Islam and Knowledge

Al Faruqi's Concept of Religion in Islamic Thought

Essays in Honor of Isma'il Al Faruqi

Edited by Intiyaz Yusuf
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infant mortality rates, and so on to establish some baseline empirical data. Theories can be developed from this data on what is going well and what is problematic using our already established criteria.

The elaboration of narratives on the established criteria must be constructed in light of our objectives — descriptive and not evaluative information to assess the state of the Ummah. Insightful, comprehensive, and instructive narratives based on empirical data do not have to be labeled ‘objective’ as they just report what is observed. It is the evaluative and the judgmental given without concern that denigrate. Our narratives should celebrate which is going well and search for the effective cost of that which is problematic with the deliberate intention of correction.

As the theories for a coherent collection of ideas become manifest, thoughts can then turn to deliberation about what policies are in place that support that well-being and what policies should be in place to correct a problematic. We would always have to look for what practices are best to fit our ethical guidelines (i.e. people should have access to food and potable water along with skills and opportunity to provide themselves with a living) and fit the natural cultural setting that can be recommended. There is no one size fits all beyond the practice of Islam itself. As we think about a template for rediscovering or refining existing cultural templates we should first use our own classical scholars such as al-Biruni and Ibn Khaldun, to name two pre-eminent thinkers. The object of social science is to form policies that ensure regulated, welfare-concerned, healthy Muslim living.

Muslim scholars must speak from more than the accolades of a golden age long past and from more than the anger and dismissal of the present. We cannot be so scared of failure that we do not apply our talents to what is surely a challenge yet immeasurable in its rewards. We also cannot continue to spend energy lamenting the templates of another worldview to ours.

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Isma‘il Al Faruqi’s Theory of Value:
A Plea for Islamic Humanism

Ibrahim M. Zein

Introduction

In his early writings Isma‘il al Faruqi realized the importance of the concept of humanism in any ethical discourse. Most importantly, perhaps, he noted that an ethical theory that did not adhere to the universality of ethics would obviously lead to relativism in ethical values. Thus, for al Faruqi, Islamic humanism should emphasize the supposition that values are relational to human beings rather than relative. In this regard, al Faruqi made a distinction between the realization of a value in a human act and its ideal being. It becomes apparent that an exposition of al Faruqi’s theory of value necessitates a close examination of his concept of Islamic humanism, how it developed, and what elements were retained throughout the different phases of his intellectual life. Therefore, the main focus of this paper will be on his understanding of humanism and its relationship to the ethical discourse.

A Preliminary Understanding of Islamic Humanism

It is most odd that al Faruqi’s early writing on humanism is in his work entitled On Arabism: Urubah and Religion. This is largely due to the fact that Arabism is associated with Arab nationalism. Thus it is a difficult task to universalize a concept which is genuinely perceived by many scholars in the field of Arab nationalism to be a particular one. Although al Faruqi was aware of the inherent difficulty in such endeavor, he was determined to finish up another three volumes on the same topic with subtitles ‘Urubah and Art,’
'Urubjah and Society,' and 'Urubjah and Man.' He promised to publish them in the years 1963, 1964, and 1965 as a series of four volumes, of which he produced only the first volume, in 1962. However, for one reason or another he decided not to follow that course of action to its meaningful end. It is not clear why he did not complete the project. More importantly, it might not be intellectually rewarding to speculate on the reasons that led al Faruqi not to continue this line of investigation on Arabism. In fact, one could argue that the final work of al Faruqi, entitled The Cultural Atlas of Islam, which was published in 1986, was a reformulation of the Urubjah project. The only difference is that the key concept of Urubjah was substituted by the concept of Mesopotamian religion. In the new submission, Islam was seen as the highest manifestation of Mesopotamian religion, whereas in the Urubjah project Islam was perceived as the highest moment of consciousness of Arabism. To al Faruqi, it seemed that the cosmic representation of man could either be seen in Urubjah consciousness or in Mesopotamian religion. In both cases that cosmic human being is both a particular and an open project for universal man.

Obviously, al Faruqi was aware of the total confusion which would result from utilizing the concept of Urubjah to convey his message of humanism. As a result, he emphasized right from the beginning of his book that "Arabism, or the pursuit of Urubjah, is not Arab nationalism." Nothing was left to the imagination of the reader in his analysis of the concept of Urubjah, yet a growing misunderstanding was generated by the very usage of the concept in his ethical discourse on Islam and Arabism. Clearly, the 1960s were the time of new discourse on Islam and Arabism. It was inconceivable for a scholar such as al Faruqi to dismiss that debate altogether or to take the side of the Arab nationalists or the Islamists. Evidently, for al Faruqi, a complete disassociation from both Arab nationalists and Islamists was, essentially, a necessary step in a complex argument leveled against Judaism and Christianity. The argument was designed to show in a detailed manner how Judaism compromised both the universality of ethics, and absolute monotheism in its formation throughout history. Although the essence of this religion as the first moment of Urubjah consciousness is to preserve both the universality of ethics and the transcendence of God, the history of the Hebrew people sacrificed the essence of their own religion.

Thus, according to al Faruqi, the development of the concept of covenant in flesh instead of an ethical one stripped the doctrine of the chosen people from all its ethical context. The connection between these two concepts rendered the divine message behind the covenant an arbitrary act. Clearly, then, a covenant without ethical content led to a category of chosen people who could do away with universal ethical values and still maintain their God's given status. Even worse, the covenant in flesh is neither open to whole humanity nor does it deal with the individual as a moral agent; but rather developed Hebrew ethnocentrism. In the history of ancient Israel there was a continuous repulsion and persecution of Judaic prophets and adherents of their religions at the hands of the Hebrews and their religious establishment. This made it possible for a complete transvaluation of Judaic values. As a result, the value of maintaining the community was given the highest status in the hierarchy of values which lay behind Hebrew separatism, and consequently led to Hebrew ethnocentrism. In this regard compliance with what makes you a member of the community became more important than the individual intention behind the act of compliance. Ultimately, the focus of ethics shifted from ethical values that are concerned with the transformation of the individual's will to an ethics of consequence.

It is because of this ethical transvaluation of Judaic values, according to al Faruqi, that Jesus' message became the only viable solution to Hebrew ethnocentrism. Thus, the cult of law was the main focus of Jesus' ethical criticism. Therefore, his ethical transformation focused merely on the individual's will instead of the community. However, for al Faruqi, Christianity in its Western form is a transvaluation of the original message of Jesus. This development in Christianity was the initiative of Paul, which consequently turned it into a religion of 'saviorism' and 'peculiarism.' Clearly, then, the ethical implications of this transvaluation had a grave consequence on both the possibility of the ethical act and the meaning of humanity.

Admittedly, al Faruqi's criticisms of the historical formations of both Judaism and Christianity were far more developed in his work which he published five years later. In this work, which is entitled Christian Ethics, he was aware of the fact that, within a setting of interreligious dialogue, an evaluation based on the concept of Urubjah would be completely undesirable. Although he kept the same line of argument, in terms of his ethical discourse, he was careful enough not to use subjective categories for both understanding and evaluating Judaism or Christianity. More specifically, he developed a critical framework based on the principles of meta-religion. This new position of al Faruqi in the study of religion - which is essentially based on the assumption that religious phenomenon is a life fact - led him to apply the phenomenological method. The study of a phenomenon such as religion, which is a combination of both fact and value in one whole complex, necessitates a method which is capable of
both an act of disengagement for accurate understanding and an evaluation process based on rational principles. The end result is a set of synthetic propositions that will both describe and evaluate the phenomenon. Through this method, al Faruqi skillfully studied the ethical values of both Judaism and Christianity. In this regard, he developed an intelligent narrative that identified the processes of transvaluation that did take place in both Judaism and Christianity. Thus, a distinction was made between Judaic values and the post-exilic ethical values. Where the Judaic values maintained the original divine message of both the universality of ethics and the transcendence of God, the post-exilic transvaluation generated a new set of values based on a new hierarchy of values dominated by both ethnic and ethical consequence. Though the ethics of Jesus was meant to rectify this situation by a complete focus on the individual’s will, the Pauline doctrine of original sin resulted in another form of transvaluation. This time the very fabric of moral value was threatened by puritanism and saviorism.

It should be noted that the main difference between al Faruqi’s narratives in On Arabism: Urubah and Religion and in Christian Ethics is the methodological stance. In his later work he applied the tenets of phenomenology of religion, which made his narrative more critical of his own religious assumptions. More significantly, he developed a critical framework for the study of religion based on a set of principles of understanding and evaluation of the religious phenomenon. However, for him, the valutational processes should be governed by a set of meta-religion principles. Although a detailed discussion of these issues seemed to be beyond the scope of this study, it did shed some light on al Faruqi’s ethical evaluation of two significant religions in the history of Islam. Most importantly, it showed us how al Faruqi utilized his ethical theory to evaluate and criticize other ethical sensibilities from a position which he claimed to be based solely on universal principles of rationality.12

Since this paper focuses on al Faruqi’s theory of value and his exposition of Islamic humanism, chapter 6 of his book On Arabism is certainly the most relevant part for us here.13 Indeed it is the culmination of the whole book; it is where al Faruqi advanced his own vision of what is Urubah, Islam, and the Arab stream of being. He cast off the position of both Arab nationalists and Islamists and developed a synthesis based on what he called the “Arabist Synthesis.”14 The narrative thread throughout this chapter is a combination of highly rational arguments based both on the Kantian tradition and on the poetics of Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi.15 As a result, he tirelessly clarified all the misconceptions arising from confusing Islam with Urubah or the Arab stream of being. By doing so he identified the essentials of each term and its different levels of meaning. Thus, it became obvious where each term might share with the others the same semantic field and still retain its distinctiveness.

Clearly, al Faruqi’s main focus in this chapter is to argue for the importance of the Arabist understanding of Urubah, where a genuine meaning of that concept became a tool of analysis for understanding the relationship between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Moreover, according to al Faruqi, this concept became the basis for an authentic meaning of monotheism, universalism, and world affirmation in the discourse on the theory of value.

The whole chapter was meant to be the concluding chapter of al Faruqi’s understanding of Urubah. In this way he felt that his position would be in line with the Arabist synthesis that transcended both the Arab nationalist and the Islamist positions. As a result, al Faruqi throughout the chapter exhibited an awareness of the shortcomings of the positions of Arab nationalists and Islamists on Islam and Urubah. It should be noted that, before chapter 6, al Faruqi had devoted two chapters to giving an elaborate discussion of the positions of both Arab nationalists and Islamists. He pointed out that neither of them help us to understand the relationship between Arabism and Islam. Therefore, for al Faruqi, the Arabist synthesis is the most accurate and meaningful stand in this regard. For him, Urubah is the soul of the Arab stream of being and Islam does have a number of meanings, each reflecting one level of meaning, and the confusion of which with Urubah or the Arab stream of being will result in a total distortion of a set of interrelated concepts. Therefore, he dedicated a significant part of the chapter to clarifying the differences between these concepts and to enlightening the reader on the different shades of meanings in each concept.

The second part of this chapter which was meant to outline the Arabist conception of Urubah was chiefly divided into four parts. Each part was to capture one essential element of Urubah. Al Faruqi perceived these four essential elements of Urubah as: piety, ethicality, universal Ummatism, and world affirmation. Concerning Urubah as piety, al Faruqi concluded after a lengthy discussion on the relationship between metaphysics and axiology, and the meaning of God’s attributes for an Arabist by saying: “To be an Arabist is to seek value, to realize the will of God, to emulate His attributes; and Arabism is therefore the highest worship of God, the highest piety.”16

Evidently, al Faruqi extrapolated the ethical sensibility of Urubah from within its religious worldview. More significantly, he emphasized the
interconnectedness of religion and ethics. In this regard the realm of value is inseparable from the attributes of God in general and directly connected with His will.

As regards ethicality and its relationship with *Urubah*, he focused on the historical development of Arab consciousness which revolted against the Hebrew separatism in Judaism and affirmed God and His unity. Following this line of historical development in ethicality in the Arab consciousness from its early moments in Judaism through Christianity to its climax in Islam, al Faruqi emphasized that "value never stops to be a value, though its order of rank may change with the discovery of new realms of value." The rest of the discussion in this section was devoted to the explanation of the historical process behind the discovery of new values, which consequently affected both the order of the hierarchy of values and the mode of their realization in the realm of real existence. A simple summary of his interpretation of the development of ethicality throughout the ages and its manifestations emphasizes both continuity of the realization of values and more balanced relationships between the moral agent, comprehensiveness of values, and striving after them. During each historical moment in Arab consciousness, whether it was Judaism, Christianity or Islam, al Faruqi believed, there should be a clear distinction between the ideal value and its real existence. This meant that only the human being could have the ability to actualize values in real existence. Thus al Faruqi vehemently emphasized that the tending of the actual towards the ideal is exclusively a human category. In addition, this human being throughout specific history, as manifested in *Urubah* consciousness, was discovering values. In each moment of this consciousness ethicality moved one step forward. It started with the negative assertion against Hebrew separatism and ethnocentrism. Then, in the ethical breakthrough of Jesus, it emphasized the importance of the ethics of intent and the human will as the focus of ethical transformation. Finally, with the ethical teaching of the Prophet Muhammad, al Faruqi argued that *Urubah* consciousness reached its climax, which resulted in both the establishment of "the unity of value and striving after it." Therefore, both the ethics of intent and ethics of action were perceived in a whole complex valuational scheme that included the individual as the moral agent, his society as the realm of ethical realization and the unity of values in one comprehensive hierarchical order.

Under the sub-topic 'Arabism as Universalistic Ummatism,' al Faruqi outlined the main characteristics of his understanding of Islamic humanism. It all started with his enthusiasm with universalism as an inevitable concept in ethical discourse. His emphasis on the ethics of act and the importance of society in transforming the category of the neighbor from an abstract entity into a real one led him to conclude that "Society and 'humanity' as a community bound together in faith, purpose and act, and therefore in destiny, is definitely an Arab idea, an Islamic discovery." Then he went on to describe the axiological significance of this discovery and how it radically changed the whole edifice of moral life. Obviously, for him, it affected the way we know value, the level of its existence, the level of obligation and the qualitative level of value. After a lengthy exposition of society's significance for value theory, al Faruqi concluded with a highly poetic statement connecting universalism and society with humanity: "Universalist society opens up entirely new vistas in ideal realm of value. So great is the discovery of humanity, so wide are the vistas it lays open and so drastic is the upsetting of the order of rank of all that had been revealed or discovered..."

He next remarked that the value of the Ummah would redefine the hierarchy of values in such a way that its new ethic should subsume all the values under its new valuational order. Al Faruqi argued that if we accepted the assumption that what differentiated society from other social organization is that the purpose of the former is the pursuit of total value, then it would be difficult to associate society with any form of fragmentation of humanity or separatism. Therefore, he concluded, "...society is universal, permitting the exclusion of no human being. Every group separatism is tribalism and rests on a contradiction of the unity of value, of the unity of God." This intellectual obsession with universalistic humanism and its interconnectedness with Ummatism ran throughout the book and found its final expression in this chapter. One could say that al Faruqi's analysis of the ethical dimension of the concept of the Ummah made him realize the humanistic characteristic of its ethos. He stated that "Arabism, therefore, is certainly humanism; but it is humanism purified of all sentimentality by the universalist consensus of the world-ummah." It should be noted that al Faruqi never used the term 'Islamic humanism' in his book *On Arabism*, though he identified the humanist and universalist ethos of Arabism. This was because it was not yet part of his vocabulary. For him, humanism in ethical discourse was obviously a very powerful and attractive concept and much of its attraction was largely due to its simplicity. It made man the point of reference for all ethical values. Therefore, it entertained relativism in ethics, and for al Faruqi this is both beyond tolerance and equally problematic in ethical discourse. This issue led al Faruqi to emphasize
time and again that ethical values are rather relational to human beings but not relative to them. He argued this position, pointing to the difference between his stand and the Kantian one. It might be the case that, although al-Faruqi felt the significance of humanism in ethical theory, it was too difficult for him to appropriate the whole concept in his valuational theory. Therefore, he pointed to the universalistic, humanistic and societal ethos of Islamic ethical theory. Moreover, he pointed to the major flaw in ethical humanism: where the human agent was made the point of reference, which in turn rendered ethicality into relativism. The conspicuous absence of Islamic humanism from his work On Arabism should not make us draw the conclusion that al-Faruqi was not aware of its importance in ethical discourse at this stage of his intellectual development. On the contrary, one could argue that at this stage he was preparing the way for a complete appropriation of this term. Rather what was important in his work was the overemphasis on both universalism and humanism as the most important characteristics of Unmatism in his theory of value. It should be repeated that al-Faruqi’s main objective was to demonstrate how a particular concept such as *Urubah* should be perceived as both universalistic and humanistic in valuational discourse.

The rest of al-Faruqi’s exposition of the Arabist synthesis in this chapter was completely devoted to his articulation of an axiological theory within a Kantian framework, with an emphasis on its rationality. He developed Ibn Taymiyyah’s axiological and metaphysical positions by using all the tools of critical philosophy set at his disposal by his previous training in Kantian philosophy. This strategy of understanding Ibn Taymiyyah on the attributes of God is highly visible throughout the chapter. Still, one could say that this reading of Ibn Taymiyyah was meant to show how he anchored his position in the Islamic legacy and skillfully appropriated Kantian philosophy. However, a deeper reading of al-Faruqi’s theory of value would clearly reveal his indebtedness to al-Tawhidi’s understanding of humanism within the context of *Urubah*. Both al-Tawhidi and Ibn Taymiyyah shared their dissonant with *Kalam*, although they were very enthusiastic about critical analysis in general and in particular about what could be connote as critical hermeneutical linguistics. According to al-Faruqi, their analysis of metaphysical or axiological issues and the position they had taken was the trademark of their intellectual legacy. This was likely present in the poetics of Arabic language and in the urge for understanding it within the well-established dictionary which was the work of both Arab grammarians and those who devoted their life to documenting Arabic poetry, prose oratory, and other forms. Al-Tawhidi and later Ibn Taymiyyah followed this tradition of linguistic hermeneutic in their understanding of both metaphysical and axiological issues within the Islamic framework. Obviously, al-Tawhidi was more inclined to highlight the poetic aspects of that linguistic hermeneutic than Ibn Taymiyyah. This dimension was developed by al-Faruqi to its meaningful end when he articulated his theory of value. There he pointed to the poetics of the Arab consciousness in its final moment which emphasized both the rational and the poetic aspects.

This conclusion is largely due to the view that the Qur’an is both the content and form. While both are taken as the word of God, the form which essentially exhibits the poetic sense of the revelation reflects another dimension of ‘rationality.’ There al-Tawhidi and al-Faruqi claim that rationality should include that element of human sensibility. In this regard a genuine understanding of al-Faruqi’s exposition of the concept of humanism will not be sufficient if the emphasis is exclusively made on Kantian rationalism. Al-Faruqi combined the importance of language and its poetics on the *Urubah* consciousness and Kantian rationality with this element of human sensibility which does have its own rationality. Therefore, it would not be accurate to view this element as completely subjective. Rather there is an element of inter-subjectivity that is closely related to Arabic as a language, and to *Urubah* consciousness as a recipient of the will of God in the form of a revelation. For *Urubah* consciousness the revelation is in a sublime form. It educates and moves the human will on both levels—the rational and the emotional. And yet, the emotional aspect is not sheer blind emotivism, but rather has its own form of rationality.

In the last section of chapter 6 of his book *On Arabism*, al-Faruqi focused on the details of his theory of value. There, he decided to give an elaborate answer to the three main questions: What are values? Are values knowable? Are they realizable? His answers were preceded by an explanation of the nature of God and His attributes. All this discussion was a continuation of his previous submission on the relationship between God and His attributes, but this time the issue was how that discussion is connected with the inner relationship between axiology and metaphysics. More specifically, which way should we take to prove the existence of God? Is it through cosmological, causal or other types of proof? Or should we move from the position of God as transcendent in His essence to the presupposition of God of being? In this regard, axiology would be the ground for the verification of faith. Al-Faruqi praised Kant and then later connected his position with that of Ibn Taymiyyah by saying, “As the great Kant has said, it is nonsensical
to speak of an appearance without something that appears." Then he went on to emphasize the Kantian position, which he claimed is similar to Ibn Taymiyyah’s position: “God, according to this reasoning, would be established for knowledge—not as a primal cause or source of being, or cosmos-designer, but as a pre-supposition of axiology, as ‘that-without-which’ valutational phenomena would not and cannot be.” In addition to this position on the relationship between metaphysics and axiology and its relevance to the discussion on the relationship of God’s essence to His attributes, it should be noted that it is because of God’s transcendence that His essence is ipso facto unknowable to us; therefore we would be able to relate to Him through His attribute of will. More significantly, His attributes are the realm of values. Through His will, which is made clear to us in revelation, and the rest of the attributes, values will be realized in the realm of real existence. This exposition, which was advanced by al Faraqui on the relationship between axiology and metaphysics in detail, was meant to serve as an indispensable introduction to his elaborate answer to the questions about the theory of value. Obviously, al Faraqui answered the three questions in the affirmative. For him, values are part of the realm of ideal which is formed of both metaphysics and axiology. The relationship between values and the real existence is based on the fundamental demarcation between actual being and ideal being. Where the former is the realization of the value in real existence, it is equally true that it is something other than the value itself. Thus, the realization of the value is not the value, but rather its realization in real existence that belongs to the actual realm of being. Consequently, the realization of the value will never exhaust the realm of value, but will always and almost be a real existence which is realized by the human agent.

According to al Faraqui, one needs to hold a worldview that makes a sharp distinction between the ideal realm and the actual one. This is, therefore, the only possible way of understanding absolute monotheism, which requires the transcendence of God. Consequently, for al Faraqui’s position, the realm of value belongs to the ideal which constitutes both axiological and metaphysical beings. From this distinction one can easily attribute to values the status of absoluteness. This means that, although values are absolute, they are relevant to the actual being. Their structure reappears in the real existence of values in the actual world. Obviously, this reappearance does not exhaust the whole realm of values. In this regard, one can say that the distinction between essence and existence is meaningful so long as this type of idealism does not degenerate into representationalism.

These distinctions and their consequences must be understood in line with al Faraqui’s analysis of the relationship between God’s essence and His attributes. Thus al Faraqui concludes his discussion on the relationship between values and their actualization in the material world by saying, “The impact of values on their materials remains ‘ideal’ a divine touch which transfigures those materials into valuable.” Then he explains that the only way the ideal realm becomes relevant to the actual is through the axiological dimension: “The how of this touch, being something which is anchored in the transcendental realm though it reaches into that of real existence, is itself transcendental, and hence forever beyond our reach. For philosophy it remains an irreducible category.”

Evidently, al Faraqui’s answer to the question regarding the status of values shaped the way he tackled the issue of how we can know values. Following the Kantian position—with some significant changes—al Faraqui stated that, “The value itself, therefore, can be discerned by its presence in the consciousness. Such primary consciousness is the datum of valutational research.” Then he went on to explain the main difference between his stand and the Kantian position on this primary consciousness of valutational sense: “The discovery and establishment of it in ethics has first been accomplished by Kant, to his immortal credit.” While he agreed with Kant on the a priori aspects of human emotionality, he pointed to the main difference in the ways of understanding emotional acts. The Kantian position confined the a priori to the relational, whereas al Faraqui added that they are both a priori and content. Al Faraqui thought that, because of this major difference, his position would allow us to consider moral insight while the Kantian position is restricted only to the sense of duty. It should be noted that al Faraqui insisted that the valutational senses are as real as the empirical senses of the external world. In order to explain the previous position, al Faraqui viewed the axiological structure of understanding the realm of value as analogous to our understanding of the empirical world. Naturally, he perceived the Kantian position in this regard as incomplete, therefore he added the ‘content’ dimension to the a priori in understanding the valutational sense.

Admittedly, the religious tone was highly visible in al Faraqui’s exposition of his theory of value. It was reflected in his extensive reference to the attributes of God and their relationship to axiology. In addition, he went into a detailed discussion on the theory of prophecy and revelation to explain the connection between the human effort in discovering values and the assistance of God. In this regard, he tackled most of the theological
questions related to the human ability to perceive values without being aided by revelation. Finally, he devoted a considerable amount of space to the issue of the realizability of values and connected it with the meaning of paradise. Obviously, his understanding of paradise from an axiological point of view was largely viewed through the religious stand he took in his exposition of the theory of value. Clearly, then, it could be said that al Faruqi's theory of value was articulated from within a deep sense of religious sensibility. It could be argued that his position did not overrule the possibility of a secular humanist account regarding axiology in general or a theory of value in particular. This is largely due to the fact that he made a sharp distinction between the axiological structure and the metaphysical one. Moreover, the latter could be comprehended only through the former. Therefore, a meaningful understanding of the metaphysical or the theoretical was only possible through the axiological. This position was an outcome of his analysis of the relationship between God's essence and His attributes.

Al Faruqi's distinction between the metaphysical and the axiological led him to argue for the primacy of the axiological. But, by the same token, this would allow his opponents to argue for the secular humanist position. Sensing this epistemological danger, al Faruqi accused the humanistic view of being completely relativistic, whereas his position argues for a relational position between the human being and values. In his argument, values should, therefore, be regarded as absolute. Their absoluteness would be the only safeguard against both relativism and self-contradiction. Although al Faruqi argued for a monotheistic worldview, his position emphasized monism in ethical values. While, for him, monism in metaphysics could ultimately lead to relativism, in axiology it opened the door for the absoluteness of ethical values. It was equally important to draw attention to the fact that pluralism in ethical values, in al Faruqi's view, is completely unacceptable. However, human beings were endowed with the capacity to discover values. This human capability, coupled with the absoluteness of values, led al Faruqi to argue for a position that declared that in matters of value judgment there should be no room for truth and falsity, but rather the criteria should be based on more and less. Thus, those who perceived more value should be duty bound to educate those who perceived less. Most importantly, perhaps, the disagreement in moral judgment was not to be understood on the basis of discovering value or lack of value. Rather, it should be seen as putting a value in the wrong place in the hierarchy of values. Both parties, therefore, discovered values, but one of them misplaced that value and allocated it a rank in the hierarchy which belonged to another value. As regards this part of his argument, it became clear that a plurality of ethical values would result from a misplaced value in the hierarchy. When priority was given to one value over others which were supposed to be higher in rank than that value, the systematization of values would be disrupted, but obviously that would not be a solid ground for ethical plurality. This was because this type of pluralism was based on a mistake in priorities, rather than on genuine perception of values themselves. Al Faruqi redefined the meaning of ethical pluralism in a way that emphasized the absoluteness of values, yet he opened a space for all humans to compete in discovering values and redefining the hierarchy of values in a positive way. This meant that the hierarchy of values was not to be perceived as a fixed state.

A comprehensive understanding of al Faruqi's concept of humanism at this phase of his intellectual development should include his articulation of the universalistic theory of value, his criticism and appropriation of Kantian ethics, his appropriation of Ibn Taymiyyah's understanding of the relationship between the essence of God and His attributes, and finally his own educational background. Perhaps al Faruqi's educational background had a significant mark on the way he dealt with humanism. It should be noted that throughout his educational years up to his doctoral degree, he was mainly trained in a secular humanist system of education. It was only after that that he decided to go to al-Azhar University. This meant, among other things, that his appropriation processes were essentially influenced by his bent for critical philosophy. However, all these factors should not be regarded as isolated and distinct elements that contributed to his understanding of humanism, but as closely interrelated ones that often merge into one another. This was because his emphasis on the absoluteness of value led to the complete rejection of relativism. Consequently, that made him a point of reference in discovering values rather than in making them. Obviously, his educational background inclined him to emphasize both critical philosophy and the importance of religion in his discussion of valuation issues and the systematization of values.

Islamic Humanism and its Appropriateness for an Islamic Worldview

Before the 1967 Arab–Israeli war, it seemed that al Faruqi was quite content with the idea of Urubah. His self-identity was well defined by its ethos. It gave him both a sense of belonging and an ability to relate to the rest of humanity. After the Israeli occupation of Palestine, his homeland, Urubah
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was an intellectual tool of analysis that could give meaning to his personal predicament and allow him to understand the roots of Western civilization. After all, Western civilization could be seen through the prism of Urubah, and that perspective allowed him to develop both a particular self-identity and a universalistic bent. Humanism, at this phase of his intellectual development, was not in open contradiction to his embedded sense of universality.

The drastic shift took place after 1967, when al Faruqi became more and more aware of the Islamic aspect of his self-identity. More specifically, he was not content with the particular aspect of that identity which was previously reflected in On Arabism. Gradually, Urubah was completely subsumed within the universalistic Islamic identity. Human particularism was completely lost. Like all Muslims who decided to live in the West, their geographical particularism would, almost always, create a real problem for their integration in the new society and their fostering of an Islamic identity that cemented their relationship with other Muslims. Though Urubah was not an affinity with a specific locality that excluded others for al Faruqi, the very use of the concept would lead to confusion and particularism. From now on al Faruqi overemphasized the universal dimension of Islam, and consequently the universalistic aspect of his own identity. As a result, his own personal identity suffered from an overwhelming loss of particularity. This situation led him to be progressively alienated from his historical particularism and to be more and more open to a complete humanistic universalism. One could argue that, in his essay entitled The Hijrah: The Necessity of its Iqamat or Vergegenwärtigung, al Faruqi reflected that sense of alienation.

In that essay, al Faruqi gave us some autobiographical materials which would help in understanding his identity crisis. Perhaps it should be noted that this type of identity crisis was meant to be seen as the only viable step from particularism to humanistic universalism. In this regard, it should be seen as a positive phase that needed to be passed in order to realize the ultimate station of being essentially human and positively defined by Islamic humanism. It was understood by al Faruqi that it was only when one transcended all forms of particularism in his self-identity that he would be able to achieve that sense of humanistic universalism. In that essay al Faruqi was not concerned with his own self-identity, yet the line of argument and the event of the celebration of the turn of the Hijrah century led him to reflect on his own mission as a Muslim living in the West. A sensitive reading of that essay could easily detect these autobiographical materials, where al Faruqi was speaking about his own predicament as a Muslim who would like both
to define his role at this critical moment of the history of Muslims and to negotiate a self-identity that would transcend all forms of particularism.

Like all Muslim scholar-activists at the turn of the fifteenth century of Hijrah, al Faruqi was concerned about his role. He was very direct in this essay, and most of the time gave autobiographical accounts to answer the main questions. Because all these questions and answers were essentially related to ethical values and connected directly with the concept of Islamic humanism, it would be appropriate to devote more attention to them. At the beginning of the essay, al Faruqi asked the question “What does the Iqamat or Vergegenwärtigung of the Hijrah mean for these new Muslim Muhajirun or expatriates in America and other places?” Then he added to that more practical and specific questions: “How does the re-living of the Prophet’s Hijrah-experience in America...determine the life of Muslims? To what ultimate objectives is it expected to alter their careers and guide the energies?” The very formulation of these questions required autobiographical input in the answers. Therefore, an analysis of these accounts through psycho-biographical tools would be justified, especially since al Faruqi made a link between his theory of value and his own endeavor to realize these values in his own life. It should be noted that the planning for Pax Islamica and the establishment of the Islamic state was part of al Faruqi’s activities in America and the rest of the Muslim world. More significantly, it was not a blueprint for Islamic activism, but rather was a plan that had been carried out for the realization of both the Pax Islamica and the Islamic state.

To deny that aspect in this essay would be, in effect, to misunderstand the real purpose behind the work. He did not concern himself overmuch with those Muslim immigrants who were not aware of their roles as da’wah. His main focus was on those Muslim immigrants who rediscovered their Islamic identity in the West. Evidently, al Faruqi was one of them, if not the archetype of this category. Al Faruqi described the situation of Hijrah: “Without a doubt, the Hijrah is the hardest fate to befall anyone. Its devastation is neither bodily nor economic, but psychic.” Then he went on to describe that transformation with autobiographical insights into this phenomenon: “Yet in its darkest hour of turbulence and anguish, Allah (swt) injects the light of Islam which fills the Muhajir with optimism, confidence and strength.” He added, “The Muhajir may have come in as immigrants in search of Western knowledge, professional advancement, or well being. However, in his travels, he awakes to a fuller recognition of Islam of his religion and cultural tradition.” Finally, he explains to us the meaning
of that transformation, "The vision of Islam is recaptured, this time with all its glow and brilliance. It is a new birth, a genuine transformation after immersion in tragedy. The vision of Islam is again 'in' his eyes, to see and nourish with all the benefits of his new-world knowledge and experience."43 Al Faruqi did not want us to speculate on this transformation — whether it took place early in his life in America or later — by drawing our attention to the insignificance of such investigation, "It is immaterial that this awakening has come late in life, or it has come only at the challenge of the new culture. It takes a rubbing stone to prove the gold present in a piece of ore; but that does not change its golden nature."44 After this poetic account of the inner sense of the transformation, al Faruqi went on to explain in detail how the new Islamic consciousness achieved this mission. Al Faruqi made a clear demarcation between the Muhajir for rizq and the true Muhajir who was completely transformed by the Islamic cause and turned into a da'i. He stated, "It is otherwise with the Muhajir who may have undertaken his Hijrah for similar reasons but who was awakened to Islam through the fire of shock, alienation and self-contempt..."45 Evidently, that category would accurately describe Isma'il al Faruqi’s situation. According to Isma'il al Faruqi, those Muhajirun who came to the West only for the sake of da'wah were quite rare. For him, the role of a true Muhajir in the West would be to call "...men to God, to His cause or truth and justice, of virtue and beauty."46 Undoubtedly he stated that da'wah had the highest position in the valuational hierarchy of charity and it should be taken as "the noblest charity of which the Muslim is capable."47 Then he declared that "Allah (swt) has assigned to it the highest order of rank among the ethical virtues."48 Finally, he made a parallel between the experience of the founders of the New World and those Muhajirun like himself:

The Islamic vision endows North America with a new destiny worthy of it. For this renovation of itself, of its rediscovery of a God-given mission and self-dedication to its pursuit, the continent cannot but be grateful to the Muhajir with Islamic mission...It will not fail to recognize in the person with Islamic mission a true son, though born overseas, whose spirit is nearly identical with that of early founders of the New World, who ran away from oppression and tyranny seeking a haven where they would replace their lives under God, seek His bounty and raise high His banner.49

With this vision, al Faruqi for the first time and perhaps the last one, talked about Islamic humanism. In this essay, he directly mentioned Islamic humanism, although in his other works he had alluded to the concept without specifically mentioning the term. It was because for him Islamic humanism in ethical discourse was connected with relativism in values. To understand the reasons behind his acceptance of the term in this essay, one should keep in mind the nature of this work. In other works, he was focusing on the interpretation of foundational concepts in Islam or understanding contemporary events from within the Islamic framework.50 Only in this work was he concerned with his role and allowing himself to reflect on his own life. Therefore, he was much less interested in the confusion that would arise from utilizing such a value-loaded concept. He was aware of the fact that the universalism of Islam could give humanism its ultimate significance in ethical values. His personal history showed him that the only viable identification would be with Islam. Being an Arab American or more specifically a Palestinian American could not capture the sense of universality with which he was charged in explaining his new sensibility as a da'i. The complete renunciation of particularism and the genuine identification with Islamic universalism made him feel that there was no contradiction between the Islamic worldview and what he perceived as Islamic humanism. One could say that al Faruqi’s acceptance of Islamic humanism was largely due to his own personal history. Therefore, he argued for the adoption of the term within the Islamic vision owing to his own predicament in North America.

It should be repeated that, although in his other works he alluded to the concept of Islamic humanism, only in this essay did he use the term. In a revealing passage in this essay while he was giving an exposition on the positive appeal of Islam, he stated, "Islam therefore finds the meaning of human life in man’s cosmic function as the sole bridge through whose free action the higher part of God’s will (viz., the moral) becomes fulfilled in history."51 Then al Faruqi vehemently declared, “Islamic humanism does not defy man. Nor does it make him the measure of all things. It regards him as the crown and ultimate purpose of creation, but under God Whose servant he is.”52 Obviously, the meaning of this passage was repeated in most of al Faruqi’s works, but the new element is that in this context he did not shy away from using the term ‘Islamic humanism.’ Perhaps, for the first time he was able to see clearly and distinctly the association between universalism of Islam which was devoid of any particularism and humanism. Evidently, the nature of the essay allowed him to reflect on humanism not as a concept that could be scholarly explained, but rather as a Sufi station to be relived. No doubt the difference would be enormous between a mere conceptual articulation of a meaning and the experience
of reliving that concept, Al Faruqi decided to take the latter route in this essay concerning humanism and Islam.

To understand al Faruqi's openness in utilizing humanism in Islamic ethical discourse, one should pay attention to both the nature of ethical theorization during the 1970s and 1980s in the Muslim world, and the dynamics of al Faruqi's self-identification from the early 1950s and the late 1960s to the 1970s and 1980s. During these four decades al Faruqi went through a process of seeing the universal aspect of Islam through the particularism of Urubah by the universalization of the latter. Towards the end of his life, however, he renounced all forms of particularism in understanding Islamic universalism. This qualified him to have a firm grip on the association between Islam and humanism. It was because of the nature of humanism and the feeling of alienation that he went on to identify his role with the da'i; he became fully aware of Islamic humanism and consequently reflected that awareness in his essay on Hijrah.

The essay was very much concerned with developing a methodology of understanding and evaluating religio-cultural traditions other than his own. This concern led him to articulate his position in studying other religio-cultural traditions by saying "...though the author is a committed Muslim this work is not written from the standpoint of the Muslim tradition exclusively." Then he drew the attention to the position that should be taken by a scholar of comparative religion: "Here, the author speaks as citizen of the coming religio-cultural world community, whose citizens are the members of the present religio-cultural divisions." Obviously, al Faruqi was not satisfied with the compartmentalization of humanity into separate disconnected units of religio-cultural entities. The alternative for this should be, according to al Faruqi, a world community where every citizen is allowed to participate intelligently in reconstructing "...the whole of man's religious legacy. In the world of the oncoming future, which is our world, nothing cultural or religious is private and everything is public." The religious humanistic tone was highly visible throughout his argument in Christian Ethics. However, the universalism of ethical values was not directly associated with humanism as a concept. Most importantly, al Faruqi utilized his articulation of ethical theory in On Arabism in his analysis of Christian Ethics. Yet from this observation one should not infer that he abandoned the study of the three Abrahamic religious ethical sensibilities in one whole complex, for he examined Christian Ethics against its Jewish background. Therefore, one could easily see the link between his analysis in On Arabism and in Christian Ethics. In both of them the core of his ethical thinking was maintained, though he played down the tone of the particularism of Urubah and substituted it with Islam. Evidently this shift of interest to Islam alone was a result of the problems of using a seemingly particular term like Urubah in ethical discourse. For al Faruqi, by its nature ethical evaluation should be universalistic, otherwise ethically would degenerate into assertions of likes and dislikes.

Prior to the International Conference on Islamic Education which was held in Makkah in 1977, al Faruqi's ethical discourse was mainly focused on the three Abrahamic religions. Thus, his understanding of humanism was connected with the religions universalism was depicted in these religions.

More significantly, what would be the consequence of its absence for ethical values in these religions? After the Makkah Conference on Education, he refocused his ethical discourse, and the main target this time was secular humanism, which was distinctly reflected in Western social sciences. In his discussion of the principles of Islamic methodology in his work entitled Islamization of Knowledge, al Faruqi made the unity of humanity one of the principles of Islamic methodology. It should be remembered that these principles of Islamic methodology were meant to provide the foundation for the Islamization of modern knowledge. Undoubtedly Islamic vision in this regard would be completely governed by these principles, and consequently to recast the whole corpus of contemporary knowledge under the framework of these principles would be the necessary and sufficient step in the process of the Islamization of Knowledge. Therefore, the very fact that two of his five principles dealt with the issue of humanity showed both the degree of magnanimity and the importance he placed on them. In addition, the rest of the principles could be related to the issue of humanity indirectly. Admittedly, al Faruqi in his articulation and elaboration of these principles was moved by the ethos of the humanism and universalism of Islam. It was clear and distinct in his submission that the substitution of ethnocentrism of Western knowledge with an 'Islamic' one would not serve both human rationality and a healthy development of these disciplines. Thus, the intellectual endeavor for the Islamization of contemporary knowledge should essentially be a call for the universalism of knowledge and values.

In his discussion of the principle of 'The Unity of Life,' al Faruqi focused on the concept of divine amanah, khilafah, and the comprehensiveness of Islam. Obviously both amanah and khilafah constituted the basic elements of universalism in ethical values in Islam. He concluded his exposition of the concept of divine amanah by emphatically declaring, "Man is therefore a cosmic bridge between the higher echelons of the divine will and historical
realism.” Therefore, the human being, for al Faruqi, would be the creature whose being was of a critical significance in the realization of values. Clearly, then, the designation of *khilafah* as the sole role of man on earth would constitute his fulfillment of moral laws stemming from the divine will. On the one hand, al Faruqi’s discussion of the principle of the unity of life focused on the positive construction of that concept, on the other his exposition of the concept of ‘The Unity of Humanity’ was devoted completely to a negative criticism of European ethnocentrism. It could be argued that the previous principles laid the foundation for the universality of humanism, therefore, al Faruqi was justified to move on to focus on the glaring mistakes of ethnocentrism in social sciences. By doing so, he pointed to the fact that the previous principles could not be in harmony with ethnocentrism. Most importantly, the unity of humanity allowed the historical Islamic civilization to develop disciplines of knowledge that regarded humanity as the essential unit of analysis. Thus al Faruqi declared, “All humans are therefore one and the same: the base and ground of Islam’s universalism.” Then he elaborated on how ethnocentrism became highly visible in modern knowledge: “In modern times, knowledge of man has nearly all been based upon ethnicity as ultimate definition of humanity; and knowledge of society, upon ethnicity as ultimate ground of social order and organization.” Consequently, he lamented the substitution of the rationality of Enlightenment with romanticism: “The universalism of the Enlightenment had never been given the chance of implementation before it was repudiated in favor of the ethnocentric approach of romanticism.” As a result, al Faruqi held Kant as equally responsible for the degeneration of European rationality of the Enlightenment by pointing to the fact that he regarded Asians and Africans as lesser beings than Europeans. This prejudice was based on a romanticism that did away with the universalism of the Enlightenment and graded human beings according to the biases of romanticism. Al Faruqi stated with great emphasis the effect of this phenomenon by saying, “Romanticism swept over the whole of the West, wiped out every trace of rationalist or Christian universalism and provided the greatest impetus for the humanities, the arts and the social sciences.” It became obvious for al Faruqi that the Islamization of contemporary knowledge which was developed in the West needed to restore both humanism and universalism. This, according to al Faruqi, could only be provided by the Islamic vision. Therefore, when these disciplines of knowledge were recent under the Islamic worldview, they would do away with ethnocentrism. In addition, these disciplines, one could argue, would maintain rationality, humanism, and universalism. One could say that al Faruqi succeeded in making humanism and universalism the only way out from the particularism of Western social sciences which was a direct result of romanticism. In this way he appropriated both Western social sciences within the Islamic worldview and argued for a prime place for humanism and universalism in the vision of Islam.

In his book entitled *Tawhid: Its Implication for Thought and Life*, al Faruqi devoted a whole chapter to ‘The Principles of Ethics.’ Once again he summarized his ethical thinking on issues related to *Tawhid*. Still he retained all the important aspects of his ethical discourse on values and the concept of humanism. Since our concern in this paper was originally on the relationship between his ethical theory of values and his concept of Islamic humanism, therefore, much attention would be focused on this part of his ethical discourse. It should be remarked that al Faruqi had a sub-section in that chapter entitled ‘The Humanism of Islam.’ In this part of his ethical discussion he chiefly refocussed his attention on the concept of humanism. Most importantly, his criticisms of different types of humanism led him to declare in an uncompromising sense:

The humanism of *al-tawhid* alone is genuine. It alone respects man and creaturely, without either deification of (or) vilification. It alone defines the worth of man in terms of his virtues, and begins its assessment of him with a positive mark for the innate endowment God has given all men in preparation for noble task.

Obviously, al Faruqi utilized his wide and indepth knowledge of world religions and civilizations to come to this conclusion. He exhibited a profound understanding of the ultimate form of humanism which reflected both universalism and rationalism. This was done in such a way that neither deified man nor vilified him, but rather perceived him as he ought to be. Then he added, “It alone defines the virtues and ideals of human life in terms of the very content of natural life, rather than denying them, thus making its humanism life affirmative as well as moral.” Undoubtedly this passage reflected one of the rare moments of al Faruqi’s articulation of the humanistic dimension of Islam. It came like a sudden flash where he captured all the characteristics of Islamic humanism in one paragraph. These characteristics of universalism, rationalism, and humanism were discussed and elaborated throughout the book, but in this passage he made a clear demarcation between Islamic humanism and other forms of humanism. Admittedly, unlike his articulation of the concept in his essay on *Hijrah*, he
decided to make humanism one dimension of Islam, although it might be argued that he made it the most foundational one.

The rest of the chapter was devoted to other familiar concepts in his Islamic ethical discourse, such as actionism, Umma, universalism, and life and world affirmation. It should be remembered that these terms were coined by al-Faruqi to convey his conception of ethicality in Islam. Though they might seem familiar to those who were initiated in critical philosophy, certainly there would be some elements which genuinely reflected al-Faruqi’s insights on ethical discourse in Islam.

Concluding Remarks

Al-Faruqi’s thought and character meant different things to different people, yet very few discerned the essence of his legacy. This paper has focused on one significant dimension of his works. It equally claimed that this dimension both reflected his scholarly contribution to the realm of thought and attempted to fathom the depth of his activism. Obviously, al-Faruqi was a multifaceted character, talented scholar and he lived and died tragically alone. His training in critical philosophy and traditional Islamic learning gave him a distinct advantage in dealing with issues concerning the interpretation of Judaism and Christianity, and, most importantly, the Islamization of social sciences. These were the most important areas where al-Faruqi contributed significantly to human knowledge.

Al-Faruqi’s articulation of Islamic humanism was a genuine discovery of the place of humanity as an ethical concept in the hierarchy of values in the Islamic worldview. Through this ethical discovery he was completely at ease in his interpretation of both Judaism and Christianity and nearly the same in his appropriation of social sciences within the Islamic vision of sciences. One could argue convincingly that al-Faruqi’s understanding of humanism turned a subversive intellectual concept in the hands of secular humanists into an intellectual weapon against their relativism in ethics and ethnocentrism in social sciences.

From his preliminary awareness of the concept of Islamic humanism to his appropriation of it within the Islamic worldview, al-Faruqi was consistently arguing for the essential characteristics of the concept. Finally, to deny the special place of Islamic humanism in al-Faruqi’s ethical discourse would be, in effect, to commit a glaring mistake in understanding his ethical theory of value.

Notes

6 Ibid., pp.63–9.
7 Ibid., pp.69–77.
9 Ibid., pp.21–32.
10 Ibid., p.4.
11 Ibid., pp.208–9.
12 Ibid., pp.3–32.
14 Ibid., p.198.
15 This position of al-Faruqi is a hallmark of his scholarship. His great admiration for Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Tawhidi was reflected in his works and lectures at Temple University.
16 Ibid., pp.121–97.
17 Ibid., p.220.
18 Ibid., pp.222–3.
19 Ibid., p.224.
20 Ibid., p.225.
21 Ibid., p.229.
22 Ibid., p.231.
23 Ibid., p.232.
24 Ibid., p.234.
28 Ibid., p.252.
29 Ibid., p.252.
30 Ibid., pp.266–70.
31 See also al-Faruqi, *Christian Ethics*, pp.22–3.
66 Ibid., p.64.
67 Ibid., p.54.
68 Undoubtedly, al Faruqi was hyper-social in terms of both the diversity and number of his social relationships. Yet for those who knew him closely, he was keeping an unseen distance between himself and others.
69 It should be remarked that Islamic humanism was a useful tool which had been utilized by secular humanists to give a new interpretation of Islamic civilization in line with the processes of secularization in history. In this regard see Joel L. Kraemer, *Humanism in the Renaisssance of Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1980); Lenn E. Goodman, *Islamic Humanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), and other works along this line of investigation.