

## **The English School and Order: The Case of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)**

**Ferhat Durmaz\***

**Wahabuddin Ra'ees\*\***

**Ishtiaq Hossain\*\*\***

**Abstract:** The English School (ES) analytical framework concerning the formation of order in international relations posits that states establish order through rules and institutions within the framework of common interests and values to protect against anarchy. State-centred orders with limited civil society cooperation are pluralistic, while their converse (with a larger role for non-state actors) are solidarist. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 by Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia based on common interests, such as strengthening sovereignty and creating stable relations in the face of anarchic problems like communism and internal instability. In numerous conventions ASEAN has adopted various norms, such as respect for the sovereignty of the states, the rule of law, non-use of power, peaceful resolution of disputes, and non-interference in other states. All these norms showed that the primary purpose of ASEAN is to protect state sovereignty and interests and to establish peaceful regional relations. The fact that state sovereignty is at the forefront, with limited cooperation of non-state actors, shows that the ASEAN regional order is pluralist. This article analyses

---

\* PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science. Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Email: ferhatdurmaz2013@gmail.com

\*\* Professor, Department of Political Science, and Deputy Dean (Postgraduate and Research), Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia. Email: wraees@gmail.com

\*\*\* Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Email: ihossain@iium.edu.my

the emergence and appearance of the ASEAN regional order (the unit of analysis) in the context of the ES (the theoretical framework).

**Keywords:** English School Theory, Order, Pluralism and Solidarism, ASEAN, Regional Order

**Abstrak:** Rangka kerja analitikal Sekolah Inggeris (ES) berkenaan dengan pembentukan perintah dalam perhubungan antarabangsa memaparkan bahawa negeri-negeri membentuk perintah melalui peraturan dan institusi-institusi dalam rangka kerja melibatkan yang minat umum dan nilai-nilai demi melindunginya daripada anarki. Perintah berpusatkan negeri dengan kerjasama masyarakat sivil terhad adalah dianggap pluralistik. Disebaliknya, mereka yang bukan pegawai kerajaan panggil sebagai satu perpaduan. Pertubuhan Bangsa-bangsa Asia Tenggara (ASEAN) telah ditubuhkan pada tahun 1967 dengan Malaysia, Thailand, Filipina, Singapura dan Indonesia dengan berlandaskan minat umum, seperti mengukuhkan kedaulatan dan mewujudkan hubungan yang stabil dalam menghadapi masalah anarki seperti komunisme dan dengan ketidakstabilan dalaman. Konvensyen ASEAN kebanyakan telah menerima pelbagai norma-norma seperti menghormati kedaulatan negara masing-masing, kedaulatan undang-undang, tidak menggunakan kuasa paksaan, penyelesaian perselisihan secara damai, dan tiada campur tangan dalam hal negara-negara lain. Kesemua norma-norma tersebut menunjukkan bahawa tujuan utama ASEAN adalah untuk melindungi kedaulatan negara demi kepentingan untuk mewujudkan hubungan serantau yang damai. Hakikatnya adalah bahawa kedaulatan negara berada di barisan hadapan. Dengan kerjasama yang terbatas, pegawai bukan kerajaan telah menunjukkan bahawa perintah serantau ASEAN adalah pluralis. Artikel ini menganalisis kemunculan dan penampilan perintah serantau ASEAN (unit analisis) dalam konteks ES (rangka kerja teoritis).

**Kita kunci:** English School Theory, Perintah, Pluralisme dan Solidarisme, ASEAN, Perintah Serantau

## Introduction

The English School (ES) theory, which emerged in the post-World War II period, posits a new ontological basis for the foundations of international relations. According to Martin Wight (1991), one of the founders of the theory, there are three significant political ideas in international relations represented by three archetypal proponents of these positions: Realism (associated with Machiavelli), Revolutionism (associated with Kant), and Rationalism (associated with Grotius), as outlined below.

Realism considers the state to be the most fundamental actor pursuing its own self-interest in international relations. According to Realism, a system involving competition and conflict is not open to change, and international law and international organizations serve the interests of great powers.

Revolutionism claims that people are the primary actors of international politics and they can act together in the framework of common interest and ideology. This paradigm is essentially rooted in Marxism (or rather it shares the same view of historical progress), and its proponents range from those anticipating a great revolution and “perpetual peace” (as in the Communist vision) to contemporary social justice movements advocating activism and socio-political and cultural change within neoliberalism.

Rationalism’s central assumption is that international relations have the potential for both anarchy and cooperation (Wight, 1991; Jorgensen 2014: pp. 126-127). From the perspective of rationalism, states are solidarist, which means that they can exchange views on various issues, and that they can help each other to solve their problems based on genuine cooperation and even altruism, in contrast to the implicit self-interest of states and other actors posited by realism and revolutionism.

The ES develops a middle way between the realism and revolutionism, basing its intellectual foundations on the rationalist tradition. Like realists, ES accepts the state as a primary actor; like revolutionists, it acknowledges that interests among states may, to some extent, be harmonious. As in rationalism, ES indicates that states can form common structures in the context of solidarity rather than conflict and claims that states exist in an international society within the framework of normative elements (Suganami 2010: pp. 15-28). According to Hedley Bull, a prominent representative of the school, international society is a concept that emphasizes that states can create order against anarchy; Bull described that although states are in an anarchic atmosphere, they can form a structure through rules, norms, and institutions, and this structure is called ‘order’ (Bull, 1977). According to him, to establish an order in the international system, the following are necessary:

- Common interests among states.

- Rules, norms, and institutions in the context of the common interests.
- Functional elements, such as the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great powers.

Bull states that there are two different types of configurations of order in international relations: pluralist and solidarity. Pluralists acknowledge that the most fundamental actor is the state and attach importance to the protection of the order within a context of limited, specific, and transient cooperation. Solidarists, who give more regard to non-state actors, posit that cooperation in the context of human rights must be comprehensive and absolute, implying a universalist ideological perspective.

In 1967, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia in Southeast Asia came together in the context of common interests, such as preserving the internal and external sovereignty, solving problems with peaceful means, and cooperation, and they established ASEAN. These five states adopted various norms and rules within the ASEAN framework and mechanisms such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) High Council and the ASEAN Secretariat (both established in 1976). These states in Southeast Asia came together in the context of common interests and created order through rules and institutions in the face of anarchy. The existence of constituent elements, such as common interests, norms, and diplomacy, indicates that the ASEAN regional order was established within the framework of Bull's order concept. In this framework, this study claims that ASEAN regional order is an example of the order concept produced by the ES. In practice, the ASEAN regional order was state-centred, and some factors like the great powers, balance of power, diplomacy, and war were quite effective in the formation of this regional order. Besides, the rules, norms, and institutions of the regional order gave priority to maintaining order and included a limited example of cooperation. Therefore, this study argues that ASEAN emerged as a pluralist regional order.

The first goal of this study is to provide a clear definition of the order concept of the ES. In this framework, the second purpose of this study is to analyse the ASEAN regional order in the context of the order concept of the ES. Also, this study aims to contribute to the academic literature

examining Southeast Asia and ASEAN from the ES framework. In this context, the fundamental question of the study is: How did the ASEAN regional order emerge within the framework of the order concept of the ES? In other words, this paper explains the formation, the appearance and practical structure of the ASEAN regional order in the Cold-War period, in terms of the anarchic environment, common interests, rules and institutions that lead to the formation of regional orders.

The following section explains the theoretical framework, including ES principles and the concept of order in the ES paradigm. Later, it traces the international political trajectory of Southeast Asia from anarchy to order, and then, it presents the formation of ASEAN in detail, and finally, it concludes the paper.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The main factor in the establishment of the ES is the search for a new analysis framework in the study of international relations (Dunne 2007: p. 129). This case can be seen in the meetings of the British Committee, established in 1959, and the works of Martin Wight (1986, 1991), Herbert Butterfield (1966), Adam Watson (1992), and Hedley Bull (1966, 1977). Based on these founders, this section summarizes the basic arguments of the ES, particularly unpacking the concept of order as expounded by Bull. In other words, the study does not address discussions concerning the ES theory in the modern period, as its main focus is to apply its principles as a conceptual framework to understand the case of ASEAN.

#### *English School Principles*

ES postulates the general opinion that the main actors in international relations are sovereign state. However, according to the ES, states are political units that can respect each other's sovereign rights, even if they have different views and goals (Jorgensen 2014: p. 124). According to Wight (1977: p. 23), as long as states recognize their mutual sovereign rights, they can form a coherent, common system. Similarly, Bull (1966, 1977) argues that the sole actor that can ensure order and the formation of society is the sovereign state. From an ES perspective, the disappearance of sovereign and independent states can lead to the disruption of order and consequently the escalation and transformation of latent anarchy into war (Watson 1992: pp. 299-310).

The state-centred approach in ES is posited on the axiomatic belief of its proponents that the nature of the international system is inherently anarchic and predisposed toward conflict due to states pursuing their own self-interest, usually in the short term, as in the realist perspective (Wight 1986: pp. 100-110). ES seeks to restrain the anarchical proclivity of the states system by the formation of international matrices of understanding (i.e. international organisations, rules, and norms) in order for all member states to rationally pursue their *enlightened* self-interest in pursuit of long-term peace and socio-economic development; Wight and Bull state that there may be cooperation in international relations, and that this cooperation can regulate the policies of the actors or lead to the formation of order (Devlen, Patrick, and Özdamar 2005: pp. 179-184).

ES views international relations as having a normative dimension, whereby norms define rules that determine the behaviour of actors, and the only way for states to cooperate and avoid anarchy is to comply with the rules (Wheeler 1992: pp. 466-467). States may form structures such as organizations and communities within the framework of rules, and ES is particularly interested in the genesis and progress of institutions in international relations and the role of rules (Linklater and Suganami 2006: pp. 43-80). Given that ES argues that states exist in an international society within the framework of normative elements, ES scholars accept 'international society' as a general appearance of the relations between states. The interests, values, wars, the balance of power, rules, and institutions play a significant role in shaping the relations between states. Therefore, if cooperation between states is strong in an order that arises in the context of rules and institutions, this would mean that the society, which is an overall expression of these relations, is also powerful. If states prefer conflict or war rather than cooperation, this will lead to a weakening of society. In this view society is an abstract concept, and the nature of the relationships between society, states, international order, and anarchy are nebulous and complex.

Bull (1977) said that an international society requires an international system, but the existence of a system does not mean that an international society exists; in other words, without considering the common interests and values and sharing common rules, states can still interact with each other bilaterally on the basis of their brute importance and power. In this context, there are two main components of a system: the state and

mutual relations (Yurdusev 1994: pp. 147-148). Nonetheless, three points are crucial to transform a system into an order:

- The states that make up the system should be aware of common values and interests.
- States should be bound by some common rules in their relations, such as adherence to contracts and not using unilateral or arbitrary force.
- States ought to establish various institutions within the framework of common values and rules.

These elements are premised on the conceptualisation of international society as having components of anarchy, system, and order. States first constitute a system in the face of an anarchic structure. After the formation of the system, states can form order to a certain degree. Ultimately, an order determines the feature of a society, depending on the nature of relations between states. The order is at the centre of this whole process, therefore it is important to examine this concept in the context of ES.

### *The Concept of Order in the English School*

The ES argues that sovereign states can create order through common interests, rules, and institutions in an anarchic international environment. Bull (1977) dealt mainly with three topics in his *Anarchical Society*: the nature of order, the formation of order, and the role of sovereign states in the creation of order.

Order is the opposite of disorder, which includes elements such as chaos, instability, and unpredictability that states generally do not want (Bull 1977: p. 3). Likewise, interfering with the internal affairs and the sovereignty of states using force can harm an order. With a simple inference, it can be said that the features such as the right to life, stability, and non-interference in internal affairs constitute the content of the concept of order. Besides that, Bull (1977: p. 4) argues that order may exist for a specific, transient purpose. The goals of order may have basic, primary, and universal features aiming to limit violence, enforce conventions, protect property, survive, preserve independence, ensure peace, and so on. Therefore, order is an example of behaviour to achieve the goals described as basic, primary and universal; moreover, in addition to being for a specific purpose, the order has a functional meaning (Bull

1977: pp. 4-5). Order is a tool that allows actors to achieve their goals, with actors believing that better progress will be achieved through the positive and beneficial elements of order.

In addition to Bull's opinion, according to Andrew Hurrell (2003: p. 25), order means the minimum conditions of living together. States are aware that they cannot live independently from other states in the context of relations, interactions, and disputes. In such a case, the determination of the rules, institutions, and means of coexistence ensure the emergence of order. At the very least, order guarantees the right to life, and it can also provide an advanced level of co-operation after a certain period. This process, as Martin Griffiths (1992: p. 238) said, can change in the dimensions of time and space, which means that order is dynamic. Given the dynamic and amorphous nature of order in international relations, there is a critical point that catalyses the formation of order, which according to Bull (1977) is determined by states wanting to obtain interests like the elimination of the threats, limiting violence, protecting sovereignty, and ensuring peace in the face of anarchy.

Common interests thus constitute the essence of order and are a result of the threat or fear that states face. States generally fear threats towards their territorial integrity, sovereignty, and national interests, which are felt in varying degrees by all states, thus precipitating common interests (Bull 1977: pp. 53-59). However, the concept of common interest is ambiguous because it does not give any information as to which elements are compatible or incompatible with the primary aims of states; *rules* play an important role in this process. Rules, including international law, moral rules, or rules of conduct determine the behaviours that are appropriate for the common interests, and indicate whether states' behaviour will be consistent with the provision of the order (Bull 1977: p. 67). Bull claims that there are three sets of rules for creating order by specifying the behaviours appropriate for broader purposes, defining the nature and boundaries of the order, including principles and institutions that regulate many technical issues (Buzan 2014: p. 98):

1. *States have the will to create order and live in it.* This is the most basic and constitutive normative principle of world politics. The basic perspective of this rule is that order, which




is a result of states following rules, is better than conflict or a cosmopolitan understanding (Bull 1977: pp. 67-71).

2. *Coexistence*. This emphasizes the idea of order, support for normative principles, and regulation of the principles of coexistence. These rules regulate relations between states through norms, such as adherence to treaties and the acceptance of sovereign rights of other states.
3. *Cooperation*. States cooperate not only in politics and security but also on the economic and social levels.

Institutions implementing the basic rules of order are states. States are actors who make, explain, apply, interpret, strengthen, legitimize, adapt and protect the rules of the order (Bull 1977: pp. 71-74). When states are maintaining or strengthening the rules of the order, they do so without a common government. This situation does not prevent the state from cooperating with other states and working in harmony. The rules of coexistence enable states to cooperate with other states and to conduct the rules of the order together. The formation of order, which starts with abstract elements, such as common interests, is completed with the institutions that implement the rules. Based on the points analysed, Figure 1 describes the formation of order.

*Figure 1: The formation of order*



(Bull, 1977; Wight, 1986, 1991; Buzan 2014: p. 13)

In ES, states should cooperate or work in harmony with each other while performing their duties related to the order. Bull (1977) said that examples of this cooperation and compatible work can be the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great power roles. The contribution of these five elements to the order are analysed below.

- **The balance of power**

Bull (1977: pp. 116-117) said that functionally, the balance of power ensures that order is sustainable by preventing states from undermining order, and it also protects the independence and sovereignty of the states against the great powers. Besides that, the balance of power ensures the continuation of dependence between states. For example, states can cooperate to prevent certain states being dominant and hegemonic (Wight 1966: p. 149, Wight 1991: pp. 166-167).

- **International law**

By agreements and rules, international law defines the rules of order, specifies the basic rules of coexistence between actors, produces rules on how to conduct formal relations between states, and ensures compliance with the rules (Bull 1977: pp. 140-141).

- **Diplomacy**

Diplomacy facilitates relations between states that are members of an order, enabling states to negotiate agreements and minimize disagreements, and symbolizing and actualizing order (Bull 1977: pp. 170-172).

- **War**

War can be a tool for maintaining the balance of power, lead to positive change, protect common interests, and enforce application of the law (Bull 1977: pp. 188-189). For instance, during war, states enforce the rules of war, and diplomacy can become more functional (Jorgensen 2014: p. 124).

- **Great powers**

Great powers contribute to order by managing the relationship between the actors, maintaining the balance of power, and trying to limit crises and wars. Order may become permanent if the great powers align with

small powers in orders about key topics, interests, and values (Bull 1977: p. 207).

These elements do not obstruct the central status of the state, and they do not form an authority over states in the regional and international order; besides, the existence, nature, and structure of these five factors vary for each particular order. Also, these elements cannot guarantee the provision of order in all circumstances, such as interstate wars (Finnemore 2001: p. 510). The most important point is that the presence of all or only one of these elements provides a perspective to explain how the order occurs or operates (Young 2005: pp. 629-630). The relationship between order and justice is a critical issue because the order is a normative initiative, in which interests and law play vital roles in determining states' behaviour. From Bull's (1977: pp. 81-86) perspective, there are three types of justice in world politics that have important implications for order:

1. Interstate or international justice, which defines the rights and duties of nation-states as both legal and moral.
2. Individual or human justice, referring to ethical rules that give individuals rights and duties.
3. Cosmopolitan or world justice pertains to ideas that try to determine what is right or good for the whole world.

In the field of human justice, human rights are open to external interference, and it is not probable to provide general protection for all people. In the same way, the search for world justice can lead to conflict with the elements that lead to the continuation of the order (Bull 1977: pp. 77-98). In this context, human or world justice can harm order by weakening the sovereignty of states, which are the main actors of order. The disappearance or weakening of the sovereignty of the state, which is the only institution that can provide order, may cause that order to be damaged, and enable a reversion to anarchy (Palabıyık 2016: p. 239). Therefore, Bull (1977: pp. 93-98) considers that order should be prioritised over justice, but it is critical to note that he has not entirely ignored justice. Order is a valuable element in world politics, and it is a precondition for attaining other values, of which justice is one of the most fundamental. Order enables states to set norms or rules or create mechanisms for them, and to thus achieve justice. When people or groups have demands for change in an order, the legitimacy of

these demands depends on the characteristic of the order. If there is no harmony between the content of order and the justice requests, the demands for change and the actions in this context can harm order and undermine general justice.

On the other hand, Bull (1966) said in his article “The Grotian Conception of International Society” that there are two different approaches in ES, pluralism and solidarism. This fundamental distinction in the ES theory is related to the position of the actors in order, the nature of the functional elements of order, and the scope of the cooperation.

Pluralism (as espoused by Hedley Bull, Robert Jackson, and James Mayall) defines the main features of order as its plural situation, which is the result of the political, economic, and cultural differences between states. Pluralists represent an approach that preserves order within the framework of a state-centred relationship perspective. Pluralists are prone to the status quo and say that the existing order is more important than the search for a new order because they are not confident that a new order would be a better alternative. In other words, according to them, in order, if the areas of cooperation are broadened, there is a very likelihood of disagreement or conflict. Hence, pluralists are concerned with how an order can be sustained among states (Weinert 2011: p. 29). Pluralists specify that norms and rules are produced, adopted and implemented only by states (Palabıyık 2016: p. 239). A norm or rule such as humanitarian intervention can damage state sovereignty and independence, and this directly affects the order negatively. For this reason, an order including principles such as sovereignty and non-intervention must be preserved. Such order is a successful example of coexistence between states, even if it is limited (Mayall, 2000; Bain 2018: p. 8).

Solidarism (as propounded by John Vincent, Tim Dunne, and Nicholas Wheeler) claims that cooperation in order can involve broader rules and topics. Solidarists argue that states can also create an order including moral and ethical issues and advocate that the order can become better within an individual-centred approach (Weinert 2011: p. 29). The solidarists think that cooperation within order should advance, and they argue that this cooperation will include an understanding that gives priority to the rights of individuals (Bain 2018: p. 3). Therefore,

solidarists focus on how the order can be improved in favour of individuals (Gonzalez-Pelaez & Buzan 2003: pp. 322, 334). Solidarists prioritize norms and emphasize the issue of justice, which they believe is a prerequisite for establishing and maintaining order (Buzan 2014: p. 16). Solidarists have adopted the natural law that claims that individuals have rights arising from being human beings, that these rights are part of international law, and that states are responsible for protecting these rights (Palabiyık, 2016: p. 240). Accordingly, according to the solidarists, if states cannot protect human rights in an order, an interventionist perspective based on universal human rights should emerge, and human rights and justice should be more prominent and significant than the sovereignty of states and order (Williams 2005: pp. 22, 25; Weinert 2011: p. 29). To better understand pluralist and solidarist order, Table 1 presents the conceptualization of Carsten F. Ronnfeldt.

Table 1: *Pluralism and Solidarism in the ES*

	Pluralist Conception	Solidarist Conception
Social agency	State	Individuals and non-state actors
Normative agenda	The morality of states, i.e. a concern for order and the principle of non-intervention	Cosmopolitan morality, i.e., a concern for justice and human rights
Institutions	The balance of power, diplomacy, great powers and war	Humanitarian intervention
Cooperation	Limited	Extensive

Source: Ronnfeldt (1999: p. 144)

Consequently, the ES is a theory that forms a strong perspective and context about the order. This conceptual framework has two dimensions. The first point is that in addition to fundamental concepts such as anarchy and the state, the ES claims that rules and institutions are significant factors in the formation of order. In doing so, the ES fully explains the place and function of rules and institutions. The second function is that the ES does not ignore the concepts of classical international relations such as power balance, diplomacy, and war, and the role of these phenomena; rather they form core parts of its analytical framework. In this context, the order concept of ES emerges as a

powerful approach that combines elements such as anarchy, state, and sovereignty with rules and institutions.

### **From Anarchy to Order in Southeast Asian Politics**

This section analyses the emergence of ASEAN regional order and its existence during the Cold War. The primary purpose of this section is to answer the questions of why states come together in the face of anarchy and what kind of order they create. In this context, this part peruses the key factors and points that led to the formation of the ASEAN regional order and identifies its key features.

#### *Anarchic Environment and Common Interests*

Communism was one of the ideological elements that had a significant impact in Southeast Asia after the Second World War. Jorgensen-Dahl (1982: p. 70) claimed that the biggest threat to Southeast Asian states like Malaysia was Communism, being aggressively propagated from China throughout the region, with noticeable success in the Communist Party of Burma, and resulting in US military intervention in the Vietnam War (1955-1975); indeed, from the US perspective containment of Communism was a global strategy, thus its efforts in Southeast Asia were an overspill from the Korean War (1950-1953) (Roberts 2012: p. 35). Southeast Asian countries certainly felt the existence of a palpable threat posed by Communism throughout the Cold War (c. 1945-1991). Aside from the global Cold War context, regional countries had international and domestic threats, including border disputes, land claims, and political violence, undermining their sovereignty as emerging postcolonial states. For this reason, the fundamental common interest of all states in Southeast Asia was to strengthen national sovereignty and promote political stability (Leifer 1989: p. 11).

At the outset, Southeast Asian nations' interstate relations were characterised by antagonism, including Indonesia's sanctions against Malaysia in the context of Konfrontasi, the Sabah problem between Malaysia and the Philippines, and border disagreements between Thailand and Malaysia, which gave rise to dispute, insecurity, and hostility. Konfrontasi in particular (the violent conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia concerning Borneo, during the period 1963-1966) induced the security perceptions of the countries in the region to be unfavourable. States began to think that their neighbours could attack

them at any time, and they shaped their relationships with other states in this axis of fear. States were aware that this fear would harm both national cohesion and the perspectives in the outside world, undermining investment and socio-economic progress. Hence, Southeast Asian states wished to minimize the adverse effects of antagonistic regional relations and to promote stable relations to avoid the repetition of *Konfrontasi* and similar situations, with a view to ultimately seeking political harmony and regional peace and prosperity (Acharya 2001: p. 49).

In the 1950s and 1960s there were significant internal instabilities like rural riots, political tensions towards regime stability, political problems, religious extremism, and social injustice in Southeast Asian states (Kin Wah 1984: pp. 16-17). There were numerous complex reasons of this. First, Southeast Asian countries had sensitive political systems and social structures. Second, economic poverty in the region countries was the basis of political and social discontent. This situation caused people to blame the administrations and sometimes to resort to acts of violence against them. Therefore, states possessed three important common interests in the field of economics: eradicating poverty, substantial economic development, and increasing the economic interaction between actors in a way conducive to dependence (Saravanamuttu 1986: p. 208). The regional countries considered that if these goals were achieved, social inequalities, insecurity, and problems between the state and society in the internal system would be eliminated.

Nevertheless, in the political realm, Southeast Asian international relations were mainly driven by the great powers struggle of the Cold War (Chee 1992: p. 384). This also continued colonial policy objectives of great powers, reflected in the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) (1954) having an undue focus on serving the interests of Western states at the expense of the national interests of regional countries (Girling 1992: p. 370). We can say that the great powers' behaviours, such as external interventions, revisionist policies, and cooperation initiatives created dangers for regional security (Narine 2002: p. 13). Therefore, the regional countries intended to ensure security by eliminating disagreements, internal confusions, and Communism, which were the basis for the intervention of foreign powers in the Southeast Asia. Also, within the framework of institutionalization, states proposed to reduce the negative effects of external forces' competition in Southeast Asia. As the former Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman

said, regional cooperation could contribute to regional security (Leifer 1989: p. 17).

The political, economic and social anarchic environment and the common interest perspective created a '*stimulating effect*' in Southeast Asian states. With this effect, each of the Southeast Asian states realized that the current conjuncture is not only harmful to themselves but also the other states. Besides that, anarchy and interests created a '*rational will*' among regional countries' leaders.<sup>1</sup> The basic motivation of this will was that the anarchy atmosphere should not be permanent, and leaders ought to take the initiative to solve problems and achieve benefits. These two elements raised some of the cooperation activities in the face of anarchy.

*The Cooperation Initiatives in the Regional System: ASA (1961) and MAPHILINDO (1963)*

Some of the states in the Southeast Asian regional system wanted to transform inter-state relations from competition to cooperation, to minimize the effects they incurred from the latent anarchic structure. In this framework, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) (1961) between Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and the Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia (MAPHILINDO) (1963) agreement are mileposts signifying remarkable political initiatives in terms of both structure and impact. Through ASA, states intended to revitalize the economy in rural regions that formed the bedrock for revolts, and to limit the influence of Communism, which had fed on poverty among agricultural communities (Pollard 1970: p. 245). MAPHILINDO, which was more political, was designed to create a community around the Austronesian ethnicity, to use *musjawarah*<sup>2</sup> and *mufakat*<sup>3</sup> to solve the problems, and to prevent foreign countries from interfering with the independence of Southeast

---

1 The emphasis and italics in the sentence belong to the authors.

2 Musjawarah means that a leader makes a polite suggestion about the method of a community, consult to all other participants, and carefully examine them before explaining his or her views. Moreover, it emphasizes that a leader should not act arbitrarily and must not impose his or her will (Jorgensen-Dahl 1982: pp. 165-166).

3 Mufakat involves the use of consensus or unanimity as a decision-making procedure. In terms of meaning, mufakat has similar content with the musjawarah process (Jorgensen-Dahl 1982: p. 166).



Asian countries (Abel 1972: p. 217; Shimada 2010: p. 91). Within the framework of joint initiative, economic aspects, and historical-cultural ties, ASA and the MAPHILINDO showed that Southeast Asian states had taken significant steps in the development of the phenomenon of political locality in their regional interactions. However, while the framework of ASA and MAPHILINDO underscored the common values and interests of Southeast Asian nations, they failed to transform the competition and conflict-based system into an order including rules and institutions, for numerous reasons listed below.

- In this period, the states gave more importance to national interests than common interests. The Sabah issue between Malaysia and Philippines, Konfrontasi between Malaysia and Indonesia, and different approaches to great powers in the member states' foreign policies was a result of different national interests. For example, while the Philippines trusted the SEATO and was subservient to the USA, Indonesia (under Sukarno) was antipathetic or even hostile to US interests (Shimada 2010: p. 193).
- These two organizations did not have the capacity to form common rules and establish common institutions in interstate relations. For instance, the ASA did not include Indonesia, one of the most powerful countries of the regional system, thus it lacked legitimacy. Furthermore, members could not agree on the number of members and function of the ASA, and the MAPHILINDO was a loose structure in the context of its foreseen objectives (Gordon 1964: p. 222; Roberts 2012: p. 39; Narine 2002: p. 11).
- Regional diplomacy values like *musjawarah* and *mufakat* could not put forth a potential for change due to political and structural problems.

Even though the ASA and the MAPHILINDO were unsuccessful, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia realized that they had the potential to come together, to discuss issues and to find a peaceful solution. The ASA and the MAPHILINDO taught these four states that an organization in the regional system should consider the balance of power, and ought to be accepted as legitimate by all actors in terms of structure (Ayoob 1999: p. 253). Also, states understood the importance

of creating a joint approach and similar attitudes toward relationships with great powers. ASA and the MAPHILINDO formed a common experience for states by shaping the essence of regional cooperation. In the context of shared experiences, states began to abandon their rigid stance concerning national interests, and they gave more importance to their common interest, which was also reflected in a reorientation from short-term to long-term goals and enlightened self-interest at the state level reflected in a commitment to international cooperation.

### **The Formation of the ASEAN Regional Order**

After Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia noticed their common interests and values, there was significant practical transformation that allowed states to establish ASEAN based on their own unique characteristics, norms, and needs within a common, united framework, which comprised the ASEAN 'Way'<sup>4</sup>. After deposing Sukarno, the US ally Suharto ended Konfrontasi and established peace with Malaysia, whereby both states recognized each other's sovereignty and legitimacy, and cooperation became more critical in Indonesia's approach to regional relations (Narine 2006: p. 214). Consequently, the positive change in the minds that emerged after the end of Konfrontasi was put into practice with Bangkok Declaration (1967), thanks to the strong leadership of Southeast Asian countries (Mahbubani & Sng 2017: pp. 59-65). Unlike the ASA and MAPHILINDO, the Bangkok Declaration and later agreements including ZOPFAN (1971), ASEAN Concord (1976), TAC and the ASEAN Secretariat (1976) showed that these five states could transform their relations within the framework of rules and institutions.

The establishment of rules and institutions indicates that ASEAN has succeeded in transforming the regional system into a regional order. The ASEAN rules and institutions emerged as a general reflection of the conjuncture. Therefore, the best way to understand the logic of rules and institutions is to try to understand the attitudes of states and their

---

4 At the official level, this concept was firstly used in 1974 by General Ali Moertopo, Indonesian intelligence agency official. The ASEAN way refers to the ASEAN norms such as conciliation, cooperation, non-interference, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the territorial integrity of the member states (Demirbaş and Aydın 2014: p. 74).

underlying motivations (simultaneously). Based on this method, this section explores the scope and boundaries of the ASEAN regional order.

*Constitutive Normative Principle: Bangkok Declaration (1967)*

Khong (2005: p. 28) stated that one of Leifer's (1989) most important contributions to ASEAN Studies is to remind readers that the primary motivation that led to the Bangkok Declaration is the need for regional reconciliation rather than economic integration. Although Leifer defines that the need for agreement arises from the Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia, the regional compromise was not only related to the Konfrontasi but also other goals, such as the strengthening of the sovereignty, economic development and providing security. The Bangkok Declaration appeared as a combination of all these elements on August 8, 1967.

Analyses of the Bangkok Declaration state that it is a product of the aim of ensuring peace and stability in Southeast Asia through economic development (Hoon 1992: p. 38) but examining the Bangkok Declaration from this perspective ignores its general rationale of being instituted to promote regional order. Expressions in the Bangkok Declaration reflect the founding principles that constitute the framework of regional order (e.g. "Common action to promote regional cooperation in the spirit of equality and partnership", "good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation", and "ensure stability and security") (ASEAN Secretariat, 1967). The ASEAN Way vision of regional cooperation with the spirit of equality and partnership showed that regional states have the will and purpose of creating order. Besides, these points in the Declaration showed that the member states intended to eliminate the factors that cause anarchy through joint action, and they accepted the minimum conditions such as good neighbourliness for living together.

With the Bangkok Declaration the ASEAN States considered the great powers in the security field by making foreign bases temporary (Narine 2002: p. 15). Based on these studies, it can be assumed that the presence of foreign bases damaged the local identity of the regional order (and more particularly, the democratic and popular credibility of ASEAN member states' regimes). Nevertheless, the acceptance of foreign bases temporary can be evaluated within the framework of the general logic of the concept of order, which functionally protected stability in the region and enabled the achievement of positive and

beneficial goals with specific tools, particularly by avoiding protracted or escalated Cold War conflicts. Viewed from this perspective, the statement in the Bangkok Declaration affirming the presence of foreign bases while conferring temporary status on them was an expedient and apt means of achieving the aims of ASEAN states (Ayoob 1999: pp. 251-252).

Populist abolition of foreign bases in the short term would have exposed member states to security problems and would have imposed a most unwelcome military spending burden on regimes that required such funding for critical economic development purposes. Furthermore, in this period, the power struggle between the regional states, and the sovereignty concerns of the member states were continuing, notably in the power struggle of the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore axis, and the involvement of great powers could have restrained potential conflicts (Roberts 2012: p. 48). In addition to all this, China and Vietnam had hostile attitudes, and the ASEAN states did not want to appear as rivals in the face of the great powers (Grant 1992: p. 373). Thus, viewed sympathetically, it can be argued that the bases of the great powers helped maintain balance and general peace among member states, and avoid the escalation of Cold War conflicts as seen in Korea and Vietnam. It could also be said to have transformed ASEAN states' relations positively and preserved their independence and sovereignty.

The Bangkok Declaration emphasized some vital principles like "accelerating economic growth, social progress and cultural development", "abiding respect for justice and the rule of law", and "adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter" (ASEAN Secretariat, 1967). When reviewed carefully, we can see that these basic principles focus on the economy, social life, and law. This situation is the product of a conscious will and, as examined previous sections, ASEAN countries think that the security problems they face and the instability in their internal systems are related to the issues in the field of economic-social development and law. Therefore, these principles were more important than a diplomatic goodwill statement. We can say that these principles are examples of behaviour that will ensure the achievement of the primary and fundamental objectives of the ASEAN regional order, such as strengthening the sovereignty of states, supplying

security, and providing internal stability. These examples of behaviour expressed a general perspective on how to solve problems.

On the other hand, while showing the will of the regional states to live together, the Bangkok Declaration had significant deficiencies, including that it did not suggest plans or programs for the examples of behaviour, such as economic growth in practice. Besides, the annual meetings of the foreign ministers, designed as a policy-making process, were ineffective as a structure, because the Bangkok Declaration did not specify clear provisions regarding the implementation dimension of these meetings. Also, statements such as adherence to the principles of the UN Charter, good neighbourliness, and the spirit of the partnership were platitudinous, and the content was not clearly defined (ASEAN Secretariat, 1967). Thus, this nature of the Bangkok Declaration led to uncertainties about how to evaluate these expressions.

*The Rules of Coexistence: Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971)*

The attitude of the great powers and regional and national developments was effective in the formation of the ZOPFAN. The dynamics leading to the ZOPFAN began during the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the US and UK not believing it would be very efficient in the region, while China and the Soviet Union were actively seeking to foment Communist influence in the region (contemporaneous with the Vietnam War), and their own state advantages (Djiwandono 1992: pp. 73-77). Among regional variables, the inevitability of ultimate US withdrawal from Vietnam would leave the ASEAN states potentially vulnerable to the spill-over of conflict from the resurgent Communist regime in Vietnam. The ASEAN states did not want a change in the balance of power and wished to emulate the startling economic success of Japan, the preeminent Asian economic power, which had achieved its amazing recovery from WWII under US guidance (and indeed occupation) (Narine 2002: p. 19). In the national dimension, race riots between the Malays and Chinese in 1969 in Malaysia showed that Communist and other interests could stoke and benefit from tensions in the sensitive political and social structures of ASEAN nations, with their struggle for national cohesion being tied to their sluggish socio-economic development (Koga 2014: p. 332). From these events and uncertainties, the ASEAN states drew the following conclusions:

1. The ASEAN states understood the importance of creating comprehensive regional coexistence rules in the context of substantial issues and interests.
2. Because of the actions of the great powers, member states realized that security phenomenon should be evaluated within the framework of regional order rather than bilateral security relations.
3. Changes such as the Vietnam War and the rise of Japan revealed that the ASEAN states should make normative arrangements to maintain the status quo and pursue their mutual self-interest in socio-economic development.
4. Member states began to think that a peaceful regional environment should be created to achieve national transformation positively and to strengthen national cohesion.

As described by Shafie (1992: pp. 44-46), in light of these results, Malaysia put forward a neutralization proposal intended to limit the political influence of foreign interests in the Southeast Asian region by making three requests of the great powers:

- They should respect Southeast Asia as a neutral region.
- They should not involve Southeast Asia in global politics.
- They should give guarantees on neutrality.

ASEAN member states were recommended:

- Not to interfere with each other's internal affairs.
- To adopt non-aggression.
- Not to participate in the competition between the great powers.

We can say that the attempt to limit the great powers through their behaviour was the most original aspect of this proposal. Besides, it can be noted that the recommendations for the behaviour of member states were aimed at strengthening the peaceful identity of the regional order. According to Acharya (2001: p. 54), two things were necessary for the neutralization to be successful in practice: the guarantees of the great powers, the ultimate end of foreign military bases, and member states refraining from opportunistically participating in external alliance relations. However, great powers such as the USA, the Soviet

Union, and China did not have the desire to withdraw from the region altogether (Abdul Wahid 1992: pp. 114-115; Alagappa 1992: p. 399). In the ASEAN framework, while Thailand and the Philippines thought that external forces were significant in forming the regional security framework, Indonesia had a sceptical approach towards the major powers and thought that neutrality would legitimize the intervention of major powers such as China. Indonesia, which considered Malaysia's proposal as a challenge to the claim of regional power, considered that the political conditions that caused foreign intervention should be eliminated (Leifer 1974: pp. 312-313). Because of all these issues, Malaysia's proposal remained highly utopian, but it was a motivating dynamic for the ASEAN states in creating a more realistic vision.

We can say that ZOPFAN symbolizes a structural change by bringing specific dynamics and norms to the ASEAN regional order. The expressions in ZOPFAN highlight the idea of the coexistence of ASEAN states, manifest in phrases such as "cooperate together in the economic, social and cultural fields" and "states may coexist peacefully" (ASEAN Secretariat, 1971). In connection with this point, referring to the UN principles, ZOPFAN regulated the principles of coexistence for the ASEAN countries based on tenets of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, abstention from threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of states (ASEAN Secretariat, 1971). When we examine these principles, four points stand out: the principle of coexistence, the immunity of states' rights, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the limitation of the use of force. Accordingly, the ZOPFAN assumed that regional security would spontaneously manifest through realization of principles of peaceful coexistence in the regional order.

The ZOPFAN shaped relations between states through norms such as *the acceptance of sovereign rights of other states, equal rights, and self-determination and non-interference* (ASEAN Secretariat, 1971). Consequently, ZOPFAN tried to support and strengthen the normative dimension of co-existence. Given that the problems between the ASEAN states were based on sovereignty and legitimacy, certain norms such as non-interference in affairs of state would make interstate relations more stable. Hence, contributing the order by making norms a common value in interstate relations was an essential goal of ZOPFAN (Narine 2006:



p. 213). Consequently, analyses of ZOPFAN asserted that ZOPFAN was a reflection of political cooperation in the region (Singh 1992: p. 78). Nevertheless, ZOPFAN was not only a reflection of political collaboration, but it was also a conceptual perspective reflecting and shaping ASEAN's view about political values like peace, freedom, and neutralization.

ZOPFAN stated that the ASEAN states could cooperate with the countries defending peace in the provision of world peace. Besides that, it stipulated that member states were responsible for ensuring peace, irrespective of the forms of conflict, including foreign intervention and political and economic forms of conflict. ZOPFAN defined the national existence of the member states independently from external interferences, and in this way accorded them significant freedom. The fundamental motivation underlying this freedom was a belief that foreign interventions would negatively affect the ability of states to govern. A major topic to be noted was that the ZOPFAN did not give any privileged role to the great powers (ASEAN Secretariat, 1971). Furthermore, the ASEAN countries were aware that they would not receive any guarantee from the great powers for neutralization, and therefore they asked from the great powers to respect the independence and sovereignty of the ASEAN states. Thus, ZOPFAN, which softly described the position of the great powers, made neutralization more flexible as a desired target in the long run.

The ZOPFAN must be seen in terms of its response to critical matters such as military bases previously raised in the Bangkok Declaration (ASEAN Secretariat, 1971). ASEAN states created the ZOPFAN blueprint to evaluate these issues (Hanggi 1991: p. 25). The ZOPFAN blueprint can be analysed in three items:

- It strengthens the practical dimension of coexistence by stating that ASEAN states should not interfere with conflicts outside the region, and they must not be a party to a treaty incompatible with the objectives of the regional order (Hanggi, 1991).
- In the ZOPFAN blueprint, the ASEAN states decided to remove foreign bases, and forbid all activities related to nuclear weapons. Because of insecure relations between member states and suspicious approaches to China and Vietnam, the Bangkok Declaration stated that foreign bases were temporary.



Expression of complete removal of foreign bases indicates that the ASEAN states were beginning to trust each other to a certain extent, though not completely. In addition, the prohibition of all activities related to nuclear weapons, both for major powers and regional states, represents a general and comprehensive standard for peace (Hanggi 1991: p. 26).

- The ZOPFAN blueprint stated that member states could undertake free trade policies and receive free assistance (Hanggi 1991: p. 25). In this way, it aimed to support the economic development of member to undermine internal discontent and thus trends conducive to internal political and social conflict, contributing positively to regional order and stability.

However, while ZOPFAN articulated the rules of coexistence, it was not fully functional due to contradictions and gaps between theory and practice. As a significant contradiction, although ASEAN stated regional security autonomy as a target, in practice, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore maintained their security-based relations with the great powers. Also, for the implementation of the objectives in the ZOPFAN, the ASEAN states did not specify a specific plan and an appropriate timeframe. Additionally, there was a disconnect between the situation in the ZOPFAN and the institutional capacity of ASEAN and the real intentions and structures of the member states (Khong 2005: p. 30; Leifer 1989: p. 58). For instance, Chin Kin Wah (1984: p. 20) said that the member states described the values of peace and freedom in the ZOPFAN, but the political legitimacies and moral qualities of the ASEAN states were not transparent in practice. In *realpolitik*, member states thought that if the ZOPFAN was not implemented, it would not impose any obligations on them (Narine 2002: pp. 21-22). Therefore, the ZOPFAN did not contain legally binding provisions, and it remained only a perspective or vision statement. More importantly, there was no complete consensus on what the topics in ZOPFAN, in particular peace, freedom, and impartiality, meant in detail. As the Philippines' Foreign Minister later pointed out, when foreign ministers discussed matters such as neutralization, they could not agree on a specific definition (Hoon 1992: p. 40). Therefore, the ASEAN states expressed a general perspective on these issues.

*The Rules of Cooperation: ASEAN Concord and TAC (1976)*

With the ZOPFAN and Nixon's visit to China in 1972, the ASEAN states hoped that regional and international relations could transform positively. The USA reduced its influence in the region in the 1970s, and this altered the regional power balances. In the 1960s, US influence in Southeast Asia had been hegemonic, and balanced the spheres of activity among other great powers and regional states themselves. In the power vacuum created by US disengagement during the 1970s, the Soviet Union and China had an opportunity to expand their political and military influence in the region, which led to increasing the divisions between the ASEAN and Indochinese (i.e. Communist-oriented) states, who had different political perspectives (Koga 2014: p. 741). Nationalist regimes in ASEAN were haunted by the spectre of the collapse of their counterparts in Vietnam and Cambodia, and the possibility of the expansion of Communist movements into the ASEAN region remained a distinct possibility. Furthermore, the existence of the Sabah Problem drew attention to the question of how ASEAN would resolve members' disputes. Also, the ASEAN countries felt that the US military and economic aid, which played an instrumental role in national development and the prevention of the effectiveness of Communist groups, would not be sustainable in parallel with Washington's desire to reduce its engagements in Asia (Koga 2014: p. 742).

According to the ASEAN countries, the threats they faced were a result of their inability to develop a strong perspective and institutional structure. In this perspective, the ASEAN states felt that existing political, economic, technological and security developments should be re-evaluated, and an arrangement ought to be made according to the current events (Luhulima 1992: p. 43). In doing so, the founding philosophy of the regional order was reflected in practice with a stronger determination (Hoon 1992: p. 41). In this context, institutional mechanisms for implementation could be established. All of these were the primary motivations that led to the gathering of ASEAN's first official summit in Bali, 1976. Compared to previous ad hoc meetings, three crucial documents emerged in this first formal meeting: the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, and the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat. These agreements contained remarkable subjects regarding

the cooperation rules of the regional order and can be read in the context of the cooperation rules mentioned by Bull (1977).

When the political dimension is examined, the ASEAN Concord addressed political cooperation for the first time in a legal framework (it was previously dealt with only as a behaviour). Besides, to make the political cooperation more functional, the ASEAN Concord mostly mentioned practical issues such as meetings of heads of government, developing judicial cooperation, and strengthening political solidarity (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976a). The ASEAN states were adding a new dimension to the regional order by foreseeing research to improve legal collaboration. In addition to the issues at ASEAN Concord, the TAC explicitly posited a state-centred political cooperation approach, some of which was expressed in the Bangkok Declaration and the ZOPFAN. The basic principles of this cooperation approach were:

- a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;*
- b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;*
- c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;*
- d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;*
- e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;*
- f. Effective cooperation among themselves.* (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976b)

With these points, TAC created a template on how to conduct inter-state relations in the regional order. TAC was designed as a pact aimed at eliminating aggression among states by envisaging a peaceful solution and forbidding the use of force (Narine 2002: p. 23). These points, which aiming at conducting interstate relations on the basis of reconciliation, positively intended to change the Indochina variables, which could adversely affect the ASEAN regional order (Kin Wah 1984: p. 16). The ASEAN countries thought that the problems in Indochina were due to the use of force and the violation of states' national and sovereign rights. Accordingly, they wanted to broaden peace, harmony, and political stability by applying these principles to all of Southeast Asia, including the Indochinese states (Sharpe 2003: p. 233). Briefly, with these six principles, TAC had set out examples of legally binding

behaviour for the nature, content, and progress of the ASEAN regional order (Koga 2014: p. 732).

The ASEAN Concord and the TAC had developed a qualified and exhaustive vision about economic cooperation. This vision envisioned an economic development based on open and economic cooperation, rather than on a closed economy. The fundamental dynamic behind this economic cooperation was related to the attitudes of the member states towards ASEAN and their approaches to regional issues. For national leaders, this was predicated on poverty alleviation. As Tun Hussein Onn, the former leader of Malaysia, said: "ASEAN is not a security organization, but our goal is to provide food for people" (Leifer 1989: p. 68). According to the ASEAN states, the main reason for the security problems in the region was that people and groups who had terrible economic conditions and exposed to social injustice, resorted to violence. Therefore, the method to prevent security threats was to encourage economic development and to provide social justice (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976b). The ASEAN states thought that ensuring domestic security through economic growth and social justice would enable member states to pay more attention to the continuity of the ASEAN regional order.

The TAC aimed to regulate the behaviour of the member states regarding the resolution of disputes. To this end, it called for the establishment of a High Council composed of a minister of the member states. The TAC High Council was the embodiment example of the intention to settle disputes peacefully, one of the founding philosophy of the regional order. For this purpose, the TAC said that the High Council shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as *good offices*, *mediation*, *inquiry* or *conciliation* (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976b). That is, the TAC High Council contributed to the continuity of diplomacy, one of the functional elements of the order. However, the fact that the implementation of these methods is linked to the agreement of the parties indicates that ASEAN will be considered as a functional mechanism rather than playing a direct role in conflict management (Weatherbee 2010: p. 131).

On the other hand, the ASEAN states did not perceive the collapse of anti-communist regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia as an event outside their borders. The member states thought that the problems in Indochina

stemmed from intervening in the internal affairs of one another and using force. Accordingly, member states believed that the implementation of the ASEAN regional order principles to Indochina would eliminate the problems and would make a more functional regional order. When the ASEAN principles played a useful role in resolving the issues between Indochinese states, the fear of Communism was the main driving force of effective cooperation among ASEAN. Within this framework, TAC was left open for accession by other states in Southeast Asia (Weatherbee, 2010). This status showed that the ASEAN regional order was not limited concerning its scope.


Another critical issue was that debate on the nature of the ASEAN regional order at the Bali Summit. Indonesia advocated that ASEAN should turn into defence cooperation in the face of regional threats, and it suggested joint military exercises in this framework. Other members of ASEAN did not accept Indonesia's offer due to some points. First, according to Malaysia and other ASEAN members, the socio-economic approach was more compatible with the realities of the regional system. Second, when ASEAN was structured as a security alliance, Indochinese states could adopt more aggressive political behaviours that could lead to serious changes in regional power balances in the context of strategic concerns. Finally, in the Cold War environment, ASEAN defence cooperation and military exercises were perceived by Indochinese states as evidence of ASEAN's subservience to US interests (Acharya 2012: p. 169). For all these reasons, the ASEAN Concord and the TAC were restricted in their main emphasis on social and economic factors, at the expense of macro-political issues such as defence. We can see this situation in the rules of cooperation, in the security perspective, and the approach to disagreements.

In the Bali Summit, member states signed the ASEAN Secretariat agreement, which regulated many technical issues concerning the operation of ASEAN. The ASEAN Secretariat was designed to coordinate communication between member states and committees in the framework with the aim of managing ASEAN more effectively. The ASEAN Secretariat Agreement adopted a practical role carrying out activities such as information and organization in many fields, from the structure of the committees to the communication between member states (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976c). That is to say, with the establishment of an institutional mechanism such as the secretariat,

member states considered that ASEAN would become more technically functional and efficient.

On the other hand, in the context of discourse, the ASEAN Concord, TAC, and Secretariat Agreement did not include binding and clear definitions regarding practice. Examining the documents reveals that many statements gave initiative to member states, but the content of such expressions were not clearly defined. Besides that, the member states were reluctant to make the necessary legal arrangements for the development of legal cooperation (Quisumbing 1992: pp. 79-80). In addition, the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN Summit, which were established for further institutionalization of ASEAN, were not functionally considerable (Koga 2014: p. 733). Therefore, the lack of a coordination mechanism that could enable member states to adopt a strong perspective about political and economic issues led to the perpetuation of institutional weakness, and thus limited practical impact. Besides, although TAC foresaw certain mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes, its functionality was indirectly limited, as the implementation of these mechanisms depends on member states bringing disputes to the High Council (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976b). Indeed, after the ASEAN regional order was fully established in 1976, the TAC High Council was never be put into practice. The fact that ASEAN Concord does not specify the time interval for the meeting of the heads of government of the member states causes this mechanism to remain ineffective most of the time. Based on the elements analysed, Figure 2 visualizes the formation of order in ASEAN.

*Figure 2: Representation of the formation of the ASEAN regional order*



## Conclusion

From the perspective of the ES, the primary determinant of the formation process of the ASEAN regional order was that Southeast Asian states wanted to avoid and inhibit anarchic elements, such as communism and internal instability. With Indonesia's decision to give up *Konfrontasi*, common interests concerning eradicating anarchy and providing economic benefits have become more significant. In this process, it was an important event that the founding members, who took lessons from the ASA and the MAPHILINDO and were aware of their shared values, became more prone to cooperation rather than adopting a rigid attitude. In this framework, through the Bangkok Declaration, ZOPFAN, ASEAN Concord, and TAC agreements, the Southeast Asian states have adopted constructive norms that protect the rights of the member states (such as sovereignty and territorial integrity), aim at solving the disputes peacefully, and establish economic collaboration. Also, the member states have sought to strengthen the normative dimension through institutional mechanisms such as the TAC High Council. Thus, the five founding members have succeeded in establishing a regional order that includes norms, rules, and institutions, instead of a regional system that includes elements such as chaos, violence, power struggle, and war.

The ES's position that norms play a significant role in the formation of political organizations is valid in the empirical example of ASEAN. In the evolution of the regional order, ASEAN formed norms or principles on how to manage inter-state relations, how to deal with problems, and how to achieve economic progress. When establishing norms and principles, ASEAN took into account the concerns of the member states, regional variables, and the basic rules of international relations. However, ASEAN has revealed the unique ASEAN Way approach, a common framework germane to the perspectives and priorities of member states. This Way allowed member states to achieve their interests and to achieve their own internal transformations under various norms, including a commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Therefore, in this early period, the member states considered the ASEAN regional order to be a value that should be protected.

The Bangkok Declaration established the basic norms in the formation of the Southeast Asia regional order, while ZOPFAN fulfilled



the transformation on a normative basis, enshrining non-interference in internal state affairs and creating a framework for a more ambitious regional order by developing a common approach to peace, freedom, and neutrality (Frost 1990: p. 7). The ASEAN Concord and the TAC provided a legal framework for regional order by expressing the regional norms under a theoretically binding contract (Weatherbee 2010: pp. 129-130). More importantly, the rules of cooperation formed a general perspective by defining the nature, characteristics, and limits of the ASEAN regional order. Within the framework of the Bangkok Declaration, ZOPFAN, ASEAN Concord, and TAC, we can say that the ASEAN regional order aims to improve cooperation and solve problems within the context of economic and social elements and does not include defence and military aspects.

On the other hand, there were uncertainties regarding the practice dimension of the regional order and the nature of institutional functioning, such as the annual meetings of the foreign ministers. More importantly, the lack of strong mechanisms to implement norms independently from the state in the institutional sense was a major deficiency. In some areas, such as the role of the great powers, the lack of balance between fiction and reality has led to the fact that the principles of regional order remain merely theoretical. This status was also valid for norms or concepts such as neutrality, whose content was ambiguous. However, despite all these shortcomings, we can say that the ASEAN regional order is a substantial formation that shows the cooperate will of member states.

We can tell that the ASEAN regional order was a state-centred formation because the protection of the existence and sovereignty of the states were priority issues. Besides, diplomacy had been the most important functional element of the order, as seen in the case of the formation of rules and institutions. The ASEAN countries, which were aware of the destruction caused by Indonesia's leadership desire in the regional system, used the diplomacy mechanism to effect a balance of power. In doing so, the ASEAN countries took advantage of the position of the great powers in some events, such as regional relations in early period. The great powers were determinant actors in the establishment of ASEAN, the formation of the content of norms, and the approach to events, mostly as an opponent, and sometimes in a supportive role. Another point is that collaboration in regional order aimed at primary topics such as strengthening sovereignty, protection of territorial



integrity, ensuring security, and realizing economic development. This situation showed that the scope of cooperation was limited. Based on all these elements, we can say that the ASEAN regional order was pluralistic in the context of actors, normative dimensions, institutions, and cooperation.

## References

- Abdul Wahid, Z. A. B. (1992). ZOPFAN: Enhances ASEAN Security. In B. A. Hamzah (Ed.), *Southeast Asia and Regional Peace: A Study of the ZOPFAN* (pp. 114-115). Malaysia: ISIS.
- Abell, R. J. (1972). *Philippine Policy towards Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia, 1961-1969*. PhD Thesis, Australia: Australian National University.
- Acharya, A. (2001). *Constructing Security Community: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. London: Routledge.
- Acharya, A. (2012). *The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Alagappa, M. (1992). The U.S. and ASEAN's Approach to Security in Southeast Asia. In K.S. Sandhu, Sharon Siddique & others (Eds.), *The ASEAN Reader* (pp. 398-400). Singapore: ISEAS.
- ASEAN Secretariat. (1967). *The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)*. Bangkok, 8 August 1967.
- ASEAN Secretariat (1971). *Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration*. Malaysia, 27 November 1971.
- ASEAN Secretariat (1976a). *The Declaration of ASEAN Concord*. Indonesia, 24 February 1976.
- ASEAN Secretariat (1976b). *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia*. Indonesia, 24 February 1976.
- ASEAN Secretariat (1976c). *Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat*. Indonesia, 24 February 1976.
- Ayoob, M. (1999). From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 53(3): 247-260.
- Bain, W. (2018). *The Pluralist–Solidarist Debate in the English School*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, Online Publication Date: January 2018.
- Bull, H. (1966). The Grotian Conception of International Society. In Herbert Butterfield & Martin Wight (Eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations*. London: Allen and Unwin.

- Bull, H. (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. London: Macmillan.
- Butterfield H. & Wight M. (Eds.) (1966). *Diplomatic Investigations*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Buzan, B. (2014). *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Devlen, B., Patrick, J., and Özdamar Ö. (2005), *The English School, International Relations, and Progress*. *International Studies Review*, 7(2): 171-197.
- Demirbaş Ç. E. and Aydın G. (2014). *Bir Örgütlenme Çerçevesi Olarak 'ASEAN Yolu'nun Başarısı*. *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, 10(37): 71-107.
- Djiwandono, J. S. (1992). *ZOPFAN: Its Continued Relevance*. In B. A. Hamzah (Ed.), *Southeast Asia and Regional Peace: A Study of the ZOPFAN* (pp. 73-77). Malaysia: ISIS.
- Dunne, T. (2007). *English School*. In Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith (Eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Finnemore, M (2001). *Exporting the English School*. *Review of International Studies*, 27(3): 509-513.
- Frost, F. (1990). *Introduction: ASEAN Since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments*. In Alison Broinowski & others (Eds.), *ASEAN into the 1990s*. London: Macmillan.
- Girling, J. L. S. (1992). *Regional Security in Southeast Asia*. In K.S. Sandhu, Sharon Siddique & others (Eds.), *The ASEAN Reader* (pp. 369-371). Singapore: ISEAS.
- Gonzalez-Pelaez, A. & Buzan, B. (2003). *A Viable Project of Solidarism? The Neglected Contributions of John Vincent's Basic Rights Initiative*. *International Relations*, 17(3): 321-339.
- Gordon, B. (1964). *Problems of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia*. *World Politics*, 16(2): 222-253.
- Grant, B. (1992). *The Strategic Balance in Southeast Asia*. In K.S. Sandhu, Sharon Siddique & others (Eds.), *The ASEAN Reader* (pp. 372-378). Singapore: ISEAS.
- Griffiths, M. (1992). *Order and International Society: The Real Realism?* *Review of International Studies*, 18(3): 217-240.
- Hanggi, H. (1991). *ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept*. Singapore: ISEAS.

- Heng Chee, C (1992). ASEAN and the Indochina Conflict. In K.S. Sandhu, Sharon Siddique & others (Eds.), *The ASEAN Reader* (pp. 382-385). Singapore: ISEAS.
- Hoon, K. (1992). The Evolution of ASEAN, 1967-1975. In K.S. Sandhu, Sharon Siddique & others (Eds.), *The ASEAN Reader* (pp. 38-42). Singapore: ISEAS.
- Hurrell, A. (2003). Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake? In Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis & Andrew Hurrell (Eds.), *Order and Justice in International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jorgensen, A (2014). İngiliz Okulu. In Şaban Kardaş & Ali Balcı, *Uluslararası İlişkilere Giriş*. Istanbul: Küre Yayınları.
- Jorgensen-Dahl, A. (1982). *Regional Organization and Order in Southeast Asia*. London: Macmillan.
- Khong, Y. (2005). The Elusiveness of Regional Order: Leifer, the English School and Southeast Asia. *The Pacific Review*, 18(1): 23-41.
- Kin Wah, C. (1984). Regional Attempts at International Order: ASEAN. *Australian Outlook*, 38(1): 16-20.
- Koga, K. (2014). Institutional Transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN, TAC, and the Bali Concord I in 1968-1976. *The Pacific Review*, 27(5): 729-753.
- Leifer, M. (1974). Regional Order in Southeast Asia: An Uncertain Prospect. *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 64(255): 309-317.
- Leifer, M. (1989). *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia*. London: Routledge.
- Linklater, A. & Suganami, H. (2006). *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Luhulima, C. P. F. (1992). The Third ASEAN Summit. In K.S. Sandhu, Sharon Siddique & others (Eds.), *The ASEAN Reader* (pp. 43-47). Singapore: ISEAS.
- Mahbubani, K. & Sng, J. (2017). *The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace*. Singapore: Ridge Books.
- Mayall, J. (2000). *World Politics: Progress and its Limits*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Narine, S. (2002). *Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Narine, S. (2006). The English School and ASEAN. *The Pacific Review*, 19(2): 199-218.

- Palabıyık, M. (2016). İngiliz Okulu. In Ramazan Gözen (Ed.), *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Pollard, V (1970). ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967: Southeast Asian Regionalism. *Asian Survey*, 10(3): 244-255.
- Quisumbing, P. V. (1992). Role of Law in ASEAN Development. In K.S. Sandhu, Sharon Siddique & others (Eds.), *The ASEAN Reader* (pp. 79-82). Singapore: ISEAS.
- Roberts, C. (2012). *ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Ronnfeldt, C. (1999). Beyond a Pluralist Conception of International Society? A Case Study on the International Response to the Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34(2): 144.
- Saravanamuttu, J. (1986). Imperialism, Dependent Development and ASEAN Regionalism. *Journal of Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 16(2): 204-222.
- Shafie, G. (1992). Neutralisation of Southeast Asia. In B. A. Hamzah (Ed.), *Southeast Asia and Regional Peace: A Study of the ZOPFAN* (pp. 44-46). Malaysia: ISIS.
- Sharpe, S. (2003). An ASEAN Way to Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia? *The Pacific Review*, 16(2): 231-250.
- Shimada, K. (2010). "Working Together" for Peace and Prosperity of Southeast Asia, 1945-1968: The Birth of the ASEAN Way, PhD Thesis, Australia: University of Adelaide.
- Singh, B. (1992). *ZOPFAN: The New Security Order in the Asia-Pacific Region*. Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications.
- Suganami, H. (2010). The English School in a Nutshell. *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies*, 9, 15-28.
- Watson, A. (1992). *The Evolution of International Society*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Weatherbee, D. (2010). *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Weinert, M. (2011). Reframing the Pluralist-Solidarist Debate. *Millennium*, 40(1): 21-41.
- Wheeler, N (1992). Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 21(463): 466-467.
- Wight, M. (1966). The Balance of Power. In Martin Wight & Herbert Butterfield (Eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Wight, M. (1977). *Systems of States*, In Hedley Bull (Ed.), UK: Leicester University Press.

- Wight, M. (1986). Power Politics. In Hedley Bull & Carsten Holbrod (Eds.), London: Penguin.
- Wight, M. (1991). International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
- Williams, J. (2005). Pluralism, Solidarism and the Emergence of World Society in English School Theory. *International Relations*, 19(1): 22-25.
- Young, O. (2005). Whither the English School. *International Studies Review*, 7(4): 629-630.
- Yurdusev, A. N. (1994). The Concept of International System as a Unit of Analysis. *METU Studies in Development*, 21(1). 147-148.