An Interview with Dr. Rashid Ghannouchi

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Rashid Ghannouchi is the co-founder of the Ennahda Movement (Party) of Tunisia, currently the largest political party and part of the country’s troika ruling coalition. Born in the year 1941, Ghannouchi is globally acknowledged as the party’s “intellectual leader” and ideologue. He is considered as one of the world’s leading figures in the area of contemporary Islamic thought. His ideas on the issues of Islam and modernity, democracy and secularism, relations between East and West, human rights and civil society have been quoted by Islamists, Muslim intellectuals and activists around the world. He was awarded the Chatham House Prize in 2012 by Prince Andrew, Duke of York, alongside Tunisian president, Moncef Marzouki, for “the successful compromises each achieved during Tunisia’s democratic transition.”

I was invited to Tunisia by al-Ghannouchi’s office on 20th January 2014, along with other journalists and academics from other Muslim countries, for a special dialogue with him. The discussion focused on many issues but primarily on Islamic political thought, Maqasid al-Shari’ah (higher objectives of Shari’ah), Arab Spring, democratic transition in Tunisia since 2010 and the achievements of Ennahda Party as the leading political party in Tunisia.

MM (Maszlee Malik): Ennahda managed to seize majority seats in parliament in the Tunisian General Election in 2011. How was that possible, given that Tunisia had gone through extensive secularisation since the Bourgeba era?

RG (Rashid Ghannouchi): Alhamdulillah (thank God), after a long series of nightmares, the people of Tunisia have finally been given the opportunity to see the bright side of the world and experience the beauty of freedom and justice. The Jasmine revolution of 2010, which brought the first spark of the current ongoing Arab Spring throughout the Middle East created a new meaning to Tunisians’ life. However, the path is not easy. The counter-revolution movements that happened mainly in Egypt have some effects on us too in Tunisia. Ennahda believes that this revolution is a gift and also a responsibility for all Tunisians. We have to protect it together. We would never want to lose it and return to the dark ages. In achieving it, Tunisians must come together and thus, the national unity should be our main priority in maintaining the revolution. Ennahda is aware of the size of the mess caused not only by the two dictators, but also by their predecessor, the French colonial power. Religion has been taken away from public life, but Alhamdulillah, religion is still strongly rooted in the majority of Tunisian people. Ennahda realised the huge sentiment against religion in certain quarter of the people, and also the anti-religious feelings amongst some. However, they too are Tunisians and they too need to come together to build this country from ashes. They too
understand the need for freedom, justice and mutual co-existence with others. At the end of the day, Ennahda strongly adheres to the national unity agenda and always believes that the revolution should not be monopolised by any one group of people. We have proven this in our actions. Despite winning the majority seats in parliament, we have never thought of ruling the country alone or by ourselves. We have never thought of shaping the future of this country singlehandedly. We established the “Troika” coalition with al-Muktamar party or Congrès pour la République (CPR) led by Moncef Marzouq who later was elected as the first Tunisian president in the post-revolution period, on 12 December 2011, and with al-Takattol party or démocratique pour le travail et les libertés (FTDL) led by Mustapha Ben Jaafar. The fact that CPR won 29 seats and FTDL won only 20 seats did not prevent Ennahda to leverage the power to be shared with them. We have also agreed to give more space to the opposition to make sure that they carry out their responsibilities in the parliament efficiently and not just be there as a token presence.

**MM:** Is Ennahda not keen in the Shari’ah law and in building the Islamic state? Is there any Islamic perspective adopted in achieving Ennahda’s political objectives?

**RG:** Ennahda adheres to the concept of Maqasid al-Shari’ah (higher objectives of Shari’ah) that was extensively developed by Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, one of the scholars of the al-Maghreb al-’Arabi (Western Arabian region, i.e., the Northern African region) and the author of a greatest treaty, al-Muwafaqat. The theory of Maqasid was then enshrined and translated into modern application by the late Tunisian great scholar of Usul al-Fiqh, Syeikh Tahir Ibn Ashur. According to the understanding of Maqasid al-Shari’ah, any act, ruling or policy undertaken or adopted by Muslims must be in accordance with the highest aims of Shari’ah that are exemplified in the preservation and promotion of five major qualities in human life, i.e. life (and quality of life), religion or belief, mind or intellectuality, wealth and progeny. Ibn Ashur added three more qualities: freedom (al-Hurriyah), justice (al-‘Adalah) and equality (al-Musawah). Whatever decisions are taken by Ennahda are in compliance with this vision. Thus, to enshrine this Maqasidic approach, Ennahda has to abide by the rule of gradual process (sunnah al-tadarruj) and the rule of priorities (fiqh al-Awlawiyat). Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) has shown to us how he treated issues and cases according to these two rules during his lifetime. The Qur’an itself has also guided Muslims to follow these methods through its revelation of certain rulings that took place gradually. It is based on this consideration that Ennahda believes that the preservation and the maintenance of freedom and justice that were the direct results of Jasmine revolution should be on the top list of its priorities now and in the years to come. Ennahda also believes that it cannot deliver this responsibility alone. However, Ennahda does not wish to establish an Islamic republic or an emirate, nor does it wish to implement certain set of criminal punishments, at this moment and in the near future. Those were never in Ennahda’s agenda. Ennahda’s gradual and accommodating approaches have been endorsed by the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), chaired by Syeikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi.

**MM:** Then what is Ennahda’s main agenda for the country?

**RG:** Ennahda is and will forever remain consistent with its aim of bringing a real revolution in Tunisians’ life. Political revolution is only part of the process; however, the real revolution that must take place is the revolution within every people’s life and their attitude. The change of the country’s system is not enough without the change in people’s attitude and their way of thinking. The real revolution must uphold the people’s change within to ensure human dignity (al-Karamah al-Insaniyah) as the cardinal principle of the society. Hence Ennahda will continuously do its best to educate all Tunisians to have a more civilised and moral way of thinking and living. To ensure that, Ennahda is committed to preserving the freedom and democracy which have been brought by the revolution. We have experienced all the nightmares brought by the dictatorial rule in which freedom and democracy were suffocated and taken away from the people. We don’t want those nightmares to haunt us again. For that, Ennahda will never allow any authoritarian rule, or any one man or one group to come into power and dictate over the people, not even if it be Ennahda itself. This is our promise.

**MM:** Ennahda is an Islamic party; how do you justify your vision as that of an Islamic party?

**RG:** It was explained earlier that Ennahda strongly adheres to the approach of Maqasid. Ennahda also believes that Tunisia is for all Tunisians and not for Muslims only or anybody else. Ennahda also firmly adheres to the principles of freedom of politics, freedom of speech, freedom of idea and all the other values that constitute a civilised country. Ennahda itself is not restricted to certain category of people with certain appearances or fashion. It opens its door to everybody. You can see that in the parliament. You can see the colourfulness of the Ennahda parliamentarians. However, it is the ideals of Maqasid, Shura (mutual consultation) and mutual respect (tasamuh) that bind us together and to uphold what we consider as our Islamic duties and good deeds in the field of politics.

**MM:** Still we can see there are resentments from certain parties against Ennahda, especially amongst the Leftist parties. Why?
RG: Not all leftists are against Ennahda and the government. It is also wrong to say that all liberals are against Ennahda. What we are having are the oppositions who represent a small segment of the population. Some of these groups have been our rivals since the university days in the 70’s. It is well known that during the 70’s, the competition in the campuses in terms of recruitments, elections and spreading of ideas had always occurred between the Leftists and the Islamists. Now that we are in power and been elected by a big portion of the community, and that they have been relegated to the opposition, they seem to be disagreeing with whatever we are doing. We tried many times and relentlessly to extend our hands asking them to be with us in the government and to build this country back together based on national consensus, but they refused. However, in a democratic country we do need a strong opposition for the sake of check and balance. Ennahda refused. However, in a democratic country we do need a strong opposition for the sake of check and balance. Ennahda refused. However, in a democratic country we do need a strong opposition for the sake of check and balance.

MM: Why should Ennahda compromise and follow the demand and pressures from the oppositions when it is enjoying a majority support from the people?

RG: If we had remained adamant and refused to listen to the oppositions, then we would have sacrificed democracy and kept the door open for disruption and terrorism. Instead we conceded power in order to make room for Tunisia’s Constitution and its national unity. As a result, we will be having Tunisia’s first peoples Constitution based on consensus, which if it comes to reality will be the greatest achievement in Tunisian history. Moreover, Ennahda believes that any change to occur in the country should be through national consensus and in an inclusive way. Ennahda did receive support and trust from many Tunisians. That will keep ensuring Ennahda to be the king maker of Tunisian political future. We might leave the government as demanded, but any government to be established will always need Ennahda to be part of it, and any leader to be chosen must always get the approval from Ennahda.

MM: After Ennahda decided to pull out from the government, was there any dissenting voice from within the party?

RG: Definitely, since the Movement itself is made up of people from all walks of life. However, all members are in agreement on certain principles that bind them together. These are adherence to democracy, collective leadership and Islamic identity based on *Maqasid*. Many disputes and disagreements would occur when certain decisions were taken which were seen by some not to be in favour of the party or in the interest of Islam. However, continuous dialogues and discussions amongst the leadership as well as amongst the grassroots leaders would slowly help to get everybody to agree unanimously, or to agree tacitly in spite of their personal differences. As you would have seen, there were a few party members in parliament who threatened to leave the party in opposition to the idea of not including the provision for Shari’ah in the new Tunisian constitution. However, after some discussion they agreed and came back for the sake of national unity.

MM: What are the great lessons learned for Ennahda from Egypt?

RG: Egypt is paying the price for its geographic position and an international conspiracy. The deep state, the elites, foreign interest and a lot of other factors have contributed to the ongoing political turmoil in Egypt.

MM: Do you think what happened in Egypt could also happen in Tunisia?

RG: I don’t see how things that occurred in Egypt could happen in Tunisia, especially a military coup, since the Tunisian army respects democracy and has never been heavily involved in politics like in Egypt.
Hijab Wearing Phenomenon among Muslim Women in Malaysia: A Quantitative Study

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Introduction
In most countries of the world, it is common among Muslim women to wear hijab. The growing emphasis on Islamic dress code has made it customary for Muslim women, in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries, to wear this garment. A great amount of attention has been given to the causes surrounding the phenomenon, ranging from matters related to religious obligation (Hawkins, 2011) and identity negotiation (Furseth, 2011), to the satisfaction in or reasons for wearing hijab (Williams and Vashi, 2007; Ali, 2005).

In Malaysia, many Malay women choose to wear hijab and this is often seen as part of Malay Muslim women’s identity. Hijab is “the headscarf that covers a woman’s head, hair, neck, and ears [but not the face]” (Williams and Vashi, 2007: 270). It is not surprising that hijab or headscarf is sold everywhere, mainly at the stalls and shopping complexes. Apart from that, the Internet has become a good selling outlet for hijab nowadays. Apparently, hijab is sold quickly, especially those with up-to-date and trendy designs, providing more choices for the customers. With loads of designs and trends, currently hijab has become a popular choice of fashion statement among Muslim women in Malaysia.

Scholars have studied the practice of wearing hijab from many perspectives including the historical, theological

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**MM:** Is there any pressure on Ennahda from foreign powers?

**RG:** As far as I am concerned, there is no direct pressure on Tunisia or on any political party in the country. Some EU countries are facing illegal migration of Tunisians to their soil, and in some instances those illegal immigrants are involved in social problems and crimes like drugs, gangs and terrorism in those countries. It is no secret that there are some Tunisian Muslim youths who are involved in terrorist activities in European countries. Moreover, some of those who had been detained by the security forces during Ben Ali’s period due to their involvement with terrorist groups were freed after the revolution. There is some fear from those European countries that these people might enter their countries. In such a situation, any instability in Tunisia will only instigate the people to migrate to a better place across the Mediterranean Sea. For the sake of mutual interest, those European countries must ensure and work together with the political power in Tunisia to maintain stability. For that, political and economic stability is on the top priority list. With regards to the terrorism issue, those countries realise that a moderate approach of Islam is needed to be embraced by the Tunisian society. They too are aware that the rising phenomenon of terrorism is just another reactionary response of certain people to the extreme secularist policies of the past regimes in Tunisia. In this regard, European countries need a movement like Ennahda to bring their moderate view to the mainstream.

**MM:** How do you think Ennahda could be a model of power-sharing between Islamic parties and others in other countries?

**RG:** For Ennahda, the domination or monopoly of power by one individual or a group is not an acceptable norm. Due to our willingness to share power, Tunisia has succeeded in getting through a national dialogue and reaching agreement among 26 political parties with different ideologies and backgrounds. Our common goal is democracy and country’s stability. As far as power is concerned, Ennahda and many others believe that the younger generation or the youths should be empowered and trusted with the leading role in running the country and that the revolution was achieved by their efforts.

**MM:** In many of your interviews in the past, you have mentioned about the “Turkish model” for establishing harmony between Islam and democracy. However, as we know, currently PM Erdogan is facing a lot of problems not only with the secularists, but also with the Islamist Gulen. What is your take on Turkey then?

**RG:** The Turkish model of AKP led by Erdogan is very unique. Not only has the party accepted democracy wholeheartedly, but the extreme secularists represented by the army that was once dominating over Turkish politics have also been pacified to accept democracy. Moreover, AKP has managed to bring growth to Turkish economy and hence created more business and job opportunities for the people. The situation in Turkey in terms of development, education, economics and politics is far better than they were in the past. We hope the new Tunisia could replicate the Turkish model in this sense. However, AKP and Erdogan are now facing a great tribulation. He is now really needed to wisely deal with both internal and external issues that will determine the future of AKP politics in Turkey. We pray for the best for Turkey.

**MM:** Thank You, Mr. Ghannouchi.

**RG:** You are welcome!
and sociological perspectives (Furseth, 2011; Williams and Vashi, 2007). In Islam, wearing hijab is a religious obligation made for all women. Apparently, it is an act of obedience that has been clearly ordained in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. In the Qur’an, there are several verses which highlight the importance of hijab. Among these are the following:

O Prophet! Say to thy wives and daughters and the believing women that they draw their outer garments (jilabeeb) close to them; so it is more likely that they will be known and not hurt. God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate. (Al-Ahzab, 33: 59)

And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husband, their father… and they should not strike their feet so as to draw attention to their hidden ornaments. (An-Nur, 24: 31-32)

And know that women advanced in years, who no longer feel any sexual desire incur no sin if they discard their thiyah (outer garments), provided they do not aim at a showy display of their zeenah (charm and beauty). But it is better for them to abstain (from this); and God is All-hearing, All-knowing. (An-Nur, 24: 60)

O children of Adam! Wear your beautiful apparel (zeenah) at every time and place of prayer. (Al-A’raaf, 7: 31)

In the Hadith, too, there are several references to the practice, one of which is cited below:

Aisha said, ‘Asma, daughter of Abu Bakr [that is, Aisha’s sister], entered upon the Apostle of God (pbuh) wearing thin clothes. The Apostle of God turned his attention from her and said, “O Asma, when a woman reaches the age of menstruation, it does not suit her except she displays parts of her body except this and this,” and he pointed her face and hands.’

To the majority of Muslim women, hijab is a symbol of modesty. When asked about the reasons for wearing hijab, Wil-

liam and Vashi (2007) found that the word “modesty” was used repeatedly by their respondents. In another study, Zulkifli and Fatin (2013) found that for Muslim women aged 13 and above in Shah Alam, fashion was one of the reasons for wearing hijab.

Many people over the years have misunderstood the meaning of hijab, thinking that it only meant covering one’s head and hair. This study, therefore, seeks to understand how the religious-minded women mediate the reasons for and satisfaction in wearing hijab to strengthen their belief in the custom. The specific objectives of the study are: (1) to analyse the relationship between the reason for and satisfaction in wearing hijab and how it changes the social perception towards Muslim women and (2) to assess how faith plays a role in the attitude of Muslim women towards wearing hijab.

Reasons for Wearing Hijab

A growing number of studies have shown that there are various reasons for wearing hijab (Furseth, 2011; William and Vashi, 2007; Zulkifli and Fatin, 2013). Many believe that wearing hijab is mandatory as it is a part of religious obligation. In a study conducted in Los Angeles, USA many respondents simply refer to hijab as an “injunction found in the Qur’an” (Furseth, 2011: 371). Similarly, in Malaysia where Islam is the official religion and where the population is predominantly Muslim, it is not surprising that Muslim women consider wearing hijab as a religious obligation.

In recent years, hijab has become the most visible symbol of Muslim identity and issues (Ali, 2005; William and Vashi, 2007). In a study conducted in the USA, Ali (2005) found various reasons for wearing hijab among young immigrant women in the country. They believe that it is Allah’s will, and hijab-wearing is part of the proper behaviour of a Muslim woman. However, there are others who wear it only to avoid the male gaze. Some wear hijab because of influence of family members and friends (Aini, Saodah and Rizalawati, 2013). Apart from that, women may also wear hijab because it is pretty, trendy and modest but an attractive outfit (Zulkifli and Fatin, 2013). Other reasons for wearing hijab include comfort, length, colour and pattern (Aini, Saodah and Rizalawati, 2013). All in all, women who wear hijab draw satisfaction from wearing it.

Integrating Social Learning Theory with Uses and Gratifications Theory

Social Learning Theory was coined by Albert Bandura, a psychologist, in 1977. Bandura proposed that individuals developed general behaviour and attitude by modelling on the behaviour of others. Individuals learn or model behaviour, values, attitudes and skills through the observation of other indi-

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Social Learning Theory recognises that much of human behaviour is learned through watching other people. This does not apply to only children but also to adolescents and adults. Women are also no exception. They, too, are affected by other people, TV and magazines. Such exposure leads to change in knowledge, attitude and behaviour. If women watch and see the fashion in women’s dressing, they will ultimately gain the knowledge on the contemporary popular trends. In all likelihood, this will then influence their thinking and taste on fashion and dressing, and make them crave for the latest designs for themselves.

The Uses and Gratifications Theory (Blumler and Katz, 1974), on the other hand, states that people differ in their sense of gratification and they often seek information from various sources to cater to this. This relates to wearing hijab as well. Muslim women provide reasons for and obtain varying degrees of satisfaction from wearing hijab. Therefore, this study incorporates both the Social Learning Theory and Uses and Gratifications Theory to investigate the hijab wearing phenomenon within the Muslim world, especially in Malaysia.

Methodology of the Study

Method

The study employs a quantitative research design, using a cross-sectional survey method. The method is used to tap the uniqueness of gathering primary data for unbiased representation of the population of interest, as well as for standardisation of measurement. The study used questionnaire as the research instrument for data collection. Data were collected by trained enumerators from November until December 2012 from Muslim students at IIUM and again in March 2013 from Muslim women nationwide.

Population and Sampling Procedure

The population for the study are Muslim women in Malaysia. Since the study taps on the issue of hijab wearing, it is pertinent that the respondents be those who wear hijab. This is to make the respondents a uniform group. The sampling procedure was basically done using stratified random sampling where the enumerators were asked to collect data from various states, according to residential areas.

The Sample of the Study

From a total of 796 respondents, the mean age of the respondents was 25.57 years, with a minimum age of 12 years and the maximum age of 68 years. More than half of the respondents were holding bachelor’s degree (56.1%) while others were mainly certificate (26.8%) and diploma holders (12.1%). Most of the respondents were from day co-education secondary schools (40.8%) while almost one-fifth of them (17.9%) were from day-religious schools, and one-fifth had attended boarding-religious schools (15.5%). The highest percentage of the respondents went to those families having more than 8 members (38.5%), followed by families with 5-6 household members (35.5%). In terms of household income, the average household income is RM4360. With regards to residential area, almost half of the respondents were staying in the urban area (47.8%), followed by suburban (29.9%) and rural areas (22.4%). All states were represented, with Selangor being the largest (21.1%), followed by WP Kuala Lumpur (11.9%), Kelantan (11.0%) and Perak (10.6%).

Figure 1: Theoretical framework for variation in effect and selected variables

Summary of Hypotheses

H1  Reason for wearing hijab has a positive relationship with wearing it.
H2  Satisfaction in wearing hijab has a positive relationship with its wearing.
H3  Reason for wearing hijab has a positive effect on the religiously resilient attribute.
H4  Satisfaction in wearing hijab has a positive effect on the religiously resilient attribute.
H5  Religiously resilient attribute has a positive relationship with the effect from wearing hijab.
H6  Reason for and satisfaction in wearing hijab influence the religiously resilient attribute which in turn motivates the person in wearing hijab.
Instrumentation and Measurement

For this paper, only selected parts are tapped to answer the objectives of the study. For the purpose of the study, effect from wearing hijab was measured on a 5-point Likert-like scale, where 1=no change, 2=little change, 3=moderate change, 4=much change, 5=very much change, with 10 items allocated for it. Reasons for wearing hijab, satisfaction in its usage and the extent of religious commitment in the practice (religiously resilient attribute) were measured according to the level of agreement on 10 items, each measured using a 5-point Likert scale, where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=slightly agree, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree. For the purpose of analysis, each variable was calculated for its mean prior to inferential statistical testing, that is, partial correlation, using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Win 20, for the relationship and for the mediating effect.

Validity and Reliability Test

For the actual data, reliability test of the variables were used to analyse for the homogeneity of items as well as for the cohesiveness of the items concerned. Exploratory factor analysis was also conducted and results showed that all items under each specific variable were loaded on one factor. Table 1 shows the reliability values for all the variables in the study, used for this paper. All variables are reliable, with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .885 to .939.

Table 1: Reliability test for selected variables in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No. of Items</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reason for wearing hijab</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction in wearing hijab</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiously resilient attribute</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect from wearing hijab</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.939</td>
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Findings of the Study

Almost all of the respondents indicated positive reasons for wearing hijab (94.3%), with the top three answers being: “It helps portray a Muslim image” (95.7%), “I want to be a good Muslim” (95.5%) and “I can protect my modesty” (94.6%). With regards to satisfaction in wearing hijab, the majority of the respondents (86.6%) expressed favourably in wearing the costume. Their satisfactions were mostly in, “I abide by the Islamic regulations” (93.3%), “I feel more confident” (91.1%) and “I can easily get the hijab in the market” (89.7%). Almost all of the respondents (89.8%) had a positive change from wearing hijab. Specifically, they expressed, “I tend to learn more about Islam” (91.7%), “I am more conscious about what to wear” and “I am closer to Allah” (both having a response of 91.6%) and, finally, “I make sure that I follow Islamic teachings closely” (91.5%). In terms of the religiously resilient attribute, almost all the respondents (92.4%) admitted that they were able to deal with difficulties in life with religion. This means that they are religiously resilient. They variously expressed that “I am proud of my religion” and “My religion makes my life more meaningful” (both scoring 96.5%), and “I found the beauty of Islam after following its practices” (94.2%).

Relationships among Effects of Wearing Hijab, Reasons for Wearing It, Satisfaction in Wearing It and Religious Commitment of the Wearer

Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of the constructs, with zero-order and partial correlations between all the variables under study. It is found that there is a strong positive relationship between effects of wearing hijab with reasons for wearing it (r=.670, p=.000, df=713) and the religious commitment of the wearer (r=.678, p=.000). However, the relationship between effects of wearing hijab and satisfaction from wearing it is a moderate one (r=.590, p=.000). There are strong relation-
ships between reasons for wearing hijab and satisfaction in wearing it ($r=.626$, $p=.000$), and with the religious commitment of the wearer ($r=.684$, $p=.000$). Nonetheless, satisfaction in wearing hijab and the religious commitment of the wearer is moderately related ($r=.545$, $p=.000$). All the relationships are significant. Therefore, H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5 are supported. Thus, the mediating effects analysis can be tested.

**Relationships between Variables and Effects of Wearing Hijab**

When religious commitment acts as a control variable (Table 2), the relationship between effects of wearing hijab and reasons for wearing it reduced from $r=.670$ ($p=.000$) to $r=.385$ ($p=.000$); similar is the case between effect of wearing hijab and the satisfaction in wearing it, where the relationship reduced from $r=.590$ ($p=.000$) to $r=.359$ ($p=.000$). Therefore, it shows that the religiously committed is partially able to mediate the reason and the satisfaction towards the effect from wearing hijab. Hence, H6 is supported.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

We can conclude from the 796 respondents that they were diverse in terms of their age group, level of education, employment status, household size, household income, residential area and state of origin. Their reasons for wearing hijab were positive, more towards religious obligation, which is in line with the findings of Ali, 2005; Furseth, 2011; Hawkins, 2011; and William and Vashi, 2007. In addition, their satisfaction in practising the custom was rooted in the teachings of Islam and in adopting it wholeheartedly. This coincides with the findings by Aini, Saodah and Rizalawati, 2013. Moreover, the effect of wearing hijab is more pronounced in the case of a better Muslimat. This is because some women found wearing hijab as something difficult. But with various elements attached to hijab, such as comfort, length, colour and pattern, hijab wearing is associated with modern ways of dressing among Muslim women in Malaysia (Aini, Saodah and Rizalawati, 2013; Zulkifli and Fatin, 2013).

Findings also show that relationships among the effects of wearing hijab, reasons for wearing it, satisfaction in upholding the practice and the religious commitment of those who adhere to the custom are significant. Therefore, Social Learning Theory together with Uses and Gratifications Theory hold true for hijab wearing. This is because adopting Islamic cultures and practices needs knowledge of Islamic teachings and beliefs which in turn instils the value of wearing hijab in a positive way in the individual. Nonetheless, religious commitment plays an important role in inculcating the value of hijab wearing as Muslimat dressing, which in turn helps to reaffirm their faith in the religion and in their identity as Muslim women.

**Works Cited**


Contrasting Views on the Development of Arabic Grammar: A Brief Analysis

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There have been debates and discussions on the influence of Greek on Arabic. Modern historians such as Ahmad Amīn, in his book Duha al-Islām (1969), says that Hunain bin Ishāk (260H/873AD) went to Rome to learn Greek and then came back to Baṣrah to learn from Khalīl (Aḥmād Amin 313). This idea is strongly supported by Mustafa Naẓīf when he states that Khalīl was visited by Hunain to study Arabic (Aḥmād Amin 313). Some modern historians are of the view that many scholars of the time were influenced by Greek civilisation such as Bustānī, a learned man who was very competent in Greek, and Khalīl, who was influenced by Aristotle’s ideas especially on the concept of cause and effect (Mahdī al-Makhzūmī 68). Muṣṭafā Ṣādiq Raḥīe says that al-harākāt (declension) in Arabic did not originate from Arabia but from Syria when it was governed by the Romans, who put some small harakāt when they read the Bible (Brokelman 105).

When we look at the historical stages through which Greek became a lingua franca, we find that at the same time the Aramaic dialect of Syria also developed into an independent and important language under the influence of Greek civilisation (Versteegh 1-2). Another version has it that the Persian Empire had built the school of Jundisapur near Kufa which became a “refugee school” for those who had run away from other universities, like those of Alexandria and Antioch because of their heretical opinions (Versteegh 2). This institution disseminated the ideas of Greek philosophy in Mesopotamia and Greek writings were translated into Syrian and Persian directly. It is evident here that Jundisapur became the greatest institution in giving inspiration to the process and that it was the first sign of Greek influence on other cultures.

Triggered by this influence, the first juridical speculation appeared among Muslim scholars in the shape of the first Mu‘tazilite debate on the Qur’ān, the problem of free will and the doctrine concerning the attributes of Allah (Versteegh 2). It was also believed that the Hellenistic universities not only provided courses in Greek philosophy but also in the Greek language which was the most important medium of teaching and which constituted a compulsory subject for every student of philosophy (Versteegh 3). Greek exercised an enormous influence upon Syrian in the form of many loan words, the system vowel-signs, even the literary style (Versteegh 3). Obviously, this process became important after the Arab invasion of Syria when the Syrian versions were rendered into Arabic (Versteegh 15), and the idea of translation passed into the language of administration such as for the tax register in Damascus (Versteegh 17). Moreover, in the late 10th century, Hamzah Aṣfahānī (d. 961 CE) used Greek historical materials directly in the court of ʿIṣfahānī (Versteegh 18).

According to G. Troupeau, A. Merx, a famous historian, in his book Historia Artis Grammaticae Apud Syros, tried to relate the dependence of Arabic grammar on the logic of the appearance of declension, the division of words into three parts of speech, the distinction of three tenses and the notions of ʿarf and hāl (Versteegh 8). Merx also believes that the influence of Greek linguistics appeared after the introduction of Mu‘tazilite logic which had been discussed among the Mu‘tazilites (Versteegh 16).

The above discussion suggests that the influence of Greek thinking on the Arabic language was clearly used in the development of the judicial process during the time of the Mu‘tazilites, especially in the logic. However, the early historians argue that the influence of Greek on Arabic started from the establishment of the “Hellenistic Institution” when books of Greek philosophy and literature were translated into another language such as Syrian. Thus, most of the historians believe that Syrian became the intermediary between Greek and Arabic. In fact, there were a few famous translators at that time such as Hunain Ibn Ishāk and Yahya Ibn Bīṭrīk. Evidently, Damascus became a centre for the Greek language during the 3rd, 4th and 5th centuries (Wright 470), when the language was officially used in the courts and administrative offices.

In contrast, some historians and linguists believe that the Arabic language was totally free from Greek influences and its grammar originated with the Arabs themselves. We will discuss the concept of an-nahw in Arabic starting from al-juz‘i ilā al-kulli or from the concept of logic in Aristotle moving from al-juz‘i ilā al-kullī. The word Nahw, which literally means intention, path or direction, has in the course of time acquired a special usage connoting a technical term an-nahw. However, it is not the only Arabic word whose sense has been restricted to denoting a particular discipline. Fīkh, which literally means knowledge or apprehension, has also been used to designate a special branch of the Islamic sciences, namely Jurisprudence (Jami‘ ʿAlīsh 17). Information as to how the word nahw became a technical term or when the science of nahw first came into existence or who developed this discipline, is very obscure. Although nearly all the anecdotes reported in connection with this issue mention Abū al-Aswād al-Du‘ālī (Jurjānī 78; Al-Ṭārīfī 34-37; Abū Ṭayyīb 27; and Shawqī Daif 13-15), when attempting to answer the questions, the information supplied by them is inconsistent. One of these anecdotes reports that Abū al-Aswād al-Du‘ālī, having seen a
paper on which it was written that all speech falls into three categories – *ism, fi’il* and *harf* (Ibn al-Anbārī 4) – Caliph Ālī said to Abū al-Aswād: *Unhā haża an-nahwa wāḏf ilaihi mā waqa’a ilaika* (Follow this direction adding to it whatever comes your way). After that, Abū al-Aswād wrote two chapters on *‘aḍf* and *na’at* (Shawqī Da‘if 5), followed by two other chapters on *ta’ajjub* and *istiḥām* (Shawqī Da‘if 15), and continued to compile his grammar up to the chapter on *inna wa akhwātuhā* (Ibn al-Anbārī 5) but for some reason or other, he forgot to include lākinnā. In revising the work, Caliph ‘Ālī asked him to include it. After that, Abū al-Aswād submitted every chapter he wrote to ‘Ālī. Addressing Abū al-Aswād, ‘Ālī said: *ma ahṣana hadha an-nahwa al-lāzī nāhuṭa* (What a marvellous direction you have followed). It is said that this occasion was the origin of the word *nahw* in the sense of “grammar.” It is also said in this connection that ‘Ālī was motivated to put forward the fundamental principles of grammar by hearing a Bedouin read the Qur’anic verse *là ya’kulu illā al-khāṭṭa’úna* incorrectly as *là ya’kulu illā al-khāṭṭī ñna* (Ibn al-Anbārī 8).

Another anecdote attributes the reason for Abū al-Aswād applying himself to his grammatical work to the fact that his daughter once said to him *ma aḥsana as-sama‘* (What is the most beautiful part of the sky), and on hearing this, Abū al-Aswād replied *nujūmuhā*; its stars. When his daughter told him that she should have said *ma aḥsana as-sama‘*, he began writing his grammar starting with the chapter *at-ta’ajjub* (al-Sirāfī 36).

A third anecdote reports that during the caliphate of ‘Umar al-Khaṭṭāb, a Bedouin, on asking to be taught the Qur’ānic verse *lā ya’kulu illā al-khāṭṭa’úna* incorrectly as *lā ya’kulu illā al-khāṭṭī ñna* (Ibn al-Anbārī 5), his daughter once said to him *wa’dū zamānī yabna marwān lam yada’/ mina al-mālī illa musahtan au mujarrafun*.

The word *mujarrafun* should be read as a genitive style (*al-naṣb*) because of its system being same as *musahtan*, the word which came before. This fact indicates to us that it was during Abū al-Aswād’s time that an attempt was made to reform the foreign speaker’s use of Arabic. Otherwise, Khalīl had concentrated on phonology until he produced the dictionary of phonology called *al-‘Ayn*. This is not to say that he overlooked the subject of *nahw*. He actually classified *nahw* in Arabic into three categories: noun (*ism*), verb (*fi’il*) and connectives (*hurūf*). What we need to stress here is that the system of *nahw* which is not discussed in al-‘Āmil itself was not quite familiar in Abū al-Aswād’s time although it was used in poetry. The dispute between Ibn Abū Ishāq al-Hadrāmī and Farazdāk led to a difference of opinion on the question of *harakāt* but by Sibawayh’s time a general agreement was reached in support of a single view.

Here we can assume that the parts of *nahw* comprising *dommah, fathah and kasrah* are taken from older languages such as Syrian, Hebrew, Persian and Sanskrit but the micro system of Arabic grammar comes from the Arabs themselves especially in confirmation of ‘Āmil Ma’nawī in subject, predi-
cated and present tense. The Basrah School of Linguists believe al-‘Āmil al-ma’nawī concept of ra’fa’ in subject and present tense to be the Ibīda’. We believe this feature is not evident in many other languages because this ra’fa’ indicate that it is free from an intruder such as nāṣob or jārr. Otherwise, the accusative (nāṣob) and generative (jārr) are called al-‘Āmil al-Lafzī which could change the case form or declension. We should not forget that in Arabic the invisible governor or element zero in ideas of al-‘Āmil is called al-ishīqīgāl. We cannot find exactly where the governor of the sentence is. In contrast, the governor appears very clearly, for example in Zaydān dharaṭbihū, Zaydān becomes the governor whereas the governor of the sentence is dharaṭbihū which is the precedent of the sentence and disappears according to the Basran School. Otherwise, another group of Arab grammarians called the Kufah School believe that the governor of the sentence is dharaṭbihū after Zaydān because daraba comes from fi’il muta’addi (transitive verb). However, we do not want to dwell on their squabbles; what we have to point out here is that in Arabic grammar according to The Basran School an invisible al-‘Āmil al-Mugaddam exists.

We believe there are differences among the national varieties of Arabic, with the Qur’ān as its model and Arabic grammar which is based on standard written. It is possible that historians of Arabic are not always aware of these differences. Thus, they treat the Arabic language and Arabic grammar in the same manner. Actually, from our analysis the situation is totally different. We could not deny that the Arabic language has been influenced by other languages which in their own turn were strongly influenced by Greek, like Assyrian, Syrian, Persian and Sanskrit. The influences are clearly seen in that we find many loan words from other languages such as Greek (Fasafah, Geografiah, Zaburīd, Zamūrīd, Ya‘qūt) (Ahmad Amin 267); Sanskrit (Zānābil, Kapūr, Babghāk, Khaizurān, Filīfī, Ahīlājī) (Ahmad Amin 267); Assyro-Armenian (Akkū, ‘Ummattatu, Tištūh, Zābū,īlā, Qarībūn, Malākū) (Magīd Khīrī Bīk 25-26); and Syrian (Aramaic dialects) (Ābū, Shama’, Hābū). There were even some pronouns similar to Aramaic such as ‘Anā ‘uṇū which means ‘Anā in Arabic and ‘Ant Anta which means Anta Antuma.

To strengthen the point, I agree that Sibawayh was the first grammarian who brilliantly undertook the task of assembling the linguistic facts, which form part of a social system, into a juridical organised corpus (Versteegh 14). He adduces four important terminological arguments: first the use of moral criteria in grammar such as hasan (good), ḫābīḥ (bad), the ḫiyās (a juridical method), Maudhī (derived a legal turn). A great many linguistic terms have a juridical connotation, e.g. Shart (condition), ‘Īwād (compensation), Badal (replacement), Hadd (limitation), Hujjah (argument) and Niyyah (intention) (Versteegh 14). However, we believe that it cannot be accepted if we base a spontaneous linguistic corpus on Sibawayh alone, because he himself acknowledged that many authorities named in his book, such as ‘Abū al-Aswād al-Durālī, Yūnūs bin Habīb, Khaliṣ, ‘Abū Amrū and Kiṣāṭī and Farrā’, also helped in the collection of linguistic corpus. This kind of information shows us that Sibawayh never ignored the contribution of others. It is possible that as a supporter of the theory of Nahw in Arabic he moulded the theory according to his own understanding of the life of the Arab tribes of his time. Nevertheless, he introduced the system which contrasts with his own Arabic grammar and he called it ‘Lughah Akailīn al-Baraghīnū’ where one governor governs two governors. This phenomenon Sibawayh found in use among the tribe of al-‘ Ṭā‘ī and Azīd as-Shanū‘ah (As-Sayyūf 514). In the case of Tanāzū‘, on the other hand, two governors govern one governor as in ‘Amrū Ibn al-‘Aṣīr’s verse: Walau anna ma‘ as‘āli adnā ma‘iṣātīn/kafāni walām āṭlōb kālīlum mināl mālī. One of the strictest rules in Arabic syntactic theory is precisely that one governor can never govern more than one element at the same time, for instance in the verse quoted above the words kafāni and walām āṭlōb are al-‘Amils. The poet didn’t say kālīlum but kālīlum with dīmmah which means it belongs to kafāni not walām āṭlōb. This verse indicates that Arabic was not influenced by Greek thinking at the time and that ‘Amrū Ibn al-‘Aṣīr introduced the system of al-‘Āmil accidentally. This point has been supported by C.H.M. Versteegh: “We do not assert that Arabic linguistic thinking was a copy of Greek grammar, but we do believe that the instruction of Greek grammar was the model and the starting point for Arabic grammar” (15).

These pieces of evidence strongly suggest that the influence of Greek on Arabic occurred only in respect of vocabulary. The system of Nahw in Arabic came from the Arab intellectuals themselves, So, the claim that Arabic language has been influenced by Greek grammatical thinking is very much questionable and ought to be disputed.

Works Cited


Commuting and Life Satisfaction among Selected Kolej Komuniti Staff in Perak

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1.0 Introduction

The national average (one way) commute duration is 29 minutes (Regus, 2011). This means the commuters are exposed to a multitude of potentially taxing stimulus and event for almost an hour every working day. The hours spent on commuting and its consequences have direct and indirect effects on the quality of life as an individual and as a member of a work organisation. For example, exhaustion among people using trains to commute is associated with both individual physical health and intention to quit their job (Mohd Mahudin, 2011). The present study was conducted to explore commuting patterns in the state of Perak by focusing on selected staff of Kolej Komuniti (Community Colleges).

Kolej Komuniti, established all over Malaysia, offers continuing education opportunities for secondary school leavers who are not able to join the tertiary education institutions. In Perak, there are 13 Kolej Komuniti offering short programmes, certificates and diplomas in various areas like culinary art, interior design and construction. The colleges provide a platform for students whose academic qualifications are not as good as their university-bound peers to gain skills in highly employable areas. Thus, the colleges are important to create equal opportunities among the younger people to carve good futures for them. To support the agenda set for the colleges, the issues surrounding employment of the academic and administrative staff need to be examined. Factors impacting the quality of working life of the staff should be understood. The main purpose of this paper is to describe the commuting patterns among staff of the colleges. The second purpose is to examine the relationship between commuting and life satisfaction among the staff. By conducting this study, a state-level statistics would be gathered to understand the local scenario with regards to commuting. This information would be useful as input for making decisions about assignment of staff to the different branches of the college.

Continued on page 13

Continued from page 11


Quotations from the Qur’an

“Let not your own hands contribute to your destruction. And do good; indeed, Allah loves those who do good.” (2: 195)

“… and that when you judge between men, you judge with justice.” (4:58)

“For you is your religion and for me is my religion.” (109:6)

“Allah loves those whose deeds are good.” (3:148)
1.1 Commuting

Commuting can be defined as a regular travel between one’s primary residence and place of work. Non-work related travels may also be considered as commuting, like going to the gym (leisure activities), places of prayer (religious activity) and sending/fetching children from school (parental duty). However, for the purpose of this paper, only work-related travel is considered as commuting. Published studies have documented the effects of commuting on people. Generally, there is a negative relationship between commuting and mental health. Commuting is associated with higher self-reported stress (Evans, Wener and Phillips, 2002), subjective well-being (Stutzer and Frey, 2008) and mental health (Feng and Boyle 2013; Ohta, Mizoue, Mishima and Ikeda, 2007), although the gender differences were inconsistent. A possible explanation of the negative relationship between commuting and psychological well-being is the negative emotion surrounding the commuting experience. Commuting can produce more negative emotions such as loneliness, irritability, worry and guilt (Mann and Holdsworth, 2003). The effects of commuting are also demonstrated objectively through physiological measures like salivary cortisol (Evans and Wener, 2006) and blood pressure (Schaeffer, Street, Singer and Baum, 1988). The level of salivary cortisol was found to be higher among people who perceived their commute as more unpredictable (Evans et al., 2002). Moreover, the level of control over the vehicle’s interior environment and choice of route were also related to stress (Schaeffer et al., 1988).

There is also evidence of negative impacts of commuting on physical health. One study found commuting to be associated with self-reported sleep quality, tiredness and self-rated health (Hansson, Mattisson, Björk, Östergren and Jakobsson, 2011). Sitting in a vehicle reduces the time and opportunities to engage in physical exercises and other healthy behaviours. It also increases the risk of back pain and exposes people to pollution and environmental hazards.

1.2 Life Satisfaction

Much of the studies on commuting involve measurement of variables that are framed in terms of negative experience (e.g. stress). The present study attempts to examine the relationship between commuting and a life experience defined in positive terms. A scale widely used to measure life satisfaction is Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) which correlates well with other measures of subjective well-being (Diener, Emmons, Larsen and Griffin, 1985). Because the scale is not domain specific, satisfaction with life can be used as a global measure of positive experience in Malaysia. The scale has been used in the original English language (Ng, Loy, Gudmunson and Cheong, 2008), but there is also a Bahasa Malaysia version of it (Swami and Chamorro-Premuzic, 2008). In both cases, the SWLS demonstrated good psychometric properties.

1.3 Objectives

The objectives of the study are as follows:

a) To measure time taken to commute to work among staff of Kolej Komuniti.

b) To examine the relationship between life satisfaction and commuting duration or time.

2.0 Method

2.1 Participants

Purposive sampling was used to recruit participants from four Kolej Komuniti in Perak. The colleges are among the biggest in Perak in terms of staff number. The participants were given the questionnaire booklets which were collected and mailed back to the researcher. A total of 200 booklets were distributed.

2.2 Instruments

The Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) consisting 5 items was taken from Diener et al. (1985). Respondents indicated their agreement or disagreement on a 7 point Likert-type scale ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree. Higher scores indicate greater satisfaction. The lowest scores range between 5 and 9, indicating extreme dissatisfaction. Scores ranging from 10 to 14 indicate dissatisfaction with life. Scores ranging between 15 and 19 indicate slight dissatisfaction with life. A middle score of 20 represents a neutral view. Scores ranging between 21 and 25 represent slight satisfaction with life. Scores ranging between 26 and 30 signify satisfaction with life, and the highest score ranging from 31 to 35 shows extreme satisfaction with life. “If I could live my life over I would change almost nothing.” is an example of a statement in this scale.

2.3 Procedure

The questionnaire booklets were distributed to the staff and they were given one month to return them. Descriptive analysis was done to describe the commuting pattern among the staff. Regression analysis was performed on the SWLS scores with duration and time spent on commuting as the predictors.

A total of 55 booklets were returned and the data from them were used. Table 1 presents the descriptive values of the
3.0 Results and Discussion

### Demographic variables

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demographic variables. Female participants comprised slightly more than three quarters of the participants. The majority of the participants had a bachelor’s or a master’s degree and this is manifested in the high percentage of DH grade holders. Only 13.2% of the participants were non-teaching staff (N, S and W grades). A high majority of the staff are married but almost three quarters of them are not living with their spouse. However, only less than 10% of them live separately from their children.

The commuting time is similar to the national estimate reported in the Introduction section. However, there is a large spread of time as reflected in the standard deviation and range (from 5 minutes to 270 minutes). There were 32.7% of the participants who had spent 60 minutes or more for their journey. The commute distance also has a big spread (from 0.5km to 150km). The majority (56.6%) covered 20km or less during their commute.

This set of values exposes the work-life reality of many skilled and knowledgeable workers. Their work-life compromises generated a multitude of solutions as represented by the big spread of commuting time and distance. Moreover, the domestic affairs seem to require special attention in light of the high percentage of the married staff living separately from their spouse.

For the second objective of the study, it was found that the SWLS had an acceptable internal consistency reliability, Cronbach alpha=0.726. Overall, the participants reported a level of satisfaction which is just above the slight satisfaction
Using a linear regression analysis, it was found that both commuting distance and time were not significant predictors of SWLS’s score. The regression model was not significant, $F(2,49)=0.904, p=0.412$. This result could be due to the large variations of the predictor’s score. Gender differences, which could mask the main effect of commuting, were not investigated using this sample due to the small number of male participants.

4.0 Conclusion

The sample of Kolej Komuniti in this study reveals a pattern of commuting that is similar to the national pattern, at least in terms of duration spent on the road. The large variation in the time and duration points to the complexity of commuting experience and the surrounding issues. This study reveals that the work-family set up requires further examination in light of the high percentage of married staff living separately from their spouse, but not from their children. To improve the life satisfaction and quality of life, more efforts are needed to help facilitate the staff to juggle the demands of work and family. Administrators of the colleges can examine the needs of the staff who literally put the extra mileage and time into their work.

Works Cited


Quotations from the Qur’an

“Give full measure and full weight, in justice…. And whenever you give your word (i.e. judge between men or give evidence), say the truth.” (6:152)

“Show forgiveness, speak for justice and avoid the ignorant.” (7:199)

“Eat and drink, but waste not by extravagance.” (7:31)

“God does not forbid you to be kind and equitable to those who have neither fought against your faith nor driven you out of your homes. In fact God loves the equitable.” (60:8)

“My Lord! Increase me in knowledge.” (20:114)
Cross-Cultural Exchanges between East and West during the Andalusian Era: An Overview

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While presenting the multiple facades and images of civilizational conflicts that existed during his time, the 12th century traveller Ibn Jubayr, an Andalusian, also documented the healthier side of relationship between the East and the West in his book Riḥlat Ibn Jubayr (Travels of Ibn Jubayr). Indeed, his account could be a good platform for any potential framework of cultural exchange between the two hemispheres. Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of Ibn Jubayr’s travelogue is the highly detailed description of his travels from Muslim to non-Muslim lands during the Crusades, including his travel experience on board of non-Muslim ships. Hence, it is fair to consider Ibn Jubayr's travels as an indispensable historical source which documented the relations between the Muslim state and the Roman Byzantine Empire, during the period that shortly preceded Ṣalaḥuddin’s conquest of Jerusalem in the year 1187 AD. In his account, he provided the most extraordinary of spectacles as quoted below:

One of the astonishing things that is talked of is that though the fires of discord burn between the two parties, Muslim and Christian, two armies of them may meet and dispose themselves in battle array, and yet Muslim and Christian travellers will come and go between them without interference. That fighting takes place between the two armies of the Muslims and the Christians, but it is followed by truces and the Muslims and the Christians exchange visits without anyone objecting to it. (Naṣar 16)

Ibn Jubayr saw Ṣalaḥuddin’s army in the fortress of Kerak, one of the greatest of the Christian strongholds, between it and Jerusalem lies a day's journey or a little more, but still the caravans passed successively from Egypt to Damascus, going through the lands of the Franks without impediment from them. In the same way, the Muslims continuously journeyed from Damascus to Acre (through Frankish territory), and likewise not one of the Christian merchants was stopped or hindered (in Muslim territories). The Christians impose a tax on the Muslims in their land; and likewise the Christian merchants pay a tax upon their goods in Muslim lands. Agreement exists between them, and there is equal treatment in all cases. Ibn Jubayr then sums up those conditions in a brief yet expressive sentence: “The soldiers engage themselves in their war, while the people are at peace and the world goes to him who conquers.” He further comments: “Such is the usage in war of the people of these lands; and in the dispute existing between Muslim Emirs and their Kings it is the same, the subjects and the merchants interfering not” (Naṣar 224). Ibn Jubayr records the same pattern in another location of his travelogue: “One of the strangest things in the world is that Muslim caravans go forth into Frankish lands, while Frankish captives enter Muslim lands” (Naṣar 232).

Ibn Jubayr indicated the dividing line between the Muslim and the Christian worlds. In the city of Paneas “We came to an oak tree with an enormous trunk and large branches, which they told us was called ‘the tree of the balance.’” In response to our questions, they said that the name was given because the tree marked on this road the boundary between security and the danger of attack by Frankish brigands, i.e., either scouts or highwaymen. They seize as prisoners all whom they find beyond this tree on the Muslim side, even if it is only by a span’s distance; on the contrary, whosoever is beyond the tree on the Frankish side by the same distance can continue his journey in freedom” (Naṣar 33).

As a consequence of Muslim and Christian mixing and sharing of land, Ibn Jubayr reported an incident of a Muslim who was captured by the Christians and after he was ransomed by his fellow Muslims, he declared his apostasy and became a Christian (Naṣar 239). For Christians who converted to Islam, such a unique event carried a special significance and was carried out in rare rituals. Ibn Jubayr relayed the incident of a man who converted with his female cousin to Islam before the Emir Mas’ūd: “He took a red-hot golden cross and put it under his foot” (Naṣar 239).

Ibn Jubayr, who returned to Spain in 1185, was shipwrecked in Sicily. Later he demonstrated a lot of affection for its king, King William II, who welcomed the traveller to Sicily and paid the landing fee for his fellow Muslim colleagues. Ibn Jubayr reported that his handmaidens who concealed their Islamic faith were able to convert many Frankish women who came to the royal palace. In his account he also reports of a meeting with a notable Sicilian called Ṭāb al-Maṣīḥ, who hosted him and his companions at his home and revealed to them his “close-guarded secrets” (Naṣar 252).

Conflict among the Romans themselves was another aspect of the politico-military status quo of that era. Ibn Jubayr remarked that when he arrived to the Roman Islands
which exceeded three hundred and fifty under the ruler of Constantinople, he found that the Romans were watchful towards its people in the same way they were cautious towards Muslims (Naṣar 243).

Cultural exchange between East and West is a social necessity that conforms to the universal laws, provided that the two sides approach one another in good faith. This rapprochement is shored up by a long compass of several historical stages, especially among nations that hold a great deal of cultural and intellectual diversity, as well as varying religions and beliefs. For the sake of interests and dogma, it is not unusual that conflicts and political tensions erupt in such an environment; nevertheless, stability soon prevails because of the strong cultural ties that bring different peoples together, whether they belong to the East or the West. Andalusia or Spain was a unique example of rapprochement between Muslims and Christians. Montgomery Watt has pointed to the unusual relations in the state and Muslim society, such as the entry of Christian families in obedience to some Muslim families and the political allegiance of some Muslim families to other Christian families.

Cultural exchange is not limited to the material things only; it rather goes beyond it to embody that superior set of human values. Therefore, it is a grave fault to simplify today’s ongoing conflicts as a struggle between rich and poor; rather, it is a conflict between two different worldviews. Between one vision that has abandoned norms, values, humanity, and adopted the principle of end justifies the means, and submits to the material reality of wealth and power. The other opposite vision is humane in nature, hence embraces moral and spiritual values and strives to employ the new power which science and new technologies have provided for humanitarian and virtuous ends. It abstains from the dull stories of princes, military generals, wars and the sort of domination that encloses vindictory mythologies. Surely, for this vision, there is always a human history — not of destruction but a history of achievement and excellence, an achievement that is dynamic and continuous, and aims to benefit humanity in a harmonious cross-enrichment of cultures and civilisations.

This adaptive history was proudly reflected in the Iberian Peninsula, where humankind’s maturity was shown — thanks to the wonderful blending of the Asian and African Eastern cultures with European Western cultures. Rauger Garaudy, a prominent French philosopher asserts the humanistic dimension of that particular civilisation when he quoted Reinhart Dozy, a Dutch historian of French origin, saying: “in some respects, the Arab conquest was even a benefit to Spain; for it brought about an important social revolution” (136).

The spirit of tolerance was of great significance to Muslim Spain. In his book The World of Islamic Civilization, Gustave Le Bon, a French sociologist, thinks that “The Arabs modernized Spain materially and culturally in a few centuries, and made it superior to other European kingdoms. The transformation was not limited to culture and the material but it involved morality as well. It was they who taught people Christianity, or you can say, they tried to teach tolerance, which is the most precious quality of humans. The leniency of the Arabs of Spain towards the conquered locals attained the point that they allowed their bishops to hold religious conferences” (Gustave Le Bon 276). In this regard, Gustave Le Bon stressed that intolerance did not originate from dogma or denomination, rather it had something to do with people. However, as far as the Arabs were concerned, it was evident that since their emergence as a powerful entity they always proved to be civilised and tolerant people. Before the Muslim conquest, Jewish community in Iberia was living in disadvantaged circumstances under Roman and Vandals rule. However, their fate changed completely when Muslims outstretched up north. “Under the Moors the Jews flourished in relative freedom and became a very useful middle class to the Arab ruling elites. As such, they were once more an integral part of a new cosmopolitan civilization” (qtd. in Halevi).

The Arab rulers in the Iberian Peninsula guaranteed religious tolerance to all subjects, and extended their patronage towards intellectuals from all sects. Likewise, the Christian Spanish kings, who recovered the land after many centuries of military conflict, followed the Arabs’ culture of tolerance. They simultaneously engaged the Arabs in battlefields and continued to look up to their scholars, admiring their scholarship and achievements.

Recent studies have pointed out to the existence of diplomatic exchange between Muslims in Spain and their Christian counterparts. Out of 10 embassies, nine were established by initiatives from Constantinople. The sixth embassy, however, was an initiative from the Muslims. The three early Christian embassies were reciprocated by three Muslim corresponding embassies.

It is notable that during those 5 centuries of communication (probably the most prosperous era of Muslim Andalusia), a large number of embassies were constantly exchanged between Andalusia and Western Europe, and they contributed in concluding specified and dated agreements of peace between the two sides.

Abdel Rahman El-Hadji believes that the establishment of diplomatic relations between Muslims in Andalusia and the Christians often emerged from mutual need or other reasons (frictions or general problems that needed to be solved). However, diplomatic ties with remote territories would normally exist in case of need only. Hence the diplomatic activities between both northern Spain and Andalusia, on one hand and the Franks on the other hand, were often based on the fact that they were neighbours (having common borders) (El-Hadji
The posting of the poet and experienced diplomat Yahyā ibn Ḥakam al-Bakrī al-Ghazālī to the embassy in Denmark is an example of that diplomatic connection. The friendly situations that accompanied the deputation portrayed various forms of cultural exchange between Muslim Andalusia and the land of the Vikings.

Sami El-Nashar in The Egyptian Institute Journal in Madrid explains that “the history of Muslim Spain is a common fortune between the Arabs and the Spanish. The latter had the place and we had the time, but they also participated in some elements of that time. The mating between the two was visible and the Arab blood mixed with the Spanish blood and the two worked together in the new edifice” (El-Nashar d).

Researchers have referred to the gateways of cultural exchange between Arabic and Western civilisations. Said Abdul Fattah Ashour, for instance, has called them crossings of Islamic civilisation and identified them into four crossings: Spain, Sicily, the Near East and the Crusades, and the movement of translation. It became certain that Arabic literature in Andalusia was one of the tributaries that fed Spanish literature in particular, and the European literature in general. Literature was just one branch of a large tree which grew in Andalusia and fructified in all fields of knowledge not only in the Iberian Peninsula, but in many other European countries.

Most of the researchers have maintained that Andalusia and Sicily were the main gateways which helped to transfer various types of knowledge and culture to Europe in the Middle Ages. Many orientalists – if not all – who specialised in the study of Andalusian culture and literature have acknowledged that such influence continued for centuries. Other studies went to illustrate the impact of Arabic persona and its features in modern Spanish society (Ashour 47).

The elements of civilisation and culture in Andalusia were very unique – so much that it maintained its magnificence even during the political decline which affected it for many decades, an exceptional phenomenon which William Montgomery Watt expressed in a chapter entitled, “Cultural Greatness in Political Decline.” The glare of Andalusian cultural mosaic over Europe was so charming and influential that many enlightened European scholars devoted themselves and passionately engaged in learning all aspects of Arabic culture. However, it was understandably not possible to transfer that large heritage of Arabic culture and civilisation very suddenly, and as stated by Gustave Le Bon, translating books was the only source of teaching in European universities for five or six centuries (Le Bon 569).

It is wrong to think that the impact of Arab culture on the European civilisation was associated with years of Muslim rule in Andalusia and no more, because this influence did not end with the fall of Granada in 897/1492, but continued after it through the Moors. Researchers maintain that the Arab impact continued to be felt through the Moors for nine centuries, long enough for the Arabs to leave a lasting effect on the culture and civilisation of the Spanish and Portuguese people.

As for the Arab presence in Sicily, it has lasted about three centuries after the first conquest (212/828-484/1091). Sicily’s cultural glare and legacy was no less than her sister Andalusia; it directly influenced the Italian literature and arts. Composing and writing poetry became a dernier cri that ultimately led to a great rise of Italian National poetry. Subsequently, the city of Genoa was compelled to set up a school for the teaching of Arabic in 1207. The existence of Arabic words in the language of Sicily and in all dialects in all Italian cities that were trading with the East and Sicily is an evidence of the long lasting impact of Arabic culture on the culture of Sicily (Al-Mulla 124).

Michele Amari (1806-1889), an Italian patriot and historian from Sicily, who devoted the best part of his life to the history of Sicily and its collection, and whose works on the period of Arab-Muslim control of Sicily were basis of many Arab researches after that, acknowledged that Sicily was indebted to the Arabs for its rich culture and civilisation, as Italy should be indebted to Sicily for its adoption of Arabic civilisation (Al-Mulla 124). The first generation of European researchers valued the Arab heritage in Spain as expressly stated by the Orientalist Francisco Codera Zaidin in 1917: “It is a plain mistake to try to Europeanize Spain, the duty is to Arabize Europe instead, and Spain has to recover its old role in this Arabization exercise” (Al-Shaka 283).

Works cited


We are now in a world in which cyber warfare is very real…. It could paralyse this country, and I think that’s an area we have to pay a lot more attention to.

-- Leon Panetta, *This Week* (ABC Television News)

**Introduction**

In 2003, Bruce Berkowitz predicted that the revolution in Information Technology (IT) would change the character of warfare in the twenty-first century. The statement in the epigraph attributed to Leon Panetta who served the administration of President Barack Obama, first as its Director of Central Intelligence Agency (2009-2011) and then as Secretary of Defence (2011-2013), recognises that hard fact. Berkowitz’s prediction about cyber warfare and Leon Panetta’s concerns about its dangers, as will be explained in this paper, have by now become a reality. It is due to the massive development in IT that it is now possible to completely wipe out an enemy-state’s military and socio-economic infrastructures by computer viruses. In this article, the term “cyber warfare” is defined, and its nature explained with examples. A brief discussion is also provided on how cyber warfare is conducted.

**What Is Cyber Warfare?**

Amit Sharma likens the attempts to define cyber warfare to that of four blind men trying to describe an elephant in which each describes the animal according to his individual perception (3). Sharma argues that cyber war is a new form of combat and instead of considering it as merely an enhancement of traditional operations, cyber warfare should be viewed as “force multipliers of traditional operations” (3). Recognising this, the UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron announced a defence budget of 1.1 billion British Pounds on 14 July 2014, out of which 800 million Pounds are assigned for a new surveillance package and the rest set aside for a new ice patrol ship and radar (http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28289331). He admitted that defence planning today is not about battle tanks in Central Europe but about modern threats like terrorism. He explained that this amount of money would help keep his country safe and stop terrorism from infiltrating the national borders (http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28289331).

There is no one single internationally accepted definition of cyber warfare. The absence of such an acceptable definition shows how complex the issue is. It also makes the task of explaining it all the more difficult. Cyber warfare means different things to different scholars. According to RAND Corporation, cyber warfare “involves the actions by a nation-state or an international organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation’s computers or information networks through, for example, computer viruses or denial-of-service attacks” (http://www.rand.org/topics/cyber-warfare.html).

In other words, cyber warfare involves anyone using the Internet to damage the key infrastructures of a state, such as the security and defence apparatus, military and civilian communication and transport systems, and water and power supplies. One can, therefore, argue that cyber warfare has fundamentally changed the concept of national security, as an attack could come from anywhere and destroy the essential infrastructures of a state, bringing thereby the state’s lifeline to a complete halt.

Cyber warfare is commonly associated with such acts as cyber-crime, cyber security, cyber terrorism and cyber espionage. But Jeffrey Carr points out that these are acts of inter-

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national cyber conflict and are not to be confused with cyber warfare. According to him, cyber warfare is the art and science of fighting without fighting, of defeating an enemy without spilling their blood. However, cyber-crime, cyber security, cyber terrorism and cyber espionage could be part of an overall strategy to defeat the enemy. Hence, these are to be considered as part of cyber warfare. Thus, cyber warfare could be defined as any Internet-based conflict involving politically motivated attacks on information and information systems.

Cyber warfare includes attacks designed to disable official websites and networks, disrupt or disable essential services, steal or alter classified data, and cripple financial systems.

Examples of Cyber Warfare
Along with the rest of the world, the cyberspace is used by a host of groups of people such as criminals, gangsters, stalkers, cyber-warriors, terrorists and others. Therefore, there is no lack of examples of cyber-attacks, which form part of cyber warfare. The following are some examples cyber warfare:

- In 1998, the US military hacked into Serbia’s air defence system to compromise the country’s air traffic control and thus facilitate the bombing of targets in Serbia.
- In 1999, during the Kosovo War, within twelve hours of bombing of the Chinese Embassy by US fighter jets, the Chinese Red Hacker Alliance carried out thousands of cyber-attacks on US government websites.
- In 2007, in Estonia, a botnet of over a million computers brought down government, business and media websites across the country. The attack was suspected to have originated from Russia, instigated by political tension between the two countries.
- In August 2008, during the Georgian-Russian war, hackers from Russia had carried out numerous cyber-attacks on Georgian government’s official websites.
- In December 2008-January 2009, during Israel’s war on Gaza, the fighting included cyber-attacks against Israel’s official websites.
- In 2009, a cyber-spy network called "GhostNet" accessed confidential information belonging to both governmental and private organisations in over 100 countries around the world. GhostNet was reported to have originated from China, but that country denied responsibility.
- In 2010, the computer network systems at nuclear facilities in Iran were attacked by a computer virus known as Stuxnet. The Iranians blamed Israel and the US for this attack.
- On 15 August 2012, the computer network of Saudi Aramco was struck by a self-replicating virus known as Shamoon that infected as many as 30,000 of its Windows-based machines. It took Aramco two weeks to recover from this cyber-attack.
- In May 2014, a serious dispute broke out between the US and the People’s Republic of China when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicted five Chinese military officers for hacking conspiracies against key American corporations. It was further alleged that these officers were part of Unit 61398 of the Third Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. This was one of the latest series of incidents involving the two countries.

Conclusion
Cyber-warfare has been taken seriously by the world’s major powers. The US has formed a Cyber Command under its military leadership. There, America’s cyber-warriors are engaged in protecting America’s cyber-space, or its essential military and civilian facilities. China reportedly has over 30,000 cyber-warriors who not only try to protect the country’s cyber-space but also allegedly spy on their own citizens by monitoring their behaviour on cyber-space. The most effective protection against cyber-attacks is securing information and networks. Security updates should be applied to all systems including those that are not considered critical, because any vulnerable system could be co-opted and used to carry out attacks.

Works Cited


