exclude groups that they wish to support or to include groups that they wish to denounce. Central to the disagreement is the categorization of whether political violence is “lawful” and “legitimate” or “unlawful” and “illegitimate” (Wardlaw, 1989:4).

Apart from those controversies and variety of meanings, however, a clear definition of the term is required not only for academic purposes but also for practical purposes. To fight against a terrorist group, for instance, we must first of all be very clear whether the organization we are fighting against is “a terrorist group.” Ganor's (2005) definition of terrorism is useful here. He proposed a simple definition of terrorism as follows, “terrorism is a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians in order to achieve political goals” (Ganor, 2005:17).

According to Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Laws (Law No. 15/2003), the basic definition of the criminal act of “terrorism” is,

“Any person who intentionally uses violence or the threat of violence to create a widespread atmosphere of terror or fear in the general population or to create mass casualties, by forcibly taking the freedom, life or property of others or causing damage or destruction to vital strategic installations or the environment or public facilities or international facilities” (Law No. 15/2003, Section 6).

A.2. Objectives

The objectives of the present study are to investigate three interrelated issues related to Indonesia’s counterterrorism policy; it asks three interrelated questions. Firstly, according to the government’s perspective, who was responsible for the major bomb attacks in Indonesia? Secondly, what sort of counterterrorism policies did the government make? Finally, what are the main factors that shaped the government’s counterterrorism policy during that period?

A.3. Literature Review

The production of scholarly works on terrorism and counterterrorism has increased considerably since the tragedy of 9/11 and Bush’s subsequent “global war on terror.” Correspondingly, the works on Southeast Asia are also abundant and can generally be classified into three major themes (see, Hamilton-Hart, 2005). First, who the terrorists in Southeast Asia and Indonesia are (e.g. Gunaratna 2003, and Abuza 2003, Ressa, 2003; and the International Crisis Group, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003, 2004, 2005,
Second, regional terrorist groups and their connection with the global terror network, Al-Qaeda (e.g. Chalk 2002; Abuza 2003; Gunaratna 2003: 232-72; Ressa 2003). Third, the root causes of terrorism. According to Hamilton-Hart (2005), the works on the root causes of terrorism can be classified into two type of explanation: religion-driven explanations (e.g. Desker 2002, Abuza 2003, Rabasa 2003, Millard 2004 and Ramakrishna 2004. And, politics-driven explanations (e.g. Gershman 2002, Putzel 2003, and Leheny 2005:15).

From the review of the major literature on terrorism and counterterrorism above, it is apparent that works which specifically focus their analyses on Indonesia’s counterterrorism policy remain rare but by no means non-existent. For instance, William Wise’s Indonesia’s War on Terror has investigated the threat of terrorism and Indonesia’s policy response (Wise, 2005). Using Ganor’s framework, Tumanggor’s Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Policy has also investigated the efficacy of Indonesia’s counterterrorism policy (Tumanggor, 2006). Unfortunately, neither of the works yet provides systematic analyses on “why the government did what it did.” Similarly, Smith’s The Politics of Negotiating the Terrorist Problem in Indonesia also investigates Indonesia’s response to terrorism (Smith, 2005). Unfortunately, his analysis focuses only on the domestic political environment and neglects international factors to explain the shaping of the government’s counterterrorism policy. To fill the gap in the existing works on Indonesia’s counterterrorism policy, therefore, a systematic analysis on the government counterterrorism policy in the context of domestic and international politics is required.

A.4. Theoretical Framework
This study begins by proposing three central and interrelated arguments. Firstly, the government is a key agency in the fight against terrorism in Indonesia. Secondly, the government responds to terrorism by incrementally adopting counterterrorism policy measures. Thirdly, an explanation of the shaping of the government’s counterterrorism policy should be located within the context of the domestic and international political environments.

Scholars agree that international and domestic politics are highly interconnected in current world politics. A prominent scholar in international relations writes aptly, “in a rapidly changing, interdependent world the separation of national and international affairs is problematic…” and, “…domestic and foreign affairs have
always formed a seamless web” (Rosenau, 1997:4). Analytically, it can be shown that hard and fast boundaries cannot be drawn between domestic policy and foreign policy: between what happens at the national level and what happens at the global level (Rosenau, 1969).

In this interdependent world, however, it does not mean that “the state” will be nudged aside as authority shifts in diverse directions. Instead, the state remains a key agency and plays a strategic role in domestic as well as in international affairs. Having a ‘Janus-face,’ the state is both a domestic and international actor (Hobson, 1997:11). Metaphorically, one might think of the state as a bidirectional valve, responding to whichever pressure is greater, sometimes releasing pressure from the domestic into the international, at other times releasing it from the international into the domestic (Ikenberry, 1986:76). Another scholar also suggests that the state is “the (shifting) accommodation between these counter-pressures” (Clark, 1999:66) and other scholars call the phenomenon “intermestic” politics (Wittkopf and Kegley, 2004: 64).

How are international politics, domestic politics and government policy interconnected theoretically? “The logic of two-level games” developed by Robert D. Putnam provides a useful theoretical perspective to explain how domestic politics and international relations get entangled (Putnam, 1988:427-60). The “two-level games” perspective suggests that government policy is a function of incentives and constraints both at the international and the domestic level. As gatekeepers between the two levels, governments simultaneously process these interdependent incentives and constraints in their policy decision-making. They balance between potentially conflicting international and domestic pressures and attempt to formulate and implement policies that satisfy both. At the international level, governmental policies are shaped by the dynamics of international political events and developments as well as by the preferences, power, and negotiating strategies of other governments. At the domestic level, the governmental room for manoeuvre is constrained by the preferences and political resources of those actors on which a government depends for political support. Domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups (Putnam, 1988: 427-60).
B. THE GOVERNMENT'S PERCEPTION ON TERRORISM

Before investigating the course of the government’s counterterrorism policy, at the outset, it is essential to scrutinize the government’s perceptions of the nature of the security threat. The guiding question here is: who was responsible for the repeated bomb attacks in Indonesia according to the government’s perspective? The issue was controversial and politically sensitive not only within the Muslim community but also within government circles in Indonesia. In the world’s biggest Muslim country, “conspiracy theories” were rampant after the Bali Bombing of 2002. These speculative” theories” posited that the bombings were designed by a foreign intelligence agency to undermine the rising of Islamic movements in Indonesia (e.g. Akaha, 2002; Junaedi, 2003; Suripto, 2003; Maulani, 2003).

Although Megawati government (2001—2004) and Yudhoyono administration (2004—2009) never proscribe it for domestic political reasons, they believe that the Bali bombing 2002 and consecutive major bomb attacks were mostly perpetrated by Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah (AJAI), that collaborated with group of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), that have network/links with global radical movement, Al-Qaeda (Coordinating Ministry of Political, Law and Security Affairs, 2006:18).

The AJAI aspires to establish Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara comprising the southern parts of Southeast Asia. Coordinating Ministry of Political, Law and Security Affairs (2006:18) clearly states that “In the investigation and due process, the authority discovers that terrorist action has political and ideological motives to
establish *Daulah Islamiyah* comprising mostly Southeast Asian region based on *Shari’ah* law, as stated in the PUPJI. The motives and goals are actually the continuation of the [Muslim] radical movement dated back in the 1950s known as DI [Darul Islam] that aims at establishing NII (*Negara Islam Indonesia*) based on the Islamic *Shari’ah*.”

According to the government’s perspective, the AJAI’s motivation for the bombings operations was global solidarity and *jihad* against the injustice and oppression in many part of the world perpetrated by “the enemy of Islam,” i.e. the US and its allies. The former Indonesian Police Chief, Da’i Bachtiar (2005: 37-8), clearly points out the motives of the AJAI members based on the confession of the captured terrorists. *First*, the global injustice in contemporary world politics, especially the policy of the US and its allies against Muslims in some parts of the world. The global injustices lead to a global Muslim solidarity to defend Muslim brethrens. *Second*, the oppression of the Thai government of Muslims in Southern Thailand and of the Philippine government of Muslims in southern Philippines. The oppression has caused Muslim solidarity at the regional level. *Thirdly*, the religious conflict in Ambon and Poso also created Muslim solidarity at the national level. In a nutshell, the political injustice and oppression of Muslims at the global, regional, and local level has encouraged the motivation of the AJAI members to wreak revenge and wage violent *jihad* against the enemy of Islam and the infidel oppressors (Bachtiar, 2005: 37-8).


C. GOVERNMENT’S COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY

The government has long history of fighting against Muslim insurgency which dated back to the 1950s, that is, the rebellion movement of *Darul Islam* or *Negara Islam Indonesia* under S.M. Kartosuwiryo (Nieuwenhuije, 1950). The previous government’s policy response toward the insurgency relied mainly on militaristic and intelligence approach. However, the post New Order governments believe that previous approach failed because it is evident that the problem re-emerged under the banner of *Komando Jihad* in the 1970s. After the downfall of the New Order, moreover, Muslim extremism and terrorism also re-emerged in the form of *Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah* and other related
splinter groups of *Darul Islam* movement (Coordinating Ministry of Political, Law and Security Affairs, 2006:18).

Before the Bali bombing, however, the post New Order governments remained indecisive and had not yet realized the existence of a terrorist network within the country (Abuza, 2003: 19). After the Bali bombing 2002, the government began to admit a bitter reality of terrorism threat (ICG, 2002, 6-7). Then, the Indonesian government adopted counter terrorism policy that broadly can be categorized into two main approach: Legal Approach (“hard approach”) and an “Ideological” approach (“soft approach”) (Mbai, interview, 26 May 2009).

**C.1. Legal Approach (“Hard Approach”)**

The Megawati government (2001—2004) began to take determined policy measures after the Bali Bombing 2002 by adopting a “law-enforcement approach.” This approach departs significantly from the previous New Order governments’ that relied heavily on militaristic and intelligence approach. It means that current counterterrorism policy mostly relies upon effective police work rather than military force. The government’s law-enforcement approach is aimed at fighting physically the terrorist network by destroying individual terrorist cells, their leaders, and their funding and logistic pipelines as well as their immediate support network. In particular, this law-enforcement approach consists of two main measures, *firstly*, the government issued a number of laws, i.e., the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (GRL) No. 1/2002 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts and GRL No. 2/2002 to make GRL No. 1/2002 retroactively applicable to the Bali Bombings (Wise, 2005; Juwono, 2006).

*Secondly*, the government also reorganized state apparatus to implement the law. Particularly, it issued a Presidential Instruction No. 4/2002 that authorized the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security to coordinate steps to fight terrorism (Wise, 2005). Following this, Presidential Instruction No. 5/2002 authorized the National Intelligence Agency to coordinate intelligence activities. The Megawati Government also issued Presidential Instruction No. 4/2002 to establish the Desk under the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam), named the Counter-terrorism Coordinating Desk (Wise, 2005: 38).

Most importantly, the government also reorganized the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) by forming the Anti-Terror and Bomb Task Force (ATB) and
Detachment 88 (Densus 88) to strengthen its capacity in denting the terrorist network (Wise, 2005). Based on scientific crime investigation, the police could identify accurately the perpetrators of the Bali Bombing 2002 and other consecutive terror attacks so that they could arrest and bring to justice persons responsible for the attacks. Up to the year 2009, for instance, the Special Task Force and Densus 88 have captured and brought to justice more than 464 terrorists and killed a number of notorious terrorists.

The Yudoyono administration (2004—2009) continued and extended the previous government’s policy by adopting an “ideological” approach (“soft-approach”) to battle against religious extremism (Mbai, 2007). The main reason behind this approach is that countering terrorism requires not only the application of law enforcement measures against individual terrorist cells, their leaders, their funding and logistic pipelines as well as their immediate support network. There is also pressing need for the government to neutralize the ‘extremist ideology’ behind the mind of terrorist group and to prevent it from spreading into a wider community (Ramakrishna, 2006: 113).

Four government’s policy measures are relevant to the approach: Firstly, to neutralize religious radicalism among imprisoned terrorists, the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) conducts a “de-radicalization” program which aims at converting imprisoned terrorists into moderate Muslims who would also preach moderation to their colleagues (ICG, 2007). Secondly, a semi-governmental organization, Majelis Ulama Indonesia, also plays crucial role in this approach by speaking out in the public and issuing fatwa haram against the acts of terrorism (Kumpulan Fatwa-Fatwa Aktual MUI, 2006:164-5).

Thirdly, The government also build strategic partnership with moderate Muslim community represented by Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama that play as the bulwark against radicalism and extremism. This partnership with the Muslim community is to emphasize moderate teachings and non-violent resolutions to religious conflict through massive religious education campaigns (Mbai, 2007:1). However, because of societal resistance, the department of religious affairs shows its hesitancy to play major role in the fight against extremism.
D. POLITICS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY

To explain the course of the government counterterrorism policy, the next sub-section will analyze the societal and international determinants. It will demonstrate that the course of Indonesia’s counterterrorism policy was shaped by contradictory pressures originating from Muslim community and human rights groups in the domestic politics on one hand as well as international pressures originating from the United States and its allies on the other hand. The government seeks to balance between the two conflicting pressures and attempt to adopt and implement counterterrorism policies that satisfy both societal and international forces.

D.1. The Impact of Societal Pressures

Explaining the direction of the Indonesian government’s counter-terrorism policy cannot be detached from societal pressures originating from the domestic environment. In particular, the downfall of the Suharto’s authoritarian rule in May 1998 has brought about dramatic political changes in the domestic political landscape. The installation of a transitional President, B.J. Habibie, was the beginning for a political opening and the restoration of a constitutional democracy. About a month after Suharto’s resignation, an announcement by the home affairs minister that political parties could be freely established was followed by a mushrooming of political parties (Suryadinata, 2002:74-85; Ananta, 2005), including Islamic political parties. Genuinely free and fair general elections were successfully held every five years, namely in the years 1999, 2004 and 2009. The once docile and “rubber-stamp” parliament during the New Order era is now very active and powerful (Ziegenhain, 2008:70-100). The role of the military in domestic politics—previously the kingmaker—has been significantly reduced (Hunna, 2003; Rinakit, 2003). The mass media, including blooming “Islamic revivalist” media, gained their freedom without the government’s control and restrictions. Waged under the spirit of “reformasi” (reform) the public engaged freely in any political activities with virtually no structural and cultural barrier.

The dramatic political changes have significant implications on the government’s counterterrorism policy. Firstly, the restoration of democracy in the world’s biggest Muslim majority country has created an opportunity for the resurgence of Islam as a political force, indicated by the rise of Islamic political parties, such as, PKS, PBB, and “New” PPP (Haris, 2004; Baswedan 2004) as well as Islamic revivalist groups,
such as, FKAWJ, MMI, HTI, and FPI (Zada, 2003; Turmuzi and Sihbudi, 2003; Fealy, 2004; Abuza, 2007). On the issue of terrorism that emerged since 9/11, these Muslim groups tend to perceive distrustfully that “the war against terrorism” is a kind of “fight against Islam.” It is important to note that their sceptical perceptions on terrorism are often shared by other sections of the Muslim community in general. Understandably, the rises of these groups have significant implications on Indonesia’s counterterrorism policy.

Secondly, the restoration of democracy has also provided space for civil society to emerge: human rights defender groups, such as KONTRAS, Imparsial, and Muslim Lawyer Team (TPM). Human rights groups monitor actively human rights abuses committed by the previous regime and have expressed their serious apprehension that some elements of the government’s counter-terrorism policy could undermine human rights, civil liberty and democratic principles in an emerging democratic polity (Marpaung and Al-Araf, 203; Hicks & McClintock, 2005; Lindsey, 2009). As expected, the rises of these groups also have significant implications on the government’s counterterrorism policy.

In particular, the critiques and the scepticism among those societal groups over the nature of terrorism and counter-terrorism have turned out to be constraints for the government’s freedom to manoeuvre in adopting and implementing certain of its counter-terrorism policy measures. In order to maintain the support from the Muslim community and to sustain the political coalition with Islamic political parties in the parliament, the Megawati (2001—2004) and Yudhoyono administrations (2004—2009) tried to compromise with their sceptical perceptions. Furthermore, because of being monitored and criticized by human rights defender groups, both consecutive governments also refrained from adopting policy measures that could undermine human rights and civil liberty. While the authorities have dented the terrorist network considerably, they have also faced societal constraints in several policy measures, such as, acting against the alleged “spiritual leader” of AJAI, outlawing the AJAI, developing vigorously an “ideological” approach, and adopting a more draconian anti-terrorism law. In brief, the pressures originating from those societal groups have turned out to be constraints for the government’s freedom to manoeuvre in adopting and implementing certain counterterrorism policy measures.
D.2. The Impact of International Pressures

Furthermore, explaining the course of the Indonesian government’s counterterrorism policy cannot also be detached from pressures originating from the international political environment. In the contemporary world politics, the United States was the sole super power that declared the so-called “Global War on Terror” in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy. The Bush administration assertively demanded the international community to take part in the fight against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, initiated regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as exerting pressures on reluctant countries. No country can escape from the influences of the new global political environment, including Indonesia.

In Southeast Asian region as the “Second Front” (Rabasa, 2004), the US and its allies began to exert pressures on the “hesitant” Indonesian government to fight terrorism since the 9/11 and intensified them since the Bali Bombing 2002. A combination of instruments—in the form of intensive diplomatic channels (Romaniuk, 2006:163), economic inducements (Lum, 2008:18), Anti Terrorism Assistance (Wise, 2005:69), as well as the promise to lift the military embargo (Rabasa, 2004:395)—were used to compel this “reluctant partner” to follow the American lead.

The US and its allies urged the government to take crucial counterterrorism measures, among others including, to adopt anti-terrorism laws (Corben, 2002); to arrest the suspected terrorists and the “JI spiritual leader” wanted by the US (McBeth, 2004; Tempointeraktif, 30 December 2004); and to proscribe the AJAI as a terrorist organization (Sydney Morning Herald, 23 March 2005).

International pressure shaped significantly the course of the government’s counterterrorism policy. Due to mounting pressure, particularly after the Bali Bombing 2002, the hesitant government became resolute in denting the terror network. Despite the widespread skepticism among the Muslim community regarding who was the “real” actor behind the consecutive bombings, the government quickly issued Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (GRL) of anti-terrorism as the legal framework and reorganized the police to respond more effectively in destroying the terror network in Indonesia. The issuance of the GRL, which was later passed by the parliament, indicated the government’s resolute effort to fight terrorism.

Moreover, with the US Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), the Indonesian Police Chief established and developed anti-terror police units (i.e. ATB Task Force and
Detachment 88) that have significantly bolstered the government’s capability to dent the terrorist network. Up to the year 2009, for instance, the Special Task Force and Densus 88 have captured more than 464 terrorists (Kompas, 3 Oct 2009) and killed a number of notorious terrorists, including Dr. Azahari bin Husin in 2005 and Noordin M. Top in 2009.

E. CONCLUSION

This study has shown that, although it never banned Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah (AJAI) because of domestic considerations, the government believes that the AJAI is a terrorist network mostly responsible for the consecutive bombings in Indonesia. Secondly, different from policy of the previous regime, the government has mostly relied on a “law-enforcement approach” in denting the terrorist network which has been incrementally complemented with an “ideological approach” to fight religious extremism. Finally, the pathway of Indonesia’s counterterrorism policy was shaped by contradictory pressures originating from the Muslim community and human rights groups in the domestic political environment, on one hand, as well as international pressures originating from the United States and its allies, on the other hand. Societal pressures constrain the government’s freedom to manoeuvre in adopting policy, whereas international pressures bolster the government’s determination and capability to fight terrorism. The government seeks to achieve a balance between the two conflicting pressures and attempts to adopt and implement policies that satisfy both conflicting forces.

This study attempts to fill the gap in the existing works on terrorism and counterterrorism in Indonesia. It analyzes the core elements of the government’s counterterrorism policy and locates them within the context of contradictory pressures originating from societal/domestic political forces and international forces.

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