

## **Demonising Demonstration: (De) Legitimization Strategies Through Emotions in the Speeches of Hosni Mubarak and Ben Ali**

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**Abstract:** From an interdisciplinary framework anchored theoretically in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and using Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), this article proposes to explain the (de) legitimization strategies employed by Arab leaders and to study the linguistic choices associated with those schemes. The strategy of legitimization through emotions (one of the five strategies of legitimization proposed by [1]) is applied in the analysis of the spoken languages of two chosen Arab leaders; former president of Tunisia, Ben Ali (FPBA) and one-time president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak (FPHM) in which both addressed the subject of demonstrations during the Arab Spring. Both FPBA and FPHM delivered, respectively, three speeches while facing the Arab Spring demonstrations. The analyses pay special attention to whether the use of the (de) legitimization strategy through emotions and the usage of language are consistent or whether they evolve from the first to the second and to the third speech. The key findings of this study reveal that both presidents (FPBA and FPHM) portrayed themselves positively and the demonstrators negatively, through the choice of (de)legitimization strategies. In addition, this research also discovered that the linguistic choices made by the leaders clearly indicate that relational values are evident in choosing vocabulary and grammar especially in those of FPHM. Above all, it became apparent that the strategies and the linguistic choices of both presidents evolved throughout their three speeches, but the evolutions of those of FPBA are more obvious than those of FBHM.

**Key words:** Arab Spring • Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) • Demonstration • Legitimization and (De)Legitimization Strategy • Political Discourse

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### **INTRODUCTION**

Mobilizing support in combating demonstrations in a country requires ‘some shared agreement and common commitment’ [2:1014] among people in society to make them believe and endorse the ruling regime. In this regard, leaders of the ruling government play a vital role to develop mutual understanding between the government and its citizens in dealing with demonstration that can lead to the fall of the ruling government. In this respect, the linguistic ‘struggle’ of leaders in managing such crisis in real life settings provides the natural data that can be examined from a linguistic perspective. Even so, less attention has been paid on the discursive strategy choices of the leaders in managing the crisis of demonstrations. To address this problem, ‘interdisciplinary discourse-oriented approach’ [3: 593] was adopted to investigate

strategic crisis management from the linguistic perspective and to explore the discourse in use during the Arab Spring.

In socio-political perspective, there is a basic conflict of interest between the ruling government and citizens, i.e. the interest in maintaining power of the ruling party’s side and the interest in obtaining equal treatment from the citizen’s side. This leads to the scenario of ‘one competes another’. On one hand, this competition between the ruling government and the rebels among the citizen can be easily realized through the discourses produced and distributed by them. On the other hand, demonstrations are seen as a sound outcome of this everlasting ‘battle’ between the two groups.

This study considers demonstrations as a ‘mass discourse’ which can influence the perception of people – locally and abroad - towards the image and reputation of the group targeted by demonstrators. Meanwhile, the

speeches of the leaders responding to this 'mass discourse' are considered as 'counter-discourse'. While facing threat to the reputation and risk of losing power, leaders produce counter-discourse in order to influence the salient audience to disbelieve the 'discourse' of another party (i.e. Demonstrators). This is because the purpose of political leaders is to preserve their hegemony, power through different means and particularly through discourse [1: 783]. Hence, this study looks at language not just as a tool for communication, but also as a 'survival tool' for the politician.

One of the most newsworthy demonstration events during the past recent years is most probably the Arab Spring demonstration. While facing these demonstrations, the Arab leaders used different strategies in their languages to convince their people that they are the appropriate leaders and their conclusions and suggestions worth to be watched. At the same time, they attempt to create the 'bad' image of 'others'. In order to achieve this, they choose certain words and grammar to accomplish their mission and to make salient audience involved and engaged in their discourses. Arab leaders used their access to power and control the public media to legitimize their own leadership and (de) legitimize the demonstrations. [1] defines legitimization as "*the process by which speakers accredit or license a type of social behaviour. In this respect, legitimization is a justification of a behaviour (mental or physical)*" (782). Reyes argues that the process of legitimization occurs by offering parameters that explain our social actions, ideas and sentiments related to a destination such as seeking our interlocutor's support and approval motivated by certain causes such as receiving or keeping power. [1: 782].

The concept of legitimization and (de)legitimization in discourse was proposed by [4]. Van Leeuwen underlines four key categories of legitimations; authority legitimization (reference to personal and impersonal authority, expertise and role modelling), rationalization (refer to the ends and uses of institutionalized social action), moral evaluation (reference to a value system) and mythopoesis (narratives that reward legitimate actions) [4: 92]. These categories have been applied by [5] while analysing the justifications of political officials for rejecting an immigrant petition to be reunited with their relatives in Austria. [6] utilized the four (de) legitimization categories of Van Leeuwen with Wodak's five discursive strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation while conducting analysis of the (de) legitimization of the actors and the actions involved in Iran's nuclear power contention in the media discourse namely The Economist.

[1] developed the categories of legitimization proposed by [4] and proposed five strategies of legitimization: legitimization through emotions; legitimization through a hypothetical future; legitimization through rationality; voice of expertise and altruism. He integrated five discursive strategies (referential strategies or nomination strategies; predication strategies; argumentative strategies; perspectivation, framing or discourse representation; intensification or mitigation) proposed by [7] into the legitimization through emotions.

This study aims to examine the (de) legitimization strategy found in the Arab Spring political discourse delivered by former president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak (FPHM) and former president of Tunisia Ben Ali (FPBA) to their people during the Arab Spring in order to elicit people's support to combat the demonstrations. Both delivered three speeches respectively, while grappling with the demonstrations and demonstrators. This study sees speeches of Arab leaders toward demonstrators during the Arab Spring as a fertile source of natural data from which a number of important issues can be looked into. The first of these is to analyse (de) legitimization process in the light of five strategies developed by [1] in which he integrates the categories of legitimization by [4] and [7] strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-the presentation into his model. Secondly, this study examines the pragmatic and linguistic features of those strategies adopted by the two former presidents in order to invoke emotions behind the justification of the (de) legitimization. This study also explains the 'consistency' and 'evolution' of strategies deployed by these former presidents while addressing their audience throughout their three speeches. In doing so, this study demonstrates how the immediate societal and political factors shape the discursive practice and the language choices during the Arab Spring.

**The Arab Spring and Discourse Analysis:** The Arab Spring became an interesting socio-political phenomenon that attracted researchers to investigate matters related to this phenomenon from several positions. [8] for example, investigated the role of social media during the Arab Spring by answering the question whether participations in social media increased the number of protests or the number of protests increased the participations in social media. [9] attempted to reveal the promises and perils of the democratization process of three earlier cases of the Arab Spring (Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco). [10] on the other hand tried to study the relationship between the Arab Spring and the Chinese Winter to identify the

similarities and differences of social and economic driving factors that lead to the fall of Egypt and Tunisia and north of China.

From the linguistic perspective, one of the initial studies on the Arab Spring and critical discourse analysis (CDA) is that of [11]. The aim of the study was a person deixis analysis of the last three speeches of former president of Tunisia, Ben Ali. This study reveals that Ben Ali used WE and THEY in his two earlier speeches before shifting to I-YOU and WE-THEY which could be explained as an effort in reproducing power abuse, dominance and inequality by way of making a political concession. Maalej in some ways includes the analyses of negative other-presentation and positive self-presentation through the pronoun choices.

[12] suggested that there were breaks from an autocratic to a democratic discourse by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and President Zine El- Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia to address the public unrest. He identified that both former presidents used – in term of structure and strategy - the patterns: blame and denial, acknowledging reality, the emphasis on individual achievements and pledges of drastic reform and change.

Although these studies are useful in providing insights into discursive strategies adopted by former presidents of the Arab countries, while facing demonstrators, they provide too little insights into the aspect of legitimization and (de) legitimization strategies by these leaders in their speeches and the pragma-linguistic devices through which they are realized in the process of managing demonstrations. To address this gap, this study attempts to resolve the following queries:

- What (de) legitimization strategies did FPBA and FPHM adopt in their speeches to evoke the emotions of their audience?
- How did FPBA and FPHM employ the pragma-linguistic devices in their (de) legitimization strategies?

## **MATERIALS AND METHODS**

The data for this study are the speeches of the former president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak (FPHM) and the former president of Tunisia, Ben Ali (FPBA). All speeches were presented as a response to the mass demonstrations during the Arab Spring in the respective states. Coincidentally, both of them delivered three speeches each in response to the crisis. The three speeches of FBHM were delivered on 29<sup>th</sup> January 2011, 1<sup>st</sup> February

2011 and 10<sup>th</sup> February 2011. Meanwhile FPBA delivered his speeches on 29<sup>th</sup> December 2010, 10<sup>th</sup> January 2011 and 13<sup>th</sup> January 2011. The former president of Egypt Hosni Mubarak (FPHM) and the former president of Tunisia Ben Ali (FPBA) were chosen because they were among the leaders who faced the demonstration's threat and they both handled the demonstrations using similar strategies within a similar time frame i.e. from December 2010 to February 2011. To note the significance of the affair, all six speeches -three of FPHM and three of FPBA- were propagated by most TV stations in Egypt and Tunisia and were major news events. All of those speeches can now be accessed from the YouTube website.

The leaders' discursive strategies will be studied and the total length of the data is 1 hour 7 minutes and 36 seconds, representing more than 5151 words. The detail of hours and word count of each voice communication of these former presidents are as follows:

While this may appear to be a small corpora, this study provides the genre of 'managing demonstrations' discourses in their specific context, i.e. Arab Spring through the lens of critical discourse analysis (CDA). It explains a specific social phenomenon through an in-depth analysis rather than studying a huge size of context-less corpora to make generalizations. In this regard, the scholars of CDA said that CDA studies 'mostly deal with only small corpora' [13: 25]. This is because the aim of CDA is to investigate the object under study with multilevel analyses to see complex social phenomena [7]. In fact, a lot of studies carried out in the CDA only dealt with small size data relating to specific contexts, for instance, the study of [1] dealt with two political speeches to investigate legitimization strategy and the study of [14] looked at only one political speech in order to investigate political apology.

In carrying out this inquiry, the legitimization strategies developed and applied by [1] were used. One of the five strategies of legitimization of [1] namely legitimization through emotions and five discursive strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation developed by [7] within her discourse, historical approach (DHA) have been integrated and applied to this study while investigating the (de) legitimization process in the speeches of FPBA and FPHM. The five strategies of (de) legitimization as elaborated by Reyes are: (a) legitimization through emotions; (b) legitimization through a hypothetical future; (c) legitimization through rationality; (d) voice of expertise and (e) altruism. Meanwhile the strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation are: (a)

referential strategies or nomination strategies; (b) strategies of predication; (c) strategies of argumentation; (d) strategies of perspectivation, framing or discourse representation; (e) intensification or mitigation.

In order to examine the relation between social practice and discourse as well as the relation between the evolution of social-political factors and the evolution of discursive strategies, this study paid close attention to the linguistic choices employed in the messages. Equally in the study of [1], this study adopted tools from Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) to examine the linguistic representation of (de) legitimization in the Arab Spring political discourse. This study argues that such multi-methods are required in order to answer the research questions postulated. The use of multi-level approach and multi-methods in CDA are highly recommended by [3].

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The analysis of this study is presented in two sections. First, the strategy of (de) legitimization through emotions in the Arab Spring political discourse examines with specific attention to pragmatic and semantic features. Second, this study demonstrates the consistency and the evolution of the use of legitimization and (de) legitimization strategies and the linguistic properties deployed by FPBA and FPHM.

**(De) Legitimization Through Emotions:** In handling demonstration and building people's support, FPBA and FPHM engaged in emotional discussions with the emphasis on the moral aspect of the demonstrations and demonstrators. Both FPBA and FPHM used the emotion evoking strategies. Pointing to problems such as the implications of demonstrations to the people and the country was an essential part of both leaders' campaign to combat the demonstrations.

**Implications to People:** FPBA and FPHM stressed the problems of demonstrations to the people such as the implication to their life, to their daily routines and their feelings to deal with the moral basis of the demonstrations, ideal to later on (due) legitimizing

demonstrations. Excerpts (1, 2, 3) show how the threat to people's life triggers an emotional mode (anger, hate, sadness, sympathy, fear) in the audience, which later on (de) legitimize demonstrations based on the effects on those emotions.

Excerpt (1)

أحداث عنيفة دامية أحيانا أتت إلى وفاة مدنيين وإصابة  
عدد من رجال أمن

*Violent incidents, sometimes bloody, which have made the death of civilians and caused injuries to various officers of the security force. (FPBA, 27 December 2010)*

Excerpt (2)

وأسفّت كلّ الأسف لما أسفرت عنه من ضحايا أبرياء  
من المتظاهرين وقوات الشرطة

I felt so sorry for *injured victims caused by it (demonstration)* among demonstrators and police officers. (FPHM, 29 January 2011)

Excerpts (1) and (2) display the explicit emphasis on the death and injury of innocent people to construct the idea of 'threat to life'. In the excerpt (1), the strategy of predication [3] to define these events as 'violent' and 'bloody' and the strategy of argumentation 'have caused the death of civilians and caused injuries to several officers of the security force' are observed. Meanwhile, in excerpt (2), the strategy of argumentation 'injured victims caused by demonstration' is observed.

In the same vein, FPBA in his last speech suggested that the people should end the demonstrations by appealing to the 'life-threat' and injury as shown in Excerpt (3) below:

Excerpt (3)

ولم أقبل يوماً (وما نقبلش) بانّ تسيل قطرة دم واحدة من  
دماء التونسيين. تألمنا لسقوط ضحايا وتضرر أشخاص  
وأنا نرفض أن يسقط المزيد بسبب تواصل العنف والنهب

Table 1: Video Length and Word Count of Presidents' Speeches

	Former President Ben Ali			Former President Hosni Mubarak			Total
	Speech 1	Speech 2	Speech 3	Speech 1	Speech 2	Speech 3	
Video Length (minutes)	7:06	12:43	8:26	11:31	10:44	16:52	67:36
Word Count (number)	615	1082	760	793	726	1175	5151

Table 2: (De)legitimization through Emotions.

No.	Emotional Strategy	Explanation	Examples	Linguistic Choices
1	Implications to people	By reference to:	أحداث عنيفة دامية أجدنا أدت إلى وفاة مئتين وإصابة عدد من رجال أمن	Predication: adjective
		• Threats to human life	Violent incidents, sometimes bloody, which have caused the death of civilians and caused injuries to several officers of the security force. (FPBA, 27 December 2010)	(violent and bloody) Argumentation: material verb (caused death and caused injuries)
		• Threats to daily routines	...وقبل أن تتحول هذه التظاهرات لأعمال شغب تهدد النظام العام وتهدد الحياة البرمجة للمواطنين ...before these demonstrations change to chaos, threaten the law and impede daily routines of citizen. (FPHM, 29 January 2011)	Nomination: noun (chaos) Argumentation: material verb (impede)
• Threats to feelings	نعيش معا أياما مؤلمة وأكثر ما يوجع قلوبنا هو الخوف الذي التاب الأغلبية الكاسحة من المصريين وما ساورهم من الزعاج وقلق وواجس حول ما سيأتي به غد نهم وترويعهم وعائلاتهم ومستقبل ومصير بلدهم We are together living in the very painful days. What hurt our hearts the most are fear, disturbance, worry and unpleasant feelings that strike the absolute majority of Egyptians on what will happen tomorrow to them, their families and the future of their country. (FPHM, 1 February 2011)	Emotive loaded vocabularies: noun (fear, disturbance, worry) Appeal to future: phrases (what will happen, tomorrow, future of their country)		
2	Implications to nation	By reference to:	وهو عظيم سئبي وغير حضاري يعطي صورة مشوهة عن بلادنا تعوق إقبال المستثمرين والسياح بما ينعكس على أحداث الشغل التي نحن في حاجة إليها لتحد من البطالة.	Predication: adjective
		• Threats to economy	This is a negative and uncivilized manifestation that tarnish the image of our country and impedes the advent of investors and tourists which will effect on jobs creation while we need them to curb unemployment. (FPBA, 27 December 2010)	(negative, uncivilized) Argumentation: material verb (tarnish, impede)
		• Threats to security	إن ما حدث خلال هذه التظاهرات يتجاوز ما حدث من نهب وقوضى وحرار لمخطط أبعد من ذلك لزعزعة الاستقرار والاضطراب على الشرعية Indeed what happened within these demonstrations transgress vandalism, chaos and fire to something planned for more than that to shake the stability and violate laws. (FPHM, 29 January 2011)	Fear appeal: phrase (to something planned for more than that) Emotive loaded vocabulary (that to shake the stability and violate laws)
• Threats to image of the country	...والتحام لبعض البعثات الدبلوماسية على أرض مصر ... and interfering some diplomatic representatives in the land of Egypt. (FPHM, 1 February 2011)	Argumentation (interfering some diplomatic representatives in the land of Egypt)		
3	Negative other-presentation	By reference to:	كما أن لجموع أكلة من المتطرفين والمعرضين المأجورين..	Nomination (extremists, agitators). predication (paid by others)
		• Naming		
		• Attributes	أحداث قامت بها عصابات مثممة	Nomination (guerrillas) predication (hooked)
• Actions	أقدمت على الاعتداء ليلا على مؤسسات صوملية وحتى على مواطنين في منازلهم في عمل إرهابي لا يمكن السكوت عنه	Argumentation (attack in the night)		

I never accept to see a *drop of blood of Tunisian*. We feel pain to see *the fall of innocent victims and injury of individuals* and We firmly refuse to see *the fall of more victims* because of the continuous violence and vandalism. (FPBA, 13 January 2011).

In excerpt (3) as in (1) and (2), there is the emphasis on life-threat and injury, but in quite implicit way to convey the idea that the demonstrations caused the death and injury of innocent people. FPBA implicitly suggested that by ending the demonstrations, Tunisians may prevent the growing number of deaths and injuries. All the above three excerpts show the negative implications for the life of both demonstrators and non-demonstrators. Linguistically, the choice of 'blood' in (3) to express injuries may give emotional impact on the audience. A quite interesting emotional-linguistic features in the above excerpts is the use of mental process verbs 'felt sorry', 'never accept', 'feel pain' and 'refuse' which are potential to engage audience emotionally to agree with the speaker's feeling.

Another human concern that was communicated in the Arab Spring political discourse is the implication to people's daily routines in which FPBA and FBHM sought support for their views and efforts to demonise demonstrations. For instance, FPBA and FPHM expressed their concerns as follows:

#### Excerpt (4)

...وقبل أن تتحول هذه التظاهرات لأصل شعب تهتك النظام العام وتعيق الحياة اليومية للمواطنين

...before these demonstrations change to chaos, threaten the law and *impede daily routines of citizen*. (FPHM, 29 January 2011)

#### Excerpt (5)

أولادنا اليوم في الدار وموش في المدرسة. وهذا حرام وعيب لأن أصبحنا خائفين عليهم من عنف مجموعات سطو ونهب واعتداء على أشخاص. وهذا إجرام موش احتجاج، وهذا حرام

*Our children today at home and not at school*. This is *immoral and unacceptable*, because we are afraid for their safety from the violence of the *gangs of robbery, vandalism and transgression* on individuals. This is a *crime and not protest* and this is 'harm'. (FPBA, 13 January 2011)

In excerpt (4) FPHM used the term citizens in general to evoke the emotions of the audience to feel the problem faced by other fellow citizens in their daily routines

because of the demonstrations. A powerful emotive word 'impede' was used as a persuasive device to convey the negative deeds of demonstrations. Note that in the phrase 'impede daily routines of citizens', the strategy of Argumentation [7] has been employed by the speaker to (de) legitimize the demonstrations. However, in excerpt (5) the implication is specified for the school children who were supposed to be in school, but then were in homes because of the continuous demonstrations. The usage of emotive phrases and words such as 'our children', 'school', 'gangs of robbery, vandalism and transgression', 'haram', 'shameful' and 'crime' constructs a very strong negative implication of demonstrations. Pointing out such impact to innocent future generations from non-demonstrators category is indeed a strategy of (de)legitimization through emotions by depicting that demonstrations do not make distinctions among its victims.

(De) legitimization of demonstrations through relating feelings of fear of citizens to what is going on is another human concern that triggers the emotions of the audience. FPHM used feelings of fear of citizens as a justification to demonise the demonstration events two times as shown in excerpts (6) and (7).

#### Excerpt (6)

إن أحداث اليوم والأيام القليلة الماضية أقتت في قلوب الأغلبية الكاسحة من أبناء الشعب الخوف على مصر ومستقبلها

The events of today and some days before threw down in the hearts of *absolute majority* of citizen *the fear feelings for Egypt and its future*. (FPHM, 29 January 2011)

#### Excerpt (7)

نعيش معا أياما مؤلمة وأكثر ما يوجع قلوبنا هو الخوف الذي انتاب الأغلبية الكاسحة من المصريين وما ساورهم من النزاع وقلق وهواجس حول ما سيأتي به الغد لهم ولذويهم وعائلاتهم ومستقبل ومصير بلدهم

We are together living in the very painful days. What hurts our hearts most is *the fear, disturbance, worry and unpleasant feelings those strike the absolute majority of Egyptians on what will happen tomorrow to them, their families and the future of their country*. (FPHM, 1 February 2011)

What is the point of sentences such as (6) in speech 1 of FPHM? And why similar content in the sentences such as (7) was restated in speech 2 of FPHM? There is no new information to the audience in such repetition.

Nevertheless, these sentences can trigger an emotional mode such as sympathy for other fellow citizens in the audience that provides ways to involve the audience to (de) legitimize demonstrations. In both excerpts, the use of Argument Strategies i.e. ‘threw down in the hearts of majority of citizen the fear feelings for Egypt and its future’ can be observed in excerpt (6) and ‘What hurts our hearts most is the fear, disturbance, worry and unpleasant feelings that strike the majority of the Egyptians’ in excerpt (7). What is obvious in the linguistic choices of FPHM in excerpt (7) above is that he employed the intensification strategy [7] by mentioning four types of feelings ‘fear’, ‘disturbance’, ‘worry’ and ‘unpleasant’ in the excerpt. Such use of lexical chains indicates the strategy of the communicator to evoke emotions of an audience. Meanwhile, the use of the phrase ‘absolute majority’ in excerpts (6) and (7) was FPHM’s strategy to illustrate that the majority of citizens were not with the demonstrators and this implicitly illustrated the demonstrators as a minority. The emotive words in describing fear of the situation such as ‘tomorrow’, ‘their relatives’, ‘their families’ and ‘future of country’ are employed to trigger emotions on human and country.

**Implications to Nation:** FPBA and FPHM highlighted the problems of demonstrations to the nation such as the implications to the economic growth, security and image of the nation to make people apprehend the consequences of the demonstrations emotionally in order to (de)legitimize demonstration act. The following excerpts are examples of FPBA and FPHM referring to those implications. Excerpts (8) and (9) that show the negative impacts of demonstrations to the economy of country could evoke an emotional mode (fear) in the audience, which could later convince them to (de)legitimize demonstrations based on the effect of these emotions.

Excerpt (8)

وهو مظهر سلبي وغير حضاري يعطي صورة مشوهة  
عن بلادنا تعوق إقبال المستثمرين والسواح بما ينعكس  
على أحداتات الشغل التي نحن في حاجة إليها للحد من  
البطالة.

This is a *negative and uncivilized manifestation* that tarnishes the image of our country *and impedes the advent of investors and tourists* which will *effect on job creation* while we need them to curb unemployment. (FPBA, 27 December 2010)

Excerpt (9)

إنّ مصر تجتاز أوقاتاً صعبة لا يصحّ أن نسح  
باستمرارها فيزداد ما ألحقته بنا وباقصادنا من أضرار  
وخسائر يوماً بعد يوم، وينتهي بمصر الأمر إلى أوضاع  
يصح معها الشباب الذين دعوا إلى التغيير والإصلاح  
أول المتضررين منها.

Egypt is going through difficult times, which it is not right for us to allow them continue, as *it will increase the harm and losses to our economy*, day to another, which will end in circumstances which those youths who called for change and reform will become the first to be harmed by. (FPHM, 10 February 2011).

In excerpt (8), (de)legitimization of demonstrations is achieved through a strategy of predication ‘negative and uncivilized manifestation’ and strategy of argumentation ‘tarnish the image of our country and impedes the advent of investors and tourists’ while in excerpt (9), the (de) legitimation is achieved through strategic of argumentation ‘it will increase the harm and losses to our economy’. In both excerpts, FPBA and FPHM concluded that the economic implications arise from demonstrations which contradicts to what the demonstrators were demonstrating for in the first place. The use of emotive words such as ‘harm’ and ‘losses’ could mobilize and invoke fear of letting the economy of the nation be affected by this event.

Another national concern presented in the Arab Spring political discourse is the negative implications of demonstration to the security of the country. In the following excerpts (10-14), the problems related to laws and security of countries such as foreign dictations in (11) and damage of public and private properties in (13) were mentioned by both FPBA and FPHM. The use of emotive phrases such as ‘aiming at the security and stability of the country’ in (10), ‘foreign dictations coming from abroad’ in (11), ‘harm to public and private properties’ in (13) and ‘to shake the stability and violate laws’ in (14) would be able to trigger the feeling of ‘patriotism’ in the audience which will lead them to hate demonstrations.

Excerpt (10)

تحوّلت تلك التظاهرات من مظهر راقٍ ومتحضّر  
لممارسة حرية الرأي والتعبير إلى مواجهات مؤسفة  
تحركها وتهدد عليها قوى سياسية سعت إلى التصعيد  
وصبّ الزيت على النار، واستهدفت أمن الوطن  
واستقراره...

These demonstrations change from modern and civilized manifestation form of practicing freedom of idea and speech to regrettable confrontations generated and overridden by political forces who struggled for aggravation, pouring oil on the fire and *aiming at the security and stability of the country*. (FPHM, 1 February 2011)

Excerpt (11)

وما لم ولن أقبه أبداً أن أستمع لإملاءات أجنبية تأتي من الخارج، أيا كان مصدرها وأيا كانت نواياها أو مبرراتها

What I have not done and will never do, would be listening to *foreign dictations coming from abroad* whatever may be their source, means and justifications. (FPHM, 10 February 2011)

Excerpt (12)

اليد في اليد من أجل بلادنا، اليد في اليد من أجل أمن كل أولادنا

Hand to hand *for our country*, hand to hand *for the peace of all our children*. (FPBA, 13 January 2011)

Excerpt (13)

أحداث شغب وتشويش وأضرار بالأماكن العمومية والخاصة

Acts of riot, disturbance and *harm to public and private properties*. (FPBA, 10 January 2011)

Excerpt (14)

إن ما حدث خلال هذه التظاهرات يتجاوز ما حدث من نهب وفوضى وحرارة لمخطط أبعد من ذلك لزعة الاستقرار والانقضاض على الشرعية

Indeed, what happened within these demonstrations transgress vandalism, chaos and fire to something planned for more than that *to shake the stability and violate laws*. (FPHM, 29 January 2011)

Problems caused by demonstrations to the country's image are also among the implications stressed in the Arab Spring political discourse. In (15), FPHM mentioned unethical attacks on diplomats who were guests of Egypt to demonise demonstrators' camp. Such actions were said to be affecting the image and reputation of the country. Linguistically, FPHM used argumentative strategy

'interfering some diplomatic representatives in the land of Egypt' to demonise demonstrators' camp in order to elicit people's support to achieve the (de)legitimization of demonstrations.

Excerpt (15)

...واقحام لبعض البعثات الدبلوماسية على أرض مصر

... *and interfering some diplomatic representatives* in the land of Egypt. (FPHM, 1 February 2011)

**Negative Other-Presentation:** An examination on the way the demonstrators were represented reveals that 'They' of the demonstrator's camp were negatively portrayed which directly or indirectly, hold the demonstrators' camp accountable for a range of negative actions and atrocities. However, the dichotomy in term of blaming demonstrators and out-group political parties where the blame on demonstrators is made with full of 'politeness', is believed to be affected by relational values or the norm of 'power as consensual' [15: 151]. On the other hand, FPBA and FPHM didn't preserve their language when blaming the opposition political parties; the real enemies who are struggling for power. The dichotomy of dealing with ordinary demonstrators and political parties are shown in excerpt (16).

Excerpt (16)

أحداث عصبية واختبارات قاسية بدأت بشباب ومواطنين شرفاء مارسوا حقهم في التظاهر السلمي تعبيراً عن همومهم وتطلعاتهم سرعان ما استغلهم من سعى إلى إشاعة الفوضى والجوء إلى العنف والمواجهة والفقر على الشرعية الدستورية والانقضاض عليها.

They were quickly *exploited by those who sought to spread chaos, resort to violence and confrontation, violate and attack constitutional legitimacy*. (FPHM, 10 February 2011)

FPHM in the above excerpt, presented the youth and citizens as 'honest' people who practice their right to express their 'sorrows' and 'visions' in 'peaceful demonstration' which shows 'politeness' of the language use. However, when it comes to the party that manipulated the demonstrators, FPHM used 'hard' terms such as who 'manipulate demonstrators' and 'strive for spreading trouble, adopting violence and confrontation and violating laws'.

Similarly, FPBA's excerpt below, taken from the beginning of his first speech shows a 'hard' language when blaming the manipulator of the situation.

Excerpt (17)

فإنّ ما اتخذته من أبعاد مبالغ فيها بسبب الاستغلال السياسي لبعض الأطراف الذين لا يريدون الخير لبلادهم، ويجزؤون إلى بعض التلفرات الأجنبية التي تبث الأكاذيب والمغالطات دون تحرر...

The exaggerated turn that these events have taken, as a result of *political manipulation by some sides who do not wish well to the homeland and resort to some foreign television channels which broadcast false and unchecked allegation...* (FPBA, 27 December 2010)

That 'horrific demonstration' was caused by 'political manipulation by some parties' those who 'do not wish well to their homeland' and those who 'resort to some foreign television channels that broadcast false and unchecked allegations'.

FPBA used more strategy of nomination [7] than FPHM in attaching negative meanings to demonstrators' camp. FPBA used 'extremists', 'agitators', 'guerrillas', 'enemies', 'sophists', 'trouble-makers', 'wrong-doers' and 'who astray'. On the other hand, it is quite difficult to find the occasions where FPHM used strategy of nomination to demonize the demonstrators. He used once the term '*al-fasidin*' in his second speech.

Excerpt (18)

كما أنّ لجوء أقلية من المتطرفين والمحرّضين المأجورين...

Minority of *extremists and agitators in the pay of others* (FPBA, 27 December 2010)

Excerpt (19)

أحداث قامت بها عصابات مثمّة...  
Incidents perpetrated by *hooded gangs* (FPBA, 10 January 2011)

Excerpt (20)

أصل قلة من المناونين...  
In excerpt (19), we found the strategies of nomination 'gangs' and predication 'hooded'. Meanwhile, the

Strategy of Argumentation had been used by both FPBA and FPHM. The following excerpts are about the Strategy of Argumentation

Excerpt (21)

أقدمت على الاعتداء علينا على مؤسسات صومالية وحتى على مواطنين في منازلهم في عمل إرهابي لا يمكن التسكوت عنه

*Attacked during the night to public institutions and even assaulted citizens at home in a terrorist act that cannot be tolerated.* (FPBA, 10 January 2011)

Excerpt (22)

يُغزّر بشبابنا وببناتنا وبناتنا في المدارس والمعاهد ويدفع بهم إلى الشغب والفوضى

Abuse the credulity of our youth and that of our sons and daughters in schools and colleges or incite unrest and agitation (FPBA, 10 January 2011)

Under the Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), the material verbs such as '*attack*' in excerpt (21) and '*influence*' youth in (22) were found. Mental process verbs such as '*feel jealous*', '*feel unrest*' and '*don't want the goods*' were also observed.

In terms of the (de) legitimization strategy through emotions throughout the data, the evolution or the shift in employing these strategies has been discovered.

## CONCLUSION

On the whole, the negative traits of demonstrations and demonstrators were found to mobilize the support from the audience, as expected from the speeches of FPBA and FPHM who were under threat of losing power. It is likely that the way implications of a demonstration to another fellow human being and to the country were highlighted would make the audience adopt a negative attitude towards demonstrations. It is also noticed that the negative attitude of the audience towards demonstrations was triggered through the emotional appeals by highlighting the threats of demonstrations of human life, their daily routines, their feelings as well as the threats to the country's economy, security and image.

Altogether, the above mentioned negative traits of demonstrations and demonstrators have been accomplished through the negative other-presentation strategy highlighted by Wodak which includes

nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivation and mitigation and intensification. In short, demonstration and demonstrators were represented negatively through the choices of lexical and grammar.

It is significant to observe that this study has concentrated on just one of the (de) legitimization strategies proposed by [1]. Future research should probably study the rest of the strategies proposed by him.

**Notes:** Bolded words and phrases in this article represent linguistic choices, relevant to the process of (de) legitimization through emotions.

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