

Islamic Studies

**QUARTERLY
JOURNAL**

Volume 38

Summer 1999

Number 2

Islamic Research Institute
International Islamic University
Islamabad (Pakistan)

THE NOTION OF *MURABBĪ* IN ISLAM: AN ISLAMIC CRITIQUE OF TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY EDUCATION

YEDULLAH KAZMI*

INTRODUCTION

The following discussion is not an attempt to provide an accurate socio-historical description of *murabbī* as this role was conceived and practiced at any given time in the history of Muslim civilization. It is rather an attempt at an ontological understanding of the notion of *murabbī* from an Islamic perspective. Here ontology is understood in the Heideggerian sense. Heidegger was always concerned with making clear the distinction between the ontic and the ontological. For Heidegger, the ontic was the realm which is given, that which has come to be. The ontological, on the other hand, is the sphere full of possibilities that have not been realized but which have been forgotten and buried.

I

CONCEPT OF *MURABBĪ*

Murabbī is a fairly common and popular concept in literature on Islamic education. A *murabbī* is regularly defined as one who is not only knowledgeable and wise but also pious, kind and considerate. In other words, a *murabbī* is a person who combines a life of learning with a life of virtue, and hence a perfect and an ideal person to learn from. Without

*Yedullah Kazmi, Assistant Professor, Department of Education, International Islamic University Malaysia.

a doubt the person, who best embodies the qualities of a *murabbī*, for Muslims, is the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be on him). Nevertheless, the discussion hardly ever goes beyond the mere listing of the attributes that a *murabbī* is supposed to possess. There is little or no reflection on the internal logic of the attributes and how and why they go together. An ontological understanding focuses on just such an internal logic to bring out the specificity of what it means to be *murabbī* in the context of Islam. Thus the attempt here is to try to arrive at an ontological description of *murabbī* using the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be on him) as an exemplar. Needless to say, we have to do more than to come up with a list of attributes needed in a *murabbī*. A list of attributes can at best give us only a one-dimensional picture when what we need is a multi-dimensional description of the concept of *murabbī*.

Furthermore, this discussion, although historical in its orientation is not an undertaking aimed at recovering something that has long been buried in the depths of Islamic tradition, but rather to make explicit what is implicit in the tradition; that is, to point to the potential that remains to be fully realized. As said earlier, the tools used here for the purpose of analysis are primarily neither historical nor sociological but ontological. An ontological analysis does not follow the trajectory of history but rather cuts across the plain of history diagonally. It is only by so doing that we can see that which is implicit in history. The attempt thus is to make sense of the notion of *murabbī* in the language we speak now and not to recover the notion as it might have been used in some remote period of history.

In our everyday thinking we are generally not very rigorous and tend to use concepts indiscriminately and hence think sloppily. A common failing of this kind is our tendency to lump together concepts like education, learning and gathering information when in fact each belongs to its own distinctive universe of meaning. This can have disastrous consequences for thinking about education generally and particularly harmful for an attempt to think through the notion of *murabbī*. The success of the attempt to understand the Islamic notion of *murabbī* hinges, to a great extent, on making clear the distinctions between education and learning, on the one hand, and education and gathering information, on the other. To mark the difference between education and learning is of utmost importance. Although we think that education and learning are synonymous yet a closer examination will show that in spite of obvious similarities they are distinct and, furthermore, learning presupposes education.

EDUCATION AND LEARNING

What is education? Education no doubt is a type of learning but it is a type of learning that makes all subsequent learning possible. In that sense it is primordial learning that makes all subsequent learning possible. In that sense it is primordial learning that creates the conditions for all later learning to take place. It should not, however, be taken to mean that education is prior to learning because it deals with teaching skills like reading and writing. What is being suggested here is hopefully not as banal as this but something more profound. Thus in order to understand how education is the condition for the possibility of all learning, we need to question certain assumptions about learning.

The most obvious premise that needs to be examined is the assumption that a learner's mind is like a clean slate on which a text gets written through the process of learning. Learning is almost then an automatic and mechanical process of recording or etching information on to the mind of the student. According to this view, the whole process is very similar to the variations in light being recorded on a photographic film in a camera or sound being recorded on a magnetic tape.

This view further assumes that what gets inscribed on to the mind are discrete bits of sensations that are inherently meaningless. The mind gives these sensations meaning by interpreting them after they have been received. Following the analogy of camera, the light sensitive photographic film records variations in the intensity of light as discrete dark or light dots that are in themselves meaningless. It is only after the film has been developed that we interpret dark and light coloured dots as either a house or the face of a friend or whatever we took the picture of. Interpretation as a meaning-investing activity is an event subsequent to the recording or receiving of the light or sensations. In other words, the human mind is initially passive with respect to knowledge and only partially active when it gives the received sensations meanings through interpretation.

This line of argument is pursued by philosophers who owe allegiance to the empiricist epistemology, i.e. the positivists. Empiricist epistemology has been shown to be most inadequate in explaining how we acquire knowledge and what is the role of human mind in the acquisition of knowledge. This theory has been thoroughly criticized and debunked and there is no need to rehearse the criticism here. It will suffice to say that Gestalt psychology has shown that the empiricist epistemology is founded on faulty psychology. Gestalt psychology has provided sufficient empirical evidence to show that human mind responds to holistic meaningful images instead of discrete sensations.

Although the empiricist philosophy is by and large now defunct in philosophical discourse, yet its shadow hovers over the mind of many in the field of education. The failure to make the distinction between education and learning is one consequence of holding on to the empiricist epistemology. In other words, since learning, according to empiricists, is mostly a process of recording or copying a text onto human mind there can hardly be any difference between education and learning. The only difference they recognize is that education is a more formal process of learning, which includes, among other things, teaching of formal skills like reading, writing and calculations. Philosophers of education critical of this philosophy have characterized teaching based on this philosophy as the "banking theory of teaching". In the words of Paulo Freire:

Education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and 'makes deposits' that the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat. This is the 'banking' concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filling, and storing the deposit.¹

Students, in other words, are viewed as passive recipients of information, which they accept uncritically.

Once, however, we discard the empirical philosophy we are open to a way of thinking that allows us to have a better understanding of how education is different from learning. What follows is an attempt to explicate such a view of education.

According to this view, education is the result of a personal encounter between teacher and student. The necessary prerequisite for education, in other words, is an encounter of a personal kind between two beings. Now, the two beings can be two human beings or the Supreme Being and a human being. To put it in simpler terms, only human beings can educate other human beings or only the Supreme Being can educate human beings.

Had education not been a personal encounter between two beings or between the Supreme Being and the human being would Allah have thought it necessary to teach Adam the names Himself? He could have found some other way for Adam to learn the names. Had education not been an encounter between beings would Allah in His infinite wisdom have thought it necessary to send with each Book a messenger? The Qur'ān or the Torah could have just as well come down if Allah had so desired without the benefit of a prophet to teach it. So why are prophets and teachers necessary in and for education? The answer to this question

leads us to the core of what is to be a *murabbī* in Islam. To answer this question, however, we need to make a distinction between theoretical and personalized knowledge.²

TWO KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE

Theoretical knowledge is that which we normally associate with the term knowledge. It is abstract, formal, impersonal, universalizing and almost completely objectifiable in language, either natural or artificial, or a combination of the two. Personalized knowledge, on the other hand, is incapable of being fully formalized or completely objectified in language. While personal knowledge is particularistic, theoretical formal knowledge has a universalizing tendency. Although on occasion the two are in conflict, yet more often they complement each other. What this means in concrete terms is that while the pretensions and the intentions of theoretical knowledge as reflected in the terms and categories it uses are universalistic in as much as they are generalizable, the categories and terms of personal knowledge all reflect intentions and pretensions of personal knowledge that are particularistic and not generalizable. To put it a little differently, whereas theoretical knowledge deals with experiences that are repeatable, personal knowledge deals with non-repeatable and specific experiences that are peculiar to a human being or humans in a given situation. Now, since theoretical knowledge is almost completely objectifiable in language it can be communicated almost entirely through written language. But since personal knowledge cannot be fully captured in language it is not wholly dependent on linguistic communication. Personalized knowledge is communicated not only through language but more importantly also through styles and strategies for living. In other words, personalized knowledge is not a compendium of skill and information but rather an orientation to knowledge and the world.

Although the two types of knowledge are distinct, they are not independent of each other. Theoretical knowledge, in absence of personal knowledge, will have no meaning to and for human beings. Neither one of them can grow without the other. All this, however, remains to be explained and shown.

Gestalt psychology has shown that human mind does not respond to discrete stimuli but to meaningful wholes. The mind, in other words, does not first record individual stimuli and then comes to the conclusion that the object in front is a book, but rather immediately notices a book. Gestalt psychologists have argued that there is no realm of pure sensation that is devoid of meaning. Hence all attempts to go beyond the

meaningful wholes to discrete stimuli have proven futile. We are cognizant only of meanings and not sensations or stimuli. Meanings require understanding; we understand meanings. I understand this object in front of me as a book and that which is a little further away from me as a coffee table and beyond that a bay window and beyond that a row of houses. I understand that what is helping me to write is a computer and so on.

Every understanding is arrived at by processing and interpreting information that we are constantly receiving from the world. Processing and interpreting information is nothing but acts of judgments regarding what is and what is not relevant and meaningful. We are constantly making judgments of this nature every second of our life but are not aware of them. Sitting in the classroom students make decisions regarding what is and what is not relevant. They quite often judge that what is happening outside the class is not that important compared to what is happening inside the classroom. (Perhaps this is not such a good example given the students' lack of interest in what happens inside the class.) When the students, for example, go to watch, say a football game, they make innumerable judgments regarding what is and what is not relevant and important in order to understand and enjoy the game. They make the judgment that watching the players inside the field and not those sitting on the sidelines is important, in order to follow the progress of the game. One who either does not know what judgments to make, or makes the wrong ones, fails to understand the game and hence will never learn to enjoy it. To learn to understand and enjoy a game is, therefore, to learn to make the proper judgments, i.e. to learn to process the information correctly regarding the game. To understand is to learn what matters in a given situation.

Now, how does one learn to make judgments about the game of football or, which means the same, to understand the game of football? Can one understand the game of football without ever having been to a football game? Can I, for example, read a book on football and understand the game that way? Or have someone perhaps tell me all about it? The point is, can I understand either by reading or listening someone talk about football, the game of football? The answer must surely be a definite no. It is not that there is so much to learn about football that it will need more time to understand it than anyone is prepared to give but rather the nature of the object that has to be understood is such that it cannot be mastered through purely linguistic communication. To learn to make judgments about football is not something that one can learn by merely following rules about making

judgments. To learn to make judgments about football is to learn what is to make judgments in the game of football. This is because the judgments the viewers make about football are not independent of the game but rather constitutive of it. For example, as a spectator I make the judgment that what transpires within the area marked out by white line is worth watching closely and when the round thing being kicked around is pushed through one of two gates posted on either side of the marked field then it is an occasion either for joy or despondency.

These judgments are not an expression of my fancy or whim. Instead, they show my understanding of the game. In other words, the judgments that the spectators make define the game, i.e. they are constitutive of it. Hence to learn what is to make judgments in football is possible only while watching the game alongside someone who understands the game and see him/her make the judgments. Because the judgments are constitutive of the game they make sense only to those who have watched the game of football. Similarly no amount of theoretical understanding of the game of chess can ever give one the grasp of the game if one has never watched it and followed the moves as they are made. One has to learn what it is to make a judgment in chess as opposed to making in football in order to understand what makes the two games different.

One can then safely say that it is personal encounter with the game of football or chess, for that matter, that gives me the knowledge I need to understand and enjoy the game. This knowledge is always particular in the sense that it is specific to a game. My knowledge of, say chess for example, does not cross over to my understanding of football, or *vice versa*. No doubt there is greater similarity among some games than there is among others. Yet each game has a sufficient number of moves and hence judgments unique to it to be considered a separate game. Furthermore, I have to observe several judgments being made in understanding football before I get the hang of them. It is seeing, watching, doing and thinking simultaneously that helps me to get the inside view of the game or, as they say, get a handle on it.

No doubt some theoretical knowledge or understanding of games as such is essential for understanding a particular game. One could imagine a society of which the citizens, for one reason or the other, have never played a game. Such a society then would lack the theoretical knowledge of games as such. To a person from such a society the suggestion to either play or to watch a game would make no sense at all.

What someone teaching me a game in fact does is to give me a definite configuration of meaning or a specific structure of meaning with

reference to which I then decide what is and what is not important, what matters and what does not. In other words, the specific configuration of meaning that I now possess helps me to process the information I receive while watching the game. Without the structure the game would be a whirling, whizzing sensation devoid of meaning and significance.

The example of game was used to illustrate how understanding is a function of making judgments. The ability to make judgments is our ability to process information that we are constantly receiving from the world about us. And the ability to make judgments, it was argued, is made possible by the acquisition of a definite configuration of meaning. It was further argued that there is no formal method by which we acquire the configuration of meaning but that it is the result of a complex process of watching, listening, reflecting and practice. This structure of meaning is called personalized knowledge. Without personalized knowledge we would not be able to make sense of the world because we would not know how to order the information. Equipping someone with the configuration of meaning is, we believe, what education is all about. The configuration of meaning can be open-ended or closed; it can be flexible or rigid. Close or open-endedness of configuration of meaning would depend no doubt on the type of education one gets. The education that imparts a rigid configuration of meaning will be considered conservative because it will not allow a student to go beyond the given meaning system.

A child's first teachers are its parents. Parents do not teach their children through theoretical discourse, by making formal theoretical statements and taking definite theoretical positions regarding issues, although they may do that too on occasions. Their teaching consists of what they say and how they say, what stories they tell their children, what books they read and have in the house, the people they like and do not like, how they treat each other and those outside the family including strangers and how they treat themselves and how they weather the storms of life. In other words, they teach by how they live their lives. This is what is meant by the style of life or the strategies for living. This is in no way an exhaustive list of all what goes into the teaching of children by their parents.

It is nevertheless sufficient to give an idea that education is not one but several things combined to give to the children a configuration of meaning. It is, above all, a very personal encounter in which the children learn what matters and what does not, what is important and what is not on a daily basis by watching and listening to their parents and practicing what they learn. There is a need to emphasize, however, that the

personal encounter is the matrix that allows all other modes of communication to be effective. It does not necessarily follow though that all the children of a couple will have identical meaning structures though their meaning structures will have what, in Wittgensteinian terminology, is called family resemblance.

What the above discussion is attempting to make clear is that education is about helping students to create a configuration of meaning that tells them what is and what is not important. This structure does not only tell them what is true or false, or that stealing is wrong and one should avoid bad company. This structure gives them something more fundamental than any moral code or ethical principle. For even though a child may know right from wrong and true from false but if he/she has not learnt that it is important to always speak the truth and to do what is right, he/she may not act according to those norms. The knowledge of norms alone is not sufficient to make me act according to them; I need to be impressed that following these norms is important, that it matters to live by them. If my father demands that I should always speak the truth but hardly ever speaks the truth himself, would telling of the truth impress me? This point can be further elaborated with the help of Gilles Deleuze's interpretation of a point Nietzsche makes in *Beyond Good and Evil*. According to Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche:

On the one hand, values appear or are given as principles: and evaluation presupposes values on the basis of which phenomena are appraised. But, on the other hand and more profoundly, it is values which presuppose evaluations . . . from which their own value is derived.³

Values, in other words, themselves require evaluation, which according to the argument pursued here cannot be made by affirming yet another set of values. For to do so will end in infinite regression. It is the function of meaning structure to evaluate values. In other words, the configuration of meaning posits the value of truth for the child.

Learning what matters is not like learning that $2+2=4$. This I can learn just as easily from a book as from a teacher. What a book cannot teach me, however, is that *it matters that I know* that $2+2=4$. To learn what matters I have to have an experience very different from the experience of reading words or figures off the page of a book. I need to have a personal experience, an experience that touches my being, an experience, furthermore, more primary than of reading and writing. It is to that primary experience that the notion of configuration of meaning points. To understand the primary nature of the configuration of meaning is to understand the role and function of *murabbī* in Islam.

II

THE FUNCTION OF A *MURABBĪ*

A *murabbī* does what parents do but much more explicitly and at a higher level of sophistication. He/she is more focused about teaching. The primary function of a *murabbī* is not so much to create theoretical knowledge as to personalize knowledge; to give it a personal bite, so to speak. In the light of the above it should neither be difficult to explain nor difficult to follow what a *murabbī* is and what he/she does. Simply put, to personalize knowledge is to show what difference the truth of the theoretical knowledge would make to someone who accepts it. To put it a little differently, what a *murabbī* constructs or tries to construct is what we have called the configuration of meaning which guides his/her judgments regarding matters and experiences of everyday life. The source of this configuration of meaning is obviously theoretical knowledge.

The act of personalization does not only represent a *murabbī*'s theoretical understanding of a given body of knowledge but more importantly his/her acumen to ask the further question: What difference would the truth of the knowledge make to him/her as a Muslim here and now? In order to answer this question a *murabbī* has to have the ability to interpret, understand and judge both routine and ordinary experiences in the light of the truth of knowledge. In other words, a *murabbī* begins to see his/her experiences as have meaning that they would have only if the knowledge, which he/she is trying to personalize, were true.

In time as a *murabbī* understands more and more of his/her experiences in this way his/her life increasingly acquires the form that embodies the truth that the knowledge speaks of. In other words, the *murabbī* has tested the truth with his/her life and as a consequence has become a person to whom it matters that the knowledge be true. In response to the question: Why should the truth of the knowledge matter? A *murabbī* gives the answer with his/her life. If his/her life has acquired a quality that is worth emulating then the truth that has shaped his/her life is worth consenting to. For a *murabbī* the only way to understand knowledge is to live it, and to test its validity is to see what difference it makes to his/her life as a Muslim. What a *murabbī* then teaches is not an impersonal body of theoretical knowledge that he/she has mastered and accepted its truth based on the objective principle of verification but rather teaches knowledge that he/she has lived and having lived found it to be true or false.

In the life of a *murabbī*, compared to that of any other person, there is far less of a distance between knowledge and practice, between theory and praxis, between knowing and acting. In other words, a *murabbī* is a living proof of why one should accept a body of knowledge, why and how the truth of that knowledge matters. No wonder some Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be on him) took six to eight years to read just one *sūrah*.⁴ It is not because they lacked the ability to comprehend the linguistic meaning of the *sūrah* but rather they needed time to personalize it by living it. The ultimate proof of truth is in and through living it and not merely through empirical verification. There might be no empirical proof of the existence of Allah but it ought to matter to every human being that He exists.

This is the reason why a prophet has always accompanied a divine book. The potency of prophetic teaching, hence, is not only in what he says but more so in what he is. He provides the configuration of meaning that makes the understanding of the book possible. While every *murabbī* tries to bridge the gap between knowing and acting, in a prophet the two are totally identified. And it cannot be otherwise, because any observable discrepancy between the two would vitiate the potency of his teaching.

That is why emulating the life of the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be on him) is so important for a Muslim. In this regard it is significant to note that when in *Sūrah Tā Hā* Allah tells Moses that he has been chosen as Allah's Prophet, Moses responds, "O my Lord! Expand me my breast" (20: 25). This, in the light of the above discussion, can be understood as Moses asking Allah for the configuration of meaning, i.e. to educate him since he has only recently been inducted into prophethood. In contrast to this Allah tells the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be on him) in verse 114 of the same *sūrah* to recite, "O my Lord advance me in knowledge" (20: 114). The difference is that the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be on him) had been a prophet for sometime before the moment of this encounter, he was therefore asked to pray to have his knowledge increased. The assumption is that he had already been given the configuration of meaning and was therefore required to increase his knowledge based on that configuration.

Now a body of knowledge does not allow only one personalized knowledge. If personalization is through the interpretation of experiences then the kinds of experiences one has had will determine the form of personalized knowledge. This is not different from a teacher trying to make his/her students understand a theorem of geometry. The teacher will give examples and draw from experiences familiar to students to prove the theorem. In another class the teacher may use different

examples but the truth he/she has been helping the students to understand nevertheless remains the same. In other words, one can personalize a truth in a variety of ways and each personalization is valid, as long as it does not violate the truth. The personalized knowledge will differ not only from place to place but also from time to time. Each time the truth is lived and each place where knowledge is personalized it is encountered as if for the first time. Repeated and continuous personalization of knowledge prevents its truth from becoming jaded.

It is not claimed that a *murabbī* should personalize every type of knowledge to the same degree or to the same extent. Notwithstanding the fact that all knowledge is from Allah, there are all kinds and varieties of knowledge. Knowledge, for a Muslim, is nothing but an attempt to understand the signs of Allah in order to get close to Him. The signs of Allah are everywhere and they are of all kind. The rising and the setting of the sun is as much a sign of Allah as are the inner mysteries of sub-atomic particles.

But there are signs of Allah that help us to understand all His other signs. And these signs are the *āyāt* of the Qur'ān. Hence understanding the *āyāt* of the Qur'ān should have primacy over understanding all other signs of Allah. It is the understanding of the Qur'ān that gives us the basic configuration of meaning with which to make judgments regarding all other signs in order to understand them. Small wonders, then, that the other name of the Qur'ān is *al-Furqān*. And this is what the Qur'ān itself commands us to do when it declares "Read in the name of the Lord Who created . . ." (96: 1). It is significant that the Qur'ān does not instruct us *to read only the name of Allah* but to read everything *in His name*. To read in His name could mean, among other things, to understand all other signs of Allah with the help of the configuration of meaning derived from the Qur'ān. Thus, once we have acquired the Qur'ānic configuration of knowledge it is safe to go even as far as China in search of knowledge. We will then have in hand the criterion that will help us to make judgments regarding any and every body of knowledge we encounter. Understanding of the Qur'ān, therefore, is primary and foundational.

Although the understanding of the Qur'ān is primary, it does not mean that while directing endeavours in all fields of knowledge it itself remains static. Every increment in knowledge in whichever field, however, curls back upon the foundational knowledge and enriches it. It is therefore incumbent upon a *murabbī* to seek knowledge and to go on seeking knowledge, not, however, in order to know all but to be able to go on refurbishing and renewing the established configuration of

knowledge. This assumes that the basic configuration of meaning derived from the Qur'ān is dynamic and not static, it is flexible and not rigid.

The above discussion also provides us with the clue as to how to conceptualize the unification of knowledge in Islam. The principle of unification of knowledge is not out there at the outer limits of knowledge but situated at the core that opens up and holds knowledge together like an umbrella. What unifies knowledge and holds it together, however, is neither the laws of logic nor the principles of rationality but ethical and moral codes that like so many spokes running through the fabric of diverse bodies of knowledge keep all of them centred at the core. And at the core of it all is *Lā ilāh ill' Allāh*.

To round up the discussion on *murabbī* it would be best to recapitulate the main points of the above discussion. To understand what a *murabbī* is all about we have to first make the distinction between education and learning. Education, in fact, furnishes the necessary condition for the learning to take place. Education is the process by which students acquire the configuration of meaning that enables them to make judgments regarding what is important and needs to be learnt and what is not. The configuration of meaning is personal knowledge of a *murabbī* that can only be communicated through personal interaction with the students. Personal knowledge is not communicable through theoretical discourse but is expressed primarily through style of life or strategies for living. Hence education is defined as an encounter between being and being or Being and being. Adam learnt through a personal encounter with Allah, as did all the prophets (peace be on them). This also explains why Allah had a prophet accompany each of His divine books. In other words, if knowledge is to result in concrete action, knowledge has to be personalized first.

Configuration of meaning, however, is not something static which having been once put in place never changes. Configuration of meaning constantly changes with learning, and one can also abandon the old meaning system for a new configuration of meaning. A radical change in configuration of meaning is normally what happens in the event of conversion to a new religion. One can hence understand the immense resistance to the new configuration of meaning that acceptance of Islam entailed and which many Makkans were loath to acquiesce to.

What the notion of personalized knowledge suggests is that although all knowledge forms are grounded in human experience yet it does not mean that all experiences that ground knowledge are of the same kind. Hence, while empirical verification may be a necessary condition for accepting or rejecting certain types of knowledge claims it is not a

sufficient condition for accepting or rejecting all forms of truth. Empirical verification is a valid procedure for evaluating experiences that are inherently repeatable and/or objectifiable in language whereas inherently unrepeatable experiences that can not be fully objectified in language, by definition, cannot be so verified. Natural sciences deal with repeatable experiences. To verify the truth of repeatable experiences the external world is manipulated to recreate the original experience. Since social sciences study objectifiable human experiences their truths are also verified against linguistically mediated symbolic forms that have the characteristic, in the language of Durkheim, of social facts.

The unrepeatable experiences that constitute personalized knowledge belong to an entirely different universe. Personalized knowledge is a valid form of knowledge and hence has to have its truth verified. The nature of verification of its truth however is very different from that of natural and social sciences.

For a statement to be true the person making the statement has to show that what the statement claims is in fact the case. The person making the statement, in other words, has to put forward arguments in support of the claim. When the arguments given in support of the claim are accepted then the truth claim of the statement is verified. In natural sciences the supporting arguments very often take the form of replication of the original experience. In social sciences, on the other hand, the arguments are mostly made through the use of language. Since personalized knowledge can neither be fully objectified in language nor the original experience recreated through manipulation, verification of its truth has to take some other form.

Although the truth of personalized knowledge cannot be objectified in language it can nevertheless be objectified in style of life and strategies for living. In other words, a style of life is an outward expression of truths that a person believes in and lives by. One has to adopt certain strategies for living and live a particular type of life in order to have access to a particular kind of knowledge and experience its truth. In other words, verification of truth of personalized knowledge requires one to make the commitment to follow a style of life for him/her to realize its truth. And that is because truth is first lived and then comes to thought. Sūfīs have always known this and therefore they have always first initiated a novice to a way of life and marked his/her progress before imparting any knowledge. In this they have been true to the pedagogical significance of following the life style of the Prophet (peace be on him). Emulating his life style is a necessary condition for realizing the truth of which the Qur'ān speaks. One first encounters the truth as

it is lived, the concrete act, and if impressed by that then tries to grasp the truth.

If we fail to see the distinction between inherently repeatable and unrepeatable experiences and lump all experiences into one undifferentiated heap we simply disregard a valid form of knowledge and hence deprive ourselves of its truths. And if today "Islamization of Knowledge" is on the agenda of most Muslim thinkers then we need to Islamize our experiences before we can think of Islamizing our concepts. Personalized knowledge allows us to accomplish just that.

The textbook description of *murabbī* is of an ideal teacher. If, however, we restrict ourselves to this definition then we miss the full import of the meaning of *murabbī* in Islam. The notion of *murabbī* has a much wider and deeper universe of meaning. A *murabbī* is not simply a teacher, as we understand this word today, but rather an exemplary human being, an ideal Muslim. An ideal Muslim teaches by living an exemplary life of a true Muslim. For after all the role of a *murabbī* was not one among several of the Prophet Muḥammad's (peace be on him) roles but rather it was the paramount role that got expressed in different forms at different times.

This is one explication of what is meant by the notion of *murabbī* in Islam.

We will now critically review some tendencies in modern education on the basis of the above discussion and in the process bring those aspects of a *murabbī* to the fore that can only be highlighted in contrast with what has come to mean to educate today. Needless to say that since the following discussion is concerned primarily with education, the textbook understanding of a *murabbī* is generally what will be meant each time reference is made to that notion without however losing sight of the larger universe of its meaning.

III

COMMODIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE

Both Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault were interested in showing how objects of thought are not independent of discursive formations but rather appear only in the space created by discourse. If discursive formations are the conditions for objects of thoughts to appear or fail to appear then we can understand why in modern educational thinking there is no talk of *murabbī*. In other words, the logic of modern educational

discourse is such that it does not allow the notion of *murabbī* the space to appear in. It is not, however, necessary to spell out modern educational discourse in detail to show why the notion of *murabbī* is alien to this discourse. It is sufficient to highlight just one major characteristic to show how alien is the notion of *murabbī* to this discourse. Contemporary educational thinking is shaped increasingly by the trend to characterize knowledge as a commodity.

Theodore W. Schultz's 1960 Presidential Address to the Seventy-Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association is considered something of a landmark in economics of education.⁵ Schultz, in his Presidential Address, was critical of the way both labour and education were traditionally viewed. Labour's productivity was generally regarded to increase only when it was mixed with greater and greater amounts of capital. Labour, in other words, was dependent upon capital. And education was viewed primarily as a form of consumption.

Against this view Schultz argued that if we regard education as a form of investment then we could increase labour's productivity not by mixing it with capital but through education. In short, Schultz was proposing that we should consider education as an investment in human beings. If education is viewed as an investment, Schultz went on to argue, then investing in education should be not different from investing in any other commodity. The consideration that guides investment strategy is the prospect of returns on the initial expenditure. Similarly, Schultz argued that society should invest in only that education which promises higher returns. If there is no demand for people with degrees, say in ancient Greek or philosophy for that matter, then there is no need to invest in teaching people these subjects. In other words, the reason for teaching a subject is decided by the demand for it. The demand for a subject is determined by the subject's marketability. Put simply, the bottom line of what Schultz proposed was that knowledge should be considered as having no intrinsic value but only exchange value.

Schultz's view was, in fact, a logical extension of the laws of market economy to the production of knowledge. In a capitalist society everything is produced by the norms of commodity production. It does not take a great leap of imagination to regard Schultz's view as being consistent with Karl Marx's insight that the capitalist mode of production and exchange reduces everything to commodity. In actual fact Schultz had not said anything new, Marx had anticipated him by almost a century. Obviously neither Schultz nor most of other economists saw human capital theory quite in this light. For them it was a major breakthrough in thinking about education and particularly understanding

education's contribution to economic development. Nor, for that matter, did they see any reason to be concerned with the growing commodification of knowledge that the theory of education as investment in human capital entailed. Schultz would, most probably, disclaim ever having promoted commodification of knowledge.

The historical significance of Schultz's theory for us is not in its contribution to the economics of education but it is rather in his theory being symptomatic of a trend in thinking about education of which commodification of knowledge is an expression. The exponential growth of knowledge that the world has witnessed since the Second World War in the West is in a large part the consequence of commodification of knowledge. The commodification of knowledge takes place when knowledge is directly linked to production instead of being mediated through culture and other social filters. The link is such that while production of knowledge is needed to sustain and increase the production of goods and services, the increase in production of goods and services in turn promotes the increase in the production of knowledge. In other words, knowledge has become the principal force of production. Hence, the French philosopher, Jean-Francois Lyotard commenting on the condition of post-modern knowledge, writes:

The old principle that the acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the training (*Bildung*) of minds, or even of individuals, is becoming obsolete and will become ever more so. The relationship of the suppliers and users of knowledge to the knowledge they supply and use is now tending, and will increasingly tend, to assume the form already taken by the relationship of commodity producers and consumers to the commodities they produce and consume — that is, the form of value. *Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange.*⁶ (Emphasis added).

Schultz, an economist, in 1960s recognized that we should change our way of thinking about education if we want it to help increase production of goods and services. Education, argued Shultz, should be thought of as a factor of production alongside such other factors as land, labour and capital. This meant that schools and colleges should dispense such knowledge as would increase production and which in turn would help produce useful knowledge. In 1980s Lyotard, a philosopher, saw knowledge serving the needs of production as the condition for the production of knowledge. The point is not that it took the philosophers almost twenty years to catch up with the economists but rather that what

was earlier understood as a relatively local condition was later recognized to be the universal condition for the production of knowledge in the contemporary world. Knowledge today is subject to the same conditions and produced for the same purpose as any other commodity, i.e. exchange. The production and consumption of knowledge as a consequence is as impersonal as the circulation of goods and services.

Although the nature of knowledge is only one of several elements that determine the character of education it is, nevertheless, an important one. Hence, once knowledge is identified as a commodity and enters into competition with other commodities for the determination of its value the landscape of education undergoes a fundamental change. For one thing the places where learning and teaching take place come to be regarded as sites where knowledge is produced. Schools and universities are submitted to the same production protocol as a factory, which produces, say cars, for example.

This tendency in education is more visible at the university than at secondary or primary school level.⁷ For example, in contrast to the time-honoured tradition of difference in the pay of faculty members being based on rank, it is the practice in most American universities to pay their faculty members according to how much what they produce is valued in the market. Thus a faculty member in the department of engineering, for example, is paid more than the faculty member of the same rank in the department of philosophy. And the justification is honest enough. Universities have to compete with industry in the market for the best talent and hence have to make the teaching job attractive. Furthermore, the deans of colleges and the department heads have regular meetings with C.E.Os and the managers of corporations in order to remain in touch with what is needed in the world. Despite frequent disclaimers to the contrary, the criterion for promotion in academia is based more on how much one produces rather than how well one teaches and/or on the quality of one's thinking and writing. Quantity considerations present no problem or less of a problem in determining the exchange value of a commodity than do quality concerns particularly in the field of knowledge where quality is not that easily definable.

An extreme example of commodification of higher education and learning is the speed with which Western universities are establishing their campuses in developing countries and the eagerness with which they are granted licenses by the host governments. If you can franchise fast food restaurants like KFC (Kentucky Fried Chicken) and Pizza Hut why not the universities? Western universities strapped for capital to fund research at home find this opportunity irresistible. Leaders of developing

countries that have money and feel the urgency to be counted among the advanced nations regard education as the surest road to progress and modernization. This, after all, is the vision that Schultz's theory holds out to the leaders and the masses of the developing nations.⁸

However important these changes in the educational landscape may be, they are not the major concern here. What is important for this discussion is how commodification of knowledge affects the distinctions among the set of processes defined as education, learning and gathering information.

Once knowledge is subjected to the logic of commodity exchange it becomes impersonal. The production of knowledge responds mostly to what is needed, demanded and required by the market and very little, if at all, to what matters to a human being in his/her human situation. No doubt non-commodifiable knowledges continue to be produced but the market forces that ultimately define the knowledge that matters, increasingly marginalize them. The institutions of learning and particularly of higher learning, eager to maintain their viability and credibility, will mostly dispense that knowledge which has market value. In factories as much as in institutions of learning the protocol of production and the logic of exchange determine what gets produced and how and how much. This protocol dictates that teaching should be impersonal. To put it a little differently, if knowledge is a commodity then teaching such a knowledge also requires teaching the students that the relationship between the knower and the knowledge should be as impersonal as one existing between a factory worker and the tools or machines he/she makes. Furthermore, the inquiry that results into knowledge that will be taught should be viewed as an impersonal activity without any hint or suggestion of personal relevance. The mode of teaching would also necessarily then be impersonal. A commodity is produced with only market imperatives in mind. Any personal considerations will only disrupt the efficiency of the process of production.

In the context of commodification of knowledge, hence, it would be a meaningless exercise to mark the differences among education, learning and gathering information. In such a context education would collapse into collecting and gathering information. The function of education, in other words, would be reduced to teaching information retrieval skills.

The essence of information is its mobility. Information moves, it circulates or else it is not information. Knowledge as commodity has to move, to circulate in order to produce more knowledge. There is a frenzy of production and circulation of knowledge today that is

unmatched by any other period in human history. There are more articles and books published today than ever before. The frantic mobility of knowledge/information, where the new relentlessly replaces the old, exerts a certain levelling down of significance of information. Information is an amalgam of valuable, valueless and downright crass information. In making judgments regarding what is and what is not worthwhile information we need those tried and tested habits of mind that have aided us before in sifting valuable from the valueless.

In the universe in which the Islamic notion of *murabbī* made sense the function of education was to provide the basic configuration of meaning with the help of which a student could systematically sift through a large amount of information and decide what does and what does not matter to him or her as a Muslim. But education, as we said, is an interaction between being and being or the Supreme Being and human beings. Without the personal interaction between being and being the configuration of meaning can neither be taught nor learnt. The impersonal atmosphere in which modern education is carried out makes it possible to teach nothing else but skills to retrieve information.

IV

DO WE STILL NEED *MURABBĪ*?

One would have thought that with the explosion and easy accessibility of knowledge, life of human beings would be qualitatively different and better. Yes human life is better in all those respects in which market forces can and have made the difference. A good number of us live better, eat better and enjoy longer lives, or at least so is the case in the West. But even in the West not everyone eats or eats well, not everyone in America has a home to go to, and not everyone is secure in his or her home. Here is half a page from Jonathan Kozol's latest book, *Amazing Grace*, which is a difficult book to read not because it is difficult to follow but because it is just too depressing to read:

"Many of these children", says the priest, "get literally nothing in the way of 'extras'. There are many children here who don't get birthday presents, who never had a gift at Christmastime and never even had a Christmas tree, which would not be included in the welfare budget. It's particularly hard here in December when so much of life in New York City has to do with buying gifts and giving gifts, when everything — the music, decorations, fragrances, the giant ribbons wrapped around some of the

stores — makes Christmas inescapable. You wish that you could wrap one of those ribbons around certain of the children. I mean some of them have *nothing*. Their bedrooms are empty. They don't hang up stocking. It is bare existence.

"Sometimes, in front of a wonderful place like FOA Schwarz, you wonder if poor kids like these have fantasies of breaking in and stealing toys or games, electric trains — whatever children play with nowadays. If they ever did it, if they just went in one night and cleaned the whole place out, you have to ask if they could ever steal back half as much as has been stolen from them".⁹

What has the explosion of knowledge done to and for their lives? Those who celebrate the fact that we are living in an age in which knowledge is growing exponentially need to pause and think what is this knowledge for and to what end is this knowledge being used. If such pockets of squalour and misery exist in the land of plenty what must it be like in countries that are far less developed.

One wonders if the celebration of the growth of knowledge is not in fact human being exulting at his/her power to create knowledge, a supreme and a grand act of self-adulation? Is it not also perhaps the case that human being is in such an awe of his/her own ability to produce wonders of knowledge that production of knowledge requires no justification outside of the act of production itself?

Now that we have the world encircled and made smaller by modern information technology do we know and understand each other better?

With *murabbī* relegated to the dust-bin of history and education redefined to mean learning skills, no doubt complex ones, to retrieve information, modern classrooms being to look more like high tech-information technology show cases. A modern child has millions of books at his or her fingertips. But how is he/she to decide what to select from the grand display of knowledge? A *murabbī* would give the student the basic configuration of meaning, which would help him/her to make such decisions. In the present age of information, however, *murabbī* seems to be obsolete and redundant.

Yet, in spite of the absence of the personalized configuration of meaning one is forced to select and choose. The basis for selection is provided today by what is needed and demanded by the market. Children learn to evaluate knowledge not through a personal encounter with a *murabbī* but simply by being brought up in a market economy and learning to read the various ways the market trends are communicated to the consumers.

When a *murabbī* on encountering a body of knowledge asks: How does it affect my life? He/she is asking primarily a spiritual and a moral question. The purview of a *murabbī*'s life is neither confined to this world nor limited to what pleases him or her. Thus, although a *murabbī* is in search of knowledge but knowledge is not sought either for its own sake or for the sake of improving his/her life here. The search for knowledge is a spiritual and a moral quest undertaken to understand the signs of Allah on the spiritual road to salvation. Hence knowledge is neither self-directing nor guided by the needs of those who fund the research. It is directed by the desire to please Allah and motivated by the need to understand the signs of Allah. All and every knowledge serves but one end and travels along but one path. The end that knowledge ought to serve is thus not defined by the market nor by the needs of human beings but by the spiritual needs of the servant of Allah. This lends coherence and unity to knowledge that is not internal to knowledge. It is a spiritual and not an epistemological coherence. Physicists are looking for a unification theory that will be able to explain all the forces of nature by identifying an epistemological coherence that will bind nature together through human understanding of the workings of the laws of nature.

Once commodification of knowledge is in place and *murabbī* is no longer needed to personalize knowledge, knowledge arises in response to human needs as mediated by the market. The market, in other words, becomes the hub that not only controls the circulation of knowledge but also decides whose needs and which needs have the potential to be exploited by the market for the satisfaction of which knowledge is then generated. Hence the question whose needs a given body of knowledge would be able to serve becomes pertinent. This fact also partially explains why in spite of the explosion of knowledge the needs of many still go unheeded. Furthermore, the market does not and cannot distinguish between refined and unrefined needs, between good and bad needs. Whichever need shows up in the market with sufficient funds to back it up is considered a legitimate need. Market does not allow any moral considerations to interfere with its operations. If knowledge has no moral commitment and serves no spiritual end then how is one to teach which of human needs are primary and which secondary? Even more importantly, can one teach how to refine and cultivate needs which are given to us by nature raw?

It is true that people have started to tackle global problems such as ecology, pollution, and nuclear arms race with the help of modern knowledge. But the irony is that the knowledge that is being used to

solve the problems is the very same knowledge that created those problems. In other words, since the nature of knowledge is not questioned the solutions, if they are found, remain specific answers to particular problems. The best solutions do not get to the root of the problem.

The absence of *murabbī* from the modern educational landscape has also brought change in thinking about curriculum. In fact curriculum has taken the place vacated by *murabbī*. The emphasis has shifted in educational thought from the teacher to what the teacher teaches or ought to teach. This could only be possible if a distinction is first made between the knower and what he/she knows. That is to say that the separation of the question, what to teach? from, who will teach? is conceivable only if we first impersonalize knowledge. In fact the question, what to teach? has become the primary focus of educational policy to such an extent that today the teachers are "trained" to teach the desired curriculum. The teacher, as a result, is seen merely as a means, a conduit to transmit the necessary knowledge. What a teacher is expected to bring to the class is what he/she knows and not what he/she is. What a teacher is is purely an accidental quality with little or no relevance to his/her competence as a teacher as long as he/she has the necessary credentials and no criminal record. And it could not be otherwise if the purpose of teacher is to teach skills considered necessary to access information.

The more progressive educationists view the teacher as a "facilitator". On this view a teacher is supposed to facilitate the learning of abstract knowledge which may also include the learning of values but in the abstract. In response to the questions, why just this knowledge? and just these values? more abstract justifications are given.

In the case of a *murrabī* his/her life is the living proof of what he/she teaches is worth learning. A *murabbī* teaches his/her life and not some abstract disembodied knowledge. In other words, a *murabbī* teaches how to think in order to live in a certain way and, how to live so that one can think in a certain way. And in order to initiate the particular way of thinking a *murabbī* uses texts that he/she has spent a lifetime reading and living and testing the truths of. Hence a *murrabī* teaches a text and not a selection from several texts. A *murrabī* believes that the best way to learn how to think is to read the text that embodies that way of thinking. To master the text is to learn the internal dynamics with the help of which that particular way of thinking proceeds. In other words, to learn how to think is not like putting on a hat or adopting a frame of mind but rather like learning a story. Different stories not only have

different tales to tell but also have different internal rhythms and logics by which the events are made to unfold in a meaningful way.

To learn a way of thinking hence is to learn the particular way the thought proceeds. To teach information is therefore easy but to teach how to think in a particular way is not something that can be broken down into semesters. After all the semester system, an American invention, is nothing but the application of the method of production to teaching. You achieve efficiency in production by breaking the process of production into manageable sizes. Likewise, you achieve efficiency in learning by breaking down the learning process into fourteen weeks of manageable learning periods. By adopting this method industry produces more and in education students process more information. In other words, it is relatively easy to teach the philosophy of this or that philosopher, or the theory of this or that sociologist. What, however, is much more difficult is to teach how to think like a philosopher or a sociologist. To learn to think like a philosopher or a sociologist one has to master the text that embodies the philosophical or sociological thinking. It is not different from learning how to play tennis by watching the game of a world class tennis player. One has to first learn to think step by step alongside a thinker and then think against him/her in order to learn to think philosophically. And of course just watching the game or reading the text by oneself is never enough. One needs a teacher or a coach, to show how a thought is thought or a stroke is played, and the one who guides has to be the one who knows the game or the text.

The purpose of this discussion is not to make a case for bringing *murabbī* back into modern educational discourse, which for a variety of reasons seems hardly an option. As is said in the beginning, this is not a socio-historical description of the role and function of *murabbī* in Islamic education, but rather an ontological description of the notion of *murabbī*. And as an ontological account it served as a norm on the basis of which a critique of modern education can be made. This discussion also serves to illustrate the point that since education is situated in society the possibilities for changes in education are determined by society. That is why the critique of education inevitably leads to social critique. Thus this discussion hopefully serves as a corrective to the thinking that reflects on education in isolation from the society.

¹Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, tr. Bergman Romas (London: Penguin Books, 1978), 45.

²The notion of personalized knowledge as used here should not be confused with Michael Polanyi's concept of personal knowledge. For Polanyi personal

knowledge socially acquired is non-thematic knowledge which one acquires without any conscious effort or even any awareness of learning it. One is, in fact, socialized into it. Cf. his *Personal Knowledge* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).

³Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, tr. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 119.

⁴Cf. Ahmad Shalaby, *History of Muslim Education*⁵ (Beirut: Dār al-Kashshāf, 1954), 28.

⁵Jerome Karabel and A.H. Halsey, eds., *On Power and Ideology in Education* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 313–324.

⁶*The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, tr. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 4.

⁷Corporations are putting enormous pressure on the governments of America and north European countries to streamline schools to serve better the needs of the economy. There is a powerful lobby in the U.S.A. which is trying to persuade the Federal Government to privatize public education by handing over to corporations the responsibility to run and maintain schools.

⁸A commodity is defined by the ease with which it can be exchanged for something else and can move from place to place in search for higher and higher returns. The exchangeability and mobility of commodity is the function of its independence from all historical and social/cultural contexts in determining its value. The value of commodity, in other words, is not bound by the context of tradition or culture. Knowledge, however, is grounded in tradition and education properly understood is education of tradition. And hence when one goes abroad for higher education one goes not to acquire disembodied theoretical knowledge but to gain knowledge of and learn from a different tradition. When knowledge is uprooted from tradition that is its proper context and where its roots are continuously nurtured and fed by cherished habits of mind that took ages to grow and develop we have only transferable skills. Those who think that knowledge can be easily uprooted and transferred to a new abode also think that education consists of easily identifiable elements. But once we acknowledge that both education and knowledge are grounded in tradition then we cannot but recognize that education is a mixed bag of knowledge, practices, habits of mind and several intangibles that cannot be easily identified and isolated from the tradition of which they are a part.

Foreign universities setting up shops in the developing countries are selling marketable skills under the guise of education and not the mode of thought that made those skills possible. The mode of thought cannot be marketed because it is grounded in tradition. And tradition is not a commodity. This is a new form of exploitation of the developing countries by the developed nations of the West. The teaching of the skills rather than modes of thought not only makes the developing nations more dependent on Western education but in the process also devalues the education of developing nations.

⁹Jonathan Kozol, *Amazing Grace: The Lives of Children and the Conscience of a Nation* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 70.

KITĀB AL-SIYAR AL-ŞAGHĪR

SHAYBĀNĪ'S FAMOUS WORK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

Al-Siyar al-Şaghīr is the shorter, more concise work of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shabānī. His other work was *al-Siyar al-Kabīr*, which later constituted part of al-Sarakhsī's famous *al-Mabsūṭ*. *Al-Siyar al-Şaghīr* has great significance in Islamic legal history. It is considered to be a record of Abū Ḥanīfah's doctrines on *Siyar* as dictated to al-Shaybānī by his senior fellow-disciple, Abū Yūsuf. The work reportedly came to the notice of the Syrian jurist, al-Awazā'ī, who in turn wrote his comments on it, expressing in a succinct form his disagreements with the doctrines of Abū Ḥanīfah on questions of *Siyar*. Subsequently, Abū Yūsuf wrote a rejoinder to Awzā'ī's work in which he defended all except a few doctrines of his master. This is known as *al-Radd 'alā Siyar al-Awzā'ī*. This work, along with the critical comments of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī, is preserved in his copious work, *Kitāb al-Umm*. Thus, there can be little doubt that Shaybānī's *al-Siyar al-Şaghīr* is a work of fundamental importance in the field of *Siyar*. The considerable debate which it generated is an index of its significance during the formative period of Islamic international law. For it is these debates and controversies which greatly led to the growth of the refinement of all branches of Islamic law, including *Siyar*. Despite its importance *al-Siyar al-Şaghīr* was unavailable in print up until now. It was extant, however, in manuscripts in several countries of the world.

Dr Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi has rendered a yeoman's service to the history of Islamic law and to Islamic scholarship by painstakingly and skilfully establishing an authentic text of this work. This naturally required much effort in obtaining a number of manuscripts from different parts of the world and then carefully comparing them. Apart from that, Dr Ghazi also ably translated this edited text into English. Additionally, he wrote a very erudite and illuminating "Introduction" to the work in which, apart from introducing Shaybānī and his contribution to *Siyar*, he presents an illuminating survey of the growth of international law among Muslims, particularly highlighting the very significant contribution made to this field by Shaybānī. Dr Ghazi has accomplished all the tasks on which he had embarked in connection with this work with remarkable ability.

Price: Rs. 250.00

Overseas: \$ 25.00
(postage included)

Write to:

Deputy Director (Publications),
Islamic Research Institute, P.O. Box: 1035,
Islamabad (Pakistan).

QUARTERLY JOURNALS

Published by

ISLAMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE

	<i>Annual Subscription</i>	<i>Single Copy</i>
1. <i>Islamic Studies</i> (English)	Rs. 150.00 \$ 60.00	Rs. 40.00 \$ 20.00
	Rs. 150.00 \$ 50.00	Rs. 40.00 \$ 15.00
	Rs. 150.00 \$ 50.00	Rs. 40.00 \$ 15.00
Annual subscription for SARC and ECO countries	\$ 30.00	\$ 8.00

Back issues (if available) can be supplied.

Please address all business correspondence to

**Deputy Director (Publications),
Islamic Research Institute,
P.O. Box No. 1035,
Islamabad-44000 (PAKISTAN)**

Islamic Studies is abstracted in *Science and Religion*,
and indexed in *Index Islamicus*, *Middle East Journal*
and *Periodica Islamica*.