The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: From Collaboration Mechanism to Party Politics, 1898–1956
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This article examines the features of the collaboration mechanism that permitted a handful of Anglo-Egyptian colonial officers to incorporate tribal shaykhs and educated Sudanese into the structure of the colonial regime (1898–1956) and manipulate religious leaders and merchants to function in harmony with the government’s objectives. It discusses how the Khartoum policy-makers maintained a wide scope of choices in shifting their support from one client to another along the lines of their political agendas. It investigates the gradual shift from collaboration mechanism to party politics, highlighting the response of the Khartoum policy-makers and the Sudanese nationalists who were largely influenced by the divergent attitudes of London and Cairo towards the future of the Sudan, and that of Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani and Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi who had a widespread influence on Sudanese society. The distinctive features of the pre-independence political discourse are examined in terms of the support that the colonised (i.e. the Umma and the National Unionist parties) received from the colonisers (Britain and Egypt) in order to run their election campaigns in 1953 and pave the way for post-independence political roles. Thus, the collaborative relationship between the colonisers and colonised reflects the uniqueness of the case of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in the history of British colonialism in Africa and the drive of African nationalists towards decolonisation.

I

In his article on ‘Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism,’ 1 Ronald Robinson views European imperialism in Asia and Africa as made up of non-European and European components. The latter components were associated with the economic drive of the major European powers to integrate the newly colonised regions and ancient agrarian empires in Asia and Africa into their industrial economy, and with
the strategic need of each imperial power to secure its interests against possible rivals in world power politics. He then argues that these two components do not explain 'why Europe was able to rule large areas of the world so cheaply and with so few troops.'\(^2\) From his point of view, the right explanation of this phenomenon is rooted in the non-European component that shaped various forms of 'collaborative mechanism' between the European agents of imperialism and their 'internal collaborators in non-European political economies.'\(^3\) The non-European component also provides 'an explanation of the process of decolonisation in terms of the growing ability of the independence movements in the colonies to disrupt the arrangements for collaboration or to use them for their own ends.'\(^4\) The process of the disruption or utilisation, as Robinson wrote, resulted in the emergence of political parties that projected 'a kind of mirror image of collaboration under imperialism,'\(^5\) in the sense that each party was essentially based on 'a confederation of neo-traditional local, ethnic, religious and status interests, managed by a small modern elite.'\(^6\) Since the safeguard of these social interests had become a function of the party system, the party also developed into a function of these social interests. The harmonisation of the two roles did not generate a real challenge to the nationalist movements during the pre-independence era, but after independence the ruling parties in Asia and Africa failed to accommodate these two roles within the framework of their new responsibilities as safeguards of their own interests and as development agents for their nations at large. The political experience shows that 'the reconciliation of the two roles, and the problem of neo-traditionalist social collaboration involved, is not much easier for new nationalists than it was for old colonialists.'\(^7\)

The success of the old colonialists and their collaborative mechanism was founded on a wide network of indigenous collaborators who were of many kinds: 'some were active, but most were passive, some were modern, but most were traditional elites; some collaborated at central, others at provincial or local levels; some cooperated commercially, others administratively, ecclesiastically, or educationally.'\(^8\) What is worth mentioning here is that this variety of collaboration had generated a wide scope of choices that gave European officials an upper hand in the process of decision-making and enabled them easily to shift their support from one client to another, whenever they realised that the client concerned was getting powerful and becoming uncooperative. In terms of the 'divide and rule' concept, this policy was cemented by an incentive and reward system that drew its efficacy from a series of social services and favours that could be given or taken away through government administrative, fiscal and educational policies.\(^9\)

The primary objective of this patron-client relationship (collaboration mechanism) as a whole was carved out to keep 'the weightier part of the dependency’s political elements on the government side,'\(^10\) since the government had a wide control over the means of coercion, production and administration, whereas its clients (collaborators) did not have enough choices. But this was not always the rule of the game, because in some cases the patron could also run short of choices, if one of his major clients derived great benefits from collaboration and achieved a position in which he could control the political landscape and challenge the power of his...
patron. The client could also force his collaboration and ask for further political concessions. If the patron did not have enough cards to play, he then had to choose between giving further political concessions at the expense of his political existence and stepping down in favour of his former client. These features of the collaboration mechanism are used as a theoretical framework to discuss the case of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in what follows.

II

The decision of the British government to occupy the Sudan in the last decade of the nineteenth century resulted in part from the British fear that the other colonial powers (Italy, France and Belgium) might take advantage of the Sudan’s instability to acquire territories previously annexed to Egypt. Apart from these considerations, Britain wanted to establish control over the Nile and safeguard its economic interests in Egypt. These two European components were the most important factors that determined the occupation of the Sudan over the period of 1896–98, but, at the same time, they did not highlight the features of the collaboration system adopted by the Anglo-Egyptian officers for the pacification of the country. The principles of the collaboration mechanism in the Sudan were laid down after the conquest of the country in 1898, when Lord Kitchener realised that he did not have enough military force to hold down indigenous politics for long. The only pragmatic option was to collaborate with the leaders of indigenous political and religious institutions, who had a broad control over the Sudanese political scene and were willing to cooperate with the new colonial regime. As a result, he instructed the provincial governors and district inspectors:

to acquire the confidence of the people, to develop their resources, and to raise them to a higher level. This can only be effected by the District Officers being thoroughly in touch with the better class of native, through whom we may hope gradually to influence the whole population. Mudirs and Inspectors should learn to know personally all the principal men of their districts and show them by friendly dealings and interests taken in their individual concerns that our object is to increase their prosperity. Once it is thoroughly realised that our officers have at heart, not only the progress of the country generally, but also the prosperity of each individual with whom they come into contact, their exhortations to industry and improvement will gain redoubled force. Such exhortations, when issued in the shape of Proclamations or Circulars, affect little; it is to the individual action of British officers, working independently, but with a common purpose, on the individual natives whose confidence they have gained, that we must look for the moral and industrial regeneration of the Soudan.

The first groups to benefit from this policy were the tribal leaders of sedentary riverine tribes and camel and cattle-breeding nomads who were confirmed in their pre-Mahdist positions and incorporated into the government bureaucracy. They were sanctioned to act as local agents of the government, responsible for a variety of duties ranging from the assessment and collection of local taxes and the administration of justice to the maintenance of security and order in their respective localities or
tribal dar. This policy was earlier initiated by the Turco-Egyptian administration (1821–81), but the most significant change brought by the Anglo-Egyptian administration was the shift from a fluid hierarchical structure based on kinship ties to a fixed and long-term established structure of authority. Thus, the British field officers reactivated, reunified or amalgamated tribal entities which had been dispersed by the Mahdist regime (1881–98) and associated them with demarcated territorial units. As a result of this policy, some Turco-Egyptian dominant tribal ruling lineages, such as of the Alwad Fadallah of the Kababbish in Kordofan and the Abu Sin of the Shukriyya in Kassala, consolidated their pre-Mahdist powers and strengthened their political ties as loyal clients of the new administration. In the case of Dar Bidayriyya Nazirate in Central Kordofan, for instance, the colonial regime resettled the scattered tribal groups of the district into territorial villages and turned the villagers into dependent clients of their village shaykhs who were responsible for the distribution of arable lands and gum gardens, and assessment and collection of local taxes within the borders of their villages. The villages were then gradually clustered into fourteen territorial units named ‘ummudiyas. Each was headed by a senior shaykh given the title of ‘umda. After a period of trial and error, Husyan Zaki al-Din of the Bidayriyya Dahmassiya was appointed as ‘umdat ‘umum (‘umda-general) in 1928 and as nazir in 1934 with full administrative, judicial and financial powers over Dar Bidayriyya Nazirate. In this sense, the establishment of Dar Bidayriyya Nazirate weakened the traditional concept of leadership based on kinship ties and created a hierarchy of local chiefs who drew their powers and functions from the state. The nazir himself was made the head of the administrative hierarchy, responsible for the administration of the whole nazirate. Under his administration, there were the ‘umdas and shaykhs who were recognised as subordinates to allocate arable land and gum gardens among villagers, assess and collect local taxes and maintain security and order in their localities.

Based on these examples, one may argue that the Anglo-Egyptian administration had succeeded in placing the tribal rulers and the ruled in an unequal position, while generating reciprocal interests between them. The outcome of this state of inequality was that the villagers became dependent clients of the nazir and his subordinates ‘umdas and shaykhs, and the nazir emerged as a patron of the whole nazirate and remained as a loyal client of the colonial regime. If he dismissed one of his subordinates, the latter would lose access to the spoils of his office. The fear of losing office privileges automatically increased the dependency of each subordinate upon his superior patron. This patron-client relationship also reflects the effectiveness of the collaboration mechanism that shaped the vertical relationships between the policy-makers in the centre and tribal elites in the periphery. It also reveals that this relationship was not purely voluntary, not free of political coercive elements, since the control of the coercion and inducement of power were in the hands of a tiny segment of the local communities that drew its power from local clients and the state.

In the religious sphere, Kitchener instructed the provincial governors and district inspectors not to allow religious leaders (e.g. fakis and Sufi shaykhs) ‘to resume
their former trade' because in 'old days, these Fikis, who lived on the superstitious ignorance of the people, were one of the curses of the Soudan, and were responsible in a great measure for the [Mahdi’s] rebellion.\textsuperscript{16} Simultaneously, he advised them to cooperate with other religious groups and leaders, who did not subscribe to the Mahdist ideology, such as Muslim scholars (orthodox ‘ulamas) and those of the Khatmiyya Sufi Order (\textit{tariqa}) which was 'the only popular Islamic movement tolerated by the new regime'.\textsuperscript{17} During this Anglo-Egyptian campaign, British intelligence officers allowed Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani\textsuperscript{18} to return to Kassala, the centre of the Khatmiyya \textit{Tariqa}, and rebuild, with British support, the mosque of the \textit{tariqa} which had been destroyed during the Mahdiyya. After the defeat of the Mahdist forces, Sayyid Ali was made a KCMG by Queen Victoria. The objective of this political recognition was to suppress the influence of the Mahdists and that of Egyptian scholars in the Sudan. As Warburg argues, Sayyid Ali fulfilled the hope of British officers in ‘both fields … [and] became the principal and most outspoken opponent of the Egyptian “partner” in the Condominium administration’.\textsuperscript{19} Orthodox ‘\textit{ulama} were organised in a religious board, ‘with the function of advising the authorities on all religious matters, especially those concerning the campaign against the new \textit{mahdi} and other “false prophets” (primarily nabi Isa) who arose frequently throughout’ the first two decades of the condominium.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, the foundation of the board of ‘\textit{ulama and the recognition of the Khatmiyya \textit{Tariqa} show the Khartoum government’s policy towards indigenous religious institutions before the outbreak of the First World War and collaboration with religious groups that were anti-Mahdist. This anti-Mahdist policy was adopted by the governor-general Wingate (1899–1916) and his inspector-general Slatin Pasha (1900–14) who considered Mahdism a serious and immediate threat to their new administration and that the Mahdists therefore should not be allowed to revive their religious sect in any form.\textsuperscript{21} Sayyid Abd al-Rahman\textsuperscript{22} was also instructed neither to use the title \textit{sayyid} nor to sign himself in official correspondence Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, but only Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Ahmad. Slatin repeatedly and firmly warned him that the government would recognise neither Mahdism as a corporate body, religious or otherwise, nor him as a leader.\textsuperscript{23}

The third group of collaborators includes the educated Sudanese who graduated from the Gordon Memorial College and other educational institutions in the Sudan, and filled various subordinate positions in the government bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{24} In 1920, out of 4,178 classified posts in the Sudan government service, the Sudanese held 1,544 compared to 535 held by the British, 1,824 by the Egyptians, 167 by the Syrians and 108 by nationals of other countries.\textsuperscript{25} Throughout the first two decades of the Anglo-Egyptian administration in the Sudan, the educated Sudanese remained loyal clients to their British patrons at the centre and the provinces, and functioned as integral parts of the government bureaucracy. After the First World War, some influential policy-makers in Khartoum turned out to be unsatisfied with the involvement of Sudanese government employees in political discourse and advised their British counterparts in the provinces to strengthen ‘the solid elements in the country, sheikhs, merchants, etc., before the irresponsible body of half-educated officials,
students and town riff-raff take control of the public mind.\textsuperscript{26} The demonstrations of
the White Flag League and the mutiny of some Sudanese sections of the Egyptian army
in Khartoum in 1924 led the government at large to lose confidence in the Sudanese
educated class.\textsuperscript{27} As an immediate reaction to these demonstrations, the colonial
regime made entrance to government posts more difficult, diminished the powers
of Sudanese \textit{ma’murs} and sub-\textit{ma’murs} and ceased their recruitment in government
service altogether by 1927.\textsuperscript{28} Special attention was given to the policy of indirect
rule in the rural areas. However, the policy was criticised by the educated elite
whose grievances were voiced by Daud al-Khalifa Abdullah, \textit{ma’mur} of Bara district,
in a letter sent to the governor of Kordofan province:

When the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance was enacted in 1922 no attention
was paid to it by the educated people of the Sudan because they thought that it
was only meant for the Nomad Sheikh who are always far away from Government
Headquarters . . .

In 1928 the amendments to the ordinance and large additions made to it, cause
the educated Sudanese, specially those in the administrative service, to suspect that
the main object of the government was to set them aside and to put the future of the
their country in the hands of uneducated sheikhs; and there was much rumour
about this ordinance. The rumour reached its peak when it was noticed that all
correspondences about the Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance ran strictly confidential
registers. This was the first reason why the rumour found fertile soil. Also it was
born in mind that in many districts administrative officials were forbidden even
to speak with the sheikhs about these powers and that they had to look upon
them as spectators.\textsuperscript{29}

The above extracts from Daud’s letter show how the educated elite lost their
confidence in their British patrons who paid less attention to their association in
the administration of the country. They also reflect the features of the unhealthy
dichotomy that emerged and later developed between the educated class in the
urban centres and the tribal leaders in the rural areas. This dichotomy can be inter-
preted in the context of the divide and rule policy but at the same time affected the
equations of the collaboration mechanisms established by the colonial regime. The
primary objective of this section is not to trace the phases of the conflict that
emerged between the educated elite and tribal leaders but rather to present the
educated elite as one of the major groups that established clientelistic ties with the
colonial regime and formed one of its choices in manipulating the process of
decision-making and controlling the political landscape.

The last group that enjoyed the patronage of the colonial regime were the Sudanese
traders and their counterparts, who came from Eastern Mediterranean countries (i.e.
Egypt, Greece, Syria and Lebanon), and established their careers in various principal
cities of the Sudan. The members of this group constituted the core of a Sudanese
commercial class that owned some of the country’s most economically rewarding
assets and activities, as in their involvement in pump and mechanised crop-
production schemes and domination of domestic and some export-import trade.
They gradually maintained a powerful economic role within the wider framework
of government policies that occupied a central position in the economic development of the country, and became subordinate bodies of the colonial regime, maintaining clientelistic ties with government officials in the centre and at the periphery. As we have seen earlier, the government classified them among the ‘solid elements’ of the society that should enjoy its support and patronage before the urban-based nationalists controlled the political scene.

The key point here is that the colonial regime had succeeded in creating various forms of local collaborators and shared with them a series of reciprocal interests. At the same time, it controlled the rotation of each group of collaborators within its own orbit without disturbing its primary political and economic interests (see Figure 1). However, this does not mean that the choices of the Sudan Political Service were always free of external manipulation and the growing influence of local collaborators outside their designed orbits. For instance, the rhetoric of the First World War drove the government to realign its collaborative equations, particularly when it established contact with its ex-opponent, al-Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, and permitted him to tour the country for the sake of advising his followers to remain loyal to the colonial regime and reject the Ottoman call for jihad. The revival of the Ansar as a religio-political entity at this particular juncture can be attributed to British war interests, and to ‘the keen desire’ of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman to promote his political image as the legitimate leader of the Ansar in seeking British protection.

After the 1924 uprising, the government lost confidence in collaborating with the educated elite and paid attention to the development of tribal institutions in the

![Figure 1: Central Government and Indigenous Collaborators](image-url)
rural areas. The rationale of this policy was in the first place to strengthen local and ethnic compartmentalisation and raise obstacles to anti-colonial agitation on a national scale; second, to seal off the rural (or ‘real’) Sudan from the intelligentsia and the contamination of sectarian politics; and, third, to reduce contact between graduates in the central administration and the provincial and local rural societies to a minimum. The intelligentsia, who projected themselves as legitimate successors of their colonial patrons, openly criticised this ‘protective glands’ (or indirect rule) policy and branded it as a reactionary step towards the resuscitation of a tribalism which had already been destroyed by the Mahdist regime. This attitude led the tribal leaders to lose confidence in the educated elite, and to realise that the expansion of the educated elite’s power would negatively affect their political and administrative career, and distort their social image.

Under the critique of the educated elite and British educationalists in the Sudan, the indirect rule policy was reviewed in 1934 by the new governor-general, Sir Stewart Symes (1934–41), who returned to the dual policy of his predecessors, Lee Stack (1916–24) and Geoffrey Archer (1924–26). He offered more opportunities to the educated elite in government bureaucracy, and invested tribal leaders with further executive, judicial and police powers in the rural areas. But the educated elite seemed to have been dissatisfied with his policy because they tried to establish contact with Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, whom they had earlier branded as ‘an opportunistic collaborator’. The Sayyid, in his turn, suggested to his new clients ‘the formation of an advisory council’ that would ‘preserve the separate identity of the Sudan and define the position and aspiration of its people’ under the colonial regime. This suggestion generated a state of fear among British officials in Khartoum on the grounds that the implementation of such a proposal could unite the intelligentsia ‘with the traditional and religious elements into a strong political front with an overwhelming nationalist appeal’. To frustrate any possible alliance between the Sayyid and the intelligentsia, the government introduced three local government ordinances for the administration of municipalities, townships and rural areas in 1937. These ordinances were generally well received by educated Sudanese who viewed them as a forward step towards self-government and independence. They also felt that their participation in local government institutions would empower them to be recognised as the representatives and spokesmen of the people. However, the outcome of these ordinances fell short of their expectations. The town and municipal councils were controlled by district commissioners, and the institutions of native administration were given further executive and administrative powers under the provisions of the 1937 Local Government Ordinance for Rural Areas. As Gaafar Bakheit argues, this local government legislation ‘was not the grave of native administration, but the waiting room in which she finished her make-up and reappeared more lively and fascinating’.

The whole scenario illustrates that the educated elite had lost their faith in government’s promises, and they felt the need to organise themselves into a political or cultural entity that would enable them to set up an effective political dialogue with the colonial regime on behalf of the Sudanese at large and safeguard their interests on a nationwide basis. This idea matured after the negotiations of the 1936 treaty
and eventually crystallised in the foundation of the Graduates’ Congress in 1938. The government supported the establishment of the congress in the hope that it could frustrate any possible revival of Egyptian influence and challenge the growing influence of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi. However, these two possibilities did not come about, particularly when the congress submitted a memorandum on 3 April 1942, asking the government to increase the share of the Sudanese in the administration of the country and acknowledge their right to self-government immediately after the Second World War. On 29 April, D. Newbold, the civil secretary, replied to the president of the Graduates’ General Congress, Ibrahim Ahmad:

I am directed by His Excellency the Governor-General to inform you that he has read your memorandum dated April 3rd 1942. He observes that many of your requests directly concern the status and constitution of the Sudan. This constitution, based on the Condominium Agreement of 1899 and the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, and implemented by the appropriate legislation, cannot be altered save by a joint act of the Condominium Powers. This Sudan government is not prepared to discuss its revision with any body of persons. If, however, the Condominium Powers at any time decide to review the Agreement or Treaty, the Sudan Government would hope to consult responsible Sudanese opinion. The Government, however, can make no promises to any body of persons in the name of the Condominium or its own . . . By the very act of submitting the memorandum which is the subject of this letter, the congress has . . . forfeited the confidence of government. There can be no restoration of that confidence until the congress has so reorganized the direction of its affairs that the government can rely on having its wishes respected and its warning observed.42

This rejection gradually led to the division of the congress members into two major political blocs: the hard-liners who closed the door to collaboration with the government and looked for another alternative to achieve self-determination and independence. They approached Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani and other pro-Egyptian elements in Khartoum, while their moderate counterparts sought the support of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, and preferred the continuation of dialogue with the government.43 Under this political pressure, the Sudan Political Service decided to change its then collaborative equations, and revived the idea of the establishment of advisory councils in the Northern Sudan on the assumption that they would maintain their control over the balance of power in Khartoum, and unite the tribal leaders, merchants and moderate educated groups in a political front against ‘the ultra nationalism represented in [the] traditional sector by the Mahdists, and in modern sector by pro-Egyptian elements and forces dominated by Egyptian culture’.44 At this crucial juncture, the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan was born in Khartoum, and its establishment was opposed by the ‘Ashiqqa’ who organised themselves into a political party in 1943.

III

The above discussion illustrates how the rapid growth of the nationalist movement had disturbed the arrangements of previous forms of collaboration, and confined the government’s choices to the unification of tribal leaders, merchants and moderate
educated groups in a common national front against the ultra-nationalism represented by pro-Egyptian elements and pro-independence activists. The Advisory Council of the Northern Sudan was established for this purpose, and about 60 per cent of its membership was drawn from tribal leaders and notables, 22 per cent from merchants and 18 per cent from moderate educated groups (senior government officials). The presidency of the council was entrusted to the governor-general, with the three secretaries (civil, financial and judicial) as vice-presidents. In sectarian terms, the outright majority of the pro-Mahdist members in the Advisory Council had provoked Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani and led him to turn down the offer from the civil secretary, Douglas Newbold, to be an honorary member of the Advisory Council with the claim that ‘the majority of the country [was] not represented’ in it. The Ashiqqa’ and pro-Egyptian elements also criticised the limitation of the Advisory Council for the northern part of the country, its advisory nature and the nomination of ‘ignorant provincial [leaders] and yes-men’ as members. They then boycotted the council and considered it a British manoeuvre to slow down the process of self-determination. In contrast, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman and his pro-independence clients hailed the council as a right step towards self-government.

Under these circumstances, the Ashiqqa’ and their allies strove to tighten their grip over the Graduates’ Congress, and to use it as a platform to voice their criticism of the Advisory Council and to promote their call for the unity of the Nile Valley. This political agenda largely manipulated the congress elections of November 1944. The whole election campaign ‘resolved itself into struggle on the old sectarian basis between the Mahdists and the Mirghanists, and practically all the groups that had formed themselves as professedly independent bodies were definitely ranged under the Ansar or Khatmi banner’. The Ashiqqa’-Mirghani alliance achieved a sweeping victory against their Mahdist opponents. Some sources attributed this victory to the Ashiqqa’ ‘propaganda which threatened the voters, if they failed to support them, with the return of the Mahdia, and Sayed Abd El-Rahman as king of the Sudan’; and to ‘the folly of some Sayed Abd El-Rahman’s own followers, who had themselves been propagating the “kingship” idea, [which] contributed very largely to the Mahdist defeat’. The result of the 1944 congress elections was also a decisive stage in a series of political events that led to the formation of the Umma Party in 1945. The Sudan Political Service was in favour of the establishment of a united front of moderate graduates that would work towards the realisation of its internal self-government programme that would be actualised through the practice of constitutional institutions. However, this attempt ended in partial failure, and government frustration was aggravated, particularly when the leadership of the Umma Party threatened to withdraw its support from the Advisory Council in protest against the Sidqi-Bevin Protocol of 1946 that had acknowledged the settlement of the Sudan question under the Egyptian crown. In brief, the government assured Sayyid Abd al-Rahman and his clients in April 1946 that the protocol would deprive the Sudanese neither of their political rights nor of the determination of the future of the country.

The critical question that needs to be addressed here is to what extent the establishment of the Graduates’ Congress and political parties had been responsible for
disturbing the internal collaborative mechanism and creating a political challenge for the government. To curtail the challenge that emerged from the establishment of the Graduates’ Congress, the government took two important measures. First, it established a number of constitutional institutions that would attract the moderate educated elite and notables and pave the way for self-government and independence. Second, it invested in the rivalry between the two Sayyids (Sayyid Ali and Sayyid Abd al-Rahman) to control the political scene in Khartoum and limit the Egyptian influence in the Sudan. However, the two options did not sell well and the government found its hand forced to propose a new concession. In 1946, the government held an administrative conference in Khartoum ‘to study the next steps in associating the Sudanese more closely with the administration of their country’. Two sub-committees (central government and local government) were formed to study and make recommendations on the conference theme. The committee dealing with central affairs suggested the substitution of the Advisory Council of the Northern Sudan by a legislative assembly of elected Sudanese members from the whole country and the establishment of an executive council that would replace the Governor-General’s Council. The two proposals were recommended by the conference, approved by the Advisory Council and blessed by the government, while they were rejected by the Egyptian government as well as the Ashiqqa’ and pro-Egyptian elements that boycotted the conference sessions. However, little consideration was given to the objection of the Egyptian government and its political clients in Khartoum, and the Sudan government went ahead with the two proposals. In 1948, the Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council were set up. About 59 per cent of the seventy-five members of the former were tribal leaders, 21 per cent government officials, 13 per cent business men and 7 per cent religious notables. The Umma Party and its supporters appear to have had a handsome majority of the Assembly’s members, and they also occupied 50 per cent of the twelve seats of the Executive Council while the rest were entrusted to ex-officio members of the British administration. Abdullah Bey Khalil, the Umma Party secretary general, was elected as the first chairman of the Assembly, and the governor-general maintained a veto right over its legislations.

The ultra influence of the Umma Party in the Assembly alarmed the civil secretary, and led him to approach some ‘reasonable Khatmiyyas’ to join the Assembly. He assumed that their participation would counterbalance the growing influence of the Umma Party, and maintain the government control over the process of decision making and dialogue in the Assembly Chamber. The Khatmiyya first showed some interest, but they eventually declined the offer, and the Assembly continued with the Umma majority until 1951, when some of its members broke away from the Umma Party and, with other government clients, formed the Socialist Republican Party.57

During this period, the secretary general of the Ashiqqa’ Party, Ismail al-Azhari, also lost his mass support due to his close relations with the Egyptian government and extreme unionist views. His ultra-unionist attitude led to the split of the Ashiqqié into two factions, and the consequent formation of a new party, the National Front, that was supported by the leadership of the Khatmiyya and sought the dominion status for Sudan under the Egyptian government. In 1951, the Ashiqqa’ witnessed
another split when Muhammad Nur al-Din formed a new party that enjoyed the support of al-Azhari political rivals. On the eve of the first general elections to parliament, the schism between the unionist parties and factions was healed by Egyptian intervention, and all parties were reunited under the umbrella of the National Unionist Party.⁵⁸

IV

Towards the close of 1950, political excitement reached its climax in Khartoum and London, particularly when on 16 November 1950 a speech from the throne announced the intention of the Egyptian government to abrogate both the 1936 Treaty and the 1899 Condominium Agreement and demanded the unification of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown. The immediate reaction in Khartoum praised the abrogation of the two agreements, but varied on the issue of ‘the Egyptian Crown’ which was backed by the Ashiqqa’ and pro-Egyptian elements and firmly rejected by the Umma Party and the government’s clients among the educated elite and tribal leaders. In the Legislative Assembly, Muhammad al-Almin al-Hajj of the Umma Party tabled the following motion:

> We, the members of the Legislative Assembly of the Sudan are of opinion that the Sudan has now reached the stage at which self-government could be granted, and request Your Excellency to approach the Condominium Powers with a request that a joint declaration of the grant of self-government be made before the end of the Third Session of the First Assembly, so that the next election may be held on this basis.⁵⁹

Muhammad al-Almin al-Hajj went on to argue that:

> We have reached the stage where we ought to ask for more. We need powers to raise this Assembly to a status of a Parliament. The Executive Council should be an All-Sudanese Cabinet responsible to the Assembly... Britain who gave Libya and Eritrea their independence and Egypt who shared that view should find their way to acceding to Sudanese demands. Mr. Bevin and Hamid Bey Zaki had made a statement to the effect that the next step would be self-government... The next elections should be conducted on the understanding that representatives were elected to a fully responsible Parliament.⁶⁰

The Sudan Political Service seems to have been taken by surprise by this challenge from the Legislative Assembly. The civil secretary, James Robertson (1945–53), had out of courtesy congratulated the mover of the motion and the leader of the Assembly, Abdullah Bey Khalil, but made it very clear that the Assembly was not empowered to ask for such drastic changes. He then asked for the adjournment of the debate for the following reasons:

> First, as the original mover has said, the members of the Assembly were representatives, and it was one of the main features of a democratic system that members come to Parliament to represent their people’s views. The great majority of the present members had come here without any mandate to make radical constitutional
changes. A great number of them came from far away, and were not able to consult their constituencies on this matter at any time, as the mover was.

Secondly, the Assembly had asked His Excellency to appoint two commissions to report on possible changes in the Constitution of this House. When these reports had been received and studied, they would know what improvements could be made with in the existing Constitutional status. [Therefore] the debate should be adjourned until these reports were received and examined.

[Thirdly, the civil secretary] knew that members had been persuaded to sign papers supporting the motion and others to sign papers opposing it. He had even heard that some members had signed both. This meant that the majority of members had come into the Chamber committed one way or the other, and were not therefore open to argument. The motion had better be postponed until next session . . . the matter might be raised again in April or May, and that would still allow plenty of time for His Excellency to approach the Condominium Governments before the next sessions.61

The members of the Umma Party rejected the civil secretary’s proposal and its political rationale. On their behalf, Muhammad al-Amin al-Hajj, again, argued that:

It was ridiculous for Sir James Robertson to say to the representatives of the people that they come here only to learn the method of government and not to decide upon important constitutional problems which directly affected the nation. They would not return to their constituencies except when the Assembly had adjourned. They had in fact a mandate from the whole nation and not a limited one from their particular constituencies. The Sudanese had cooperated with the present regime and hoped that it would help them to achieve self-government, but it seemed that the present regime was deserting the Sudanese. The terms of reference of the proposed commissions to enquire into possible amendments in the Legislative Assembly and Executive Council’s Ordinance should be framed on the understanding that self-government was the immediate goal. That would ensure that there would be a full Sudanese cabinet responsible for Parliament.62

This dialogue shows that there was no room for the civil secretary to manoeuvre since the Umma members were determined not to withdraw their motion or postpone the debate to the next session of the Assembly in April or May 1951. The only pragmatic alternative left for the civil secretary and his British colleagues in the Assembly was to approach the tribal and southern members of the Assembly to oppose the Umma’s motion. After a series of negotiations, nazir Yusuf al-Ajab of the Blue Nile was instigated to propose the following amendment to the original motion:

We, the members of the Legislative Assembly of the Sudan are of opinion that the Sudan has made good progress towards the stage at which full self-government can be granted, and request Your Excellency to press on urgently with such measures which, while consistent with the maintenance of good government throughout the country, will ensure, not only that such self-government shall be full and complete, but also that, in working towards that end, all sections of the community and all parties may co-operate in developing the institutions of government so as to hasten the day when this is attained.63

Al-Ajab amendment was supported by Buth Diu of the Upper Nile Province, who criticised the original motion and proclaimed that ‘the southern members would
withdraw from the Assembly if the motion was carried out', and by Stanislaus Paysama of the Bahr al-Ghazal Province, who denounced the prospect of self-government 'before a number of Southern Sudanese were sufficiently educated to fill high posts', while Abd al-Rahman Bahr al-Din of Dar Masalit asked for the postponement of the debate to give the members a chance to consult their constituencies, otherwise, 'they would merely be acquiescing to the dictates of the Umma Party'.

The lengthy debate of this motion, which took place in the Assembly Hall on 13 December 1950, showed the temporary success of the government in dividing the house into two political blocs: the Umma and pro-Umma members who were not ready to compromise and the tribal and southern members who were in favour of the adjournment of the Assembly. Finally, however, the original motion was passed by the barest possible majority (39 votes to 38), which gave the governor-general the opportunity to veto it.

Nevertheless, the whole process of this self-government debate was rejected by the Egyptian government on the grounds that the governor-general had no jurisdiction to allow such a debate on a sensitive political issue. The Egyptian prime minister, Mustafa al-Nahhas, sent the following telegram dated 14 December 1951 to the governor-general, Sir Robert Howe:

We learned that you have decided to table discussion by the Legislative Assembly proposition presented to Your Excellency by some members of that Assembly concerning the demand to grant the Sudan self-government. Egypt which is keen on the Sudanese enjoying self-government within the unity of Egypt and Sudan under the Egyptian Crown, considers that this is a purely political matter and does not fall within the jurisdiction of Sudan Government. Your Excellency, as representative of the two countries administering the Sudan, should not deal with or discuss this matter which at present is the object of political discussions taking place in London. As for the letter sent to you by El Sayed Saddik el Mahdy and his colleagues of el Umma Party, we resent its contents. This party does not represent the Sudan people. Please inform me with the immediate measures you have taken to stop this planned campaign meant to challenge the people of Egypt and Sudan.

In his reply, Sir Robert Howe criticised the Egyptian government, and emphasised that there was 'no planned campaign against either the Egyptian or Sudan people'. He assured the Egyptian premier that he would not 'interfere with the exercise by the Sudanese of their rights to free speech inherent both in the laws ... in force in the Sudan and throughout the world'.

This fluid political atmosphere encouraged the Umma’s opponents in the Legislative Assembly to organise themselves into a political party, styled as the Socialist Republican Party, a name coined by Makki ‘Abbas in 1947 in a series of articles published in his newspaper, al-Ra’d, promoting the noble merits of a socialist republican for the administration of the Sudan. The idea was shared by a number of educated elite, tribal leaders and moderate intellectuals, ‘who wished to dissociate themselves from ... Sayed Abdel Rahman el-Mahdi’ and his aspiration to be king of an independent Sudan, and committed themselves to the establishment of a centre party that would work for independence and the betterment of the Sudanese community. This
proposal remained on the horizon until 15 November 1951, when a group of the Assembly members representing tribal leaders and the South held a press conference in the Legislative Assembly Hall, in which they declared their promotion as follows:

We are not a political party but we believe that we speak for the overwhelming majority of the ordinary people of the Sudan. In our own constituencies and in those of members thinking as we do we represent directly... 5,708,000 persons constituting 70 per cent of the Sudan’s 8,500,000 population. Our view of the present situation is that whereas last year we favoured the attainment of full self-government in steady progressive steps, the recent unilateral action by Egypt in repudiating the 1899 Agreement had, in effect, destroyed the Condominium...

We completely disagree with the proposal that an international commission appointed by the United Nations Organization should take over responsibility for government of the country. We believe this step would be disastrous. Other countries have had experience of the disagreement and dissension of such a commission. As members of the Legislative Assembly we know well if we were united we could bring great pressure on the Government to shape policy as we want it. We could have no such control or influence over an international commission. Until the time when the Sudan decides its own future and selects the head of the state who would be answerable to the Sudanese people, we are convinced the only hope of ordered steady progress in social, economic and constitutional field is for the Governor-General to continue as head of the state for maintaining a rational government in the Sudan.

We entirely repudiate the attempt by the Egyptian Government to bring the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown without consulting the Sudanese and to impose a constitution in the framing of which we have had no say. We do not want a paper constitution conceived in this country and fitted to our particular needs... Whenever the advice or help of foreigners is required we should make use of foreign officials who have spent their working lives here through understanding our problems.

The outcome of this press conference was that the key speakers, from the very beginning, dismissed the call for complete independence under a local monarchy and that of the unionist parties for the unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown. Both calls were branded as ‘barren and bankrupt policies’ that had already failed to ‘win the support of many who believe in the question of independence,’ and the entrenched differences among their supporters and partisan gains had halted the development of the country. They argued that the crucial needs of the country were the ‘unity of purpose, constructive policy and sound administration’ that would not be achieved without cooperation with the existing regime that had sincerely backed ‘the Sudan to stand on its feet politically and economically’. They argued that such a smart cooperation would lead to ‘a fully self-governing constitution’ and independence.

A few days later, ‘the non-party group members’ held a meeting in Khartoum and declared themselves as a political party given the name of Socialist Republican. Ibrahim Badri was elected as secretary general and the party constitution was approved later. Badrè was a former northern official with a good reputation in the South, where he had worked for many years. He seems to have been ‘responsible for the unlikely name of Socialist Republicans for a group of conservative tribal
leaders. His leadership and political thinking also encouraged a small group of the intelligentsia, formerly known as al-Ahrar (the Liberals), to join the party and then work together towards the establishment of a non-sectarian republican movement for the independence of the Sudan. On 18 December the SRP published its aims in a long statement in the Khartoum local press, which criticised the political parties and attributed their failure to the deep-rooted difference between the political agendas of the pro-independence and unionists, and the centralisation of the national interests of the country round partisan and sectarian gains. The party was branded as ‘Socialist’ to suppress ‘the appearance of any wealthy capitalist class in the country’, and ‘Republican’ to counter ‘the Pro-Independence call for a Mahdist Monarchy.’

Thus, the founders of the SRP, most of whom were tribal leaders and high-ranking bureaucrats, ironically presented themselves as socialist and republican. They then promised to establish a set of ‘sound principles’ for ‘an independent Sudan Republic’, probably seeking dominion status with Britain. They proclaimed that they had 33 per cent of support in Khartoum, 45 per cent in the Blue Nile, 50 per cent in Kassala, 83 per cent in Kordofan and 100 per cent in Darfur and the southern provinces.

In Khartoum, the Socialist Republicans’ call for British trusteeship, with the governor-general as head of the state until the Sudanese decided their future, was heavily criticised by the local press and political parties. The Umma Party, for instance, considered the establishment of the SRP ‘as a stab in the back of the Sudanese political parties,’ and Sayyid Abd al-Rahman ‘had correctly viewed the SRP as a British intrigue to undermine his influence, and was out to destroy it at all costs.’ The Ashiqqa’ shared the same views and considered the emergence of the new party as ‘a British maneuver’ instigated by the Sudan Political Service to counterbalance the growing influence of the Umma party in the Legislative Assembly. In one of his letters to C. G. Davies, first in the Intelligence Department and latter in the civil secretary’s office, R. Allen, head of the African Department in the Foreign Office, wrote:

> Since the ‘letter of the 17th [November 1951] I have heard from Robertson that this new party had been standing well to a torrent of abuse in the local Khartoum Press, and that of individual members have faced up cheerfully to provide Wiggins from S.A.R. [Sayyid Abd al-Rahman], who has obviously been rattled by this defection of a group whom he considered to be his personal followers, and whose physical and robust support he has at times paraded before his political rivals. I think this party, if it develops, promises greater stability in the Sudan than the others, if for no other reason than that it is non-sectarian.

On the one hand, this passage highlights the government’s interest in establishing a centre party that would curtail the growing power of the sectarian forces. In his personal letter of 17 November 1951 to C. G. Davies, the civil secretary James Robertson criticised ‘the intransigence of Sayed Abdel Rahman and Sayed Ali Mirghani in their personal relations’ and showed how this disturbed political life in the Sudan. He went on to say: ‘Every attempt in recent years to affect some measure of reconciliation has failed and I think we must assume that we are unlikely ever to make progress while the two leaders are alive.’ The correspondence also reflects the government’s frustration and underlines that the ‘great mass of opinion’ throughout the length and breadth
of the country was ‘heartily sick of both the secular quarrel of the two Sayyids and of
the temporal manoeuvres of their politicians’. He then supported the SRP’s manifesto
on the grounds that it would lead to ‘(1) full self-government next year, (2) self-
determination on a date which the Sudanese Parliament would fix when it thought
the time was ripe, (3) a democratic republican regime in an independent Sudan,
[and] (4) Sudan membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations.’ At the
same time, he drew the attention of his colleagues to the fact that the formation of
such a centre party would create ‘a dangerous split in the forces cooperating in the
Assembly and Council’, but in the long run the party could ‘count on the powerful
backing of a large proportion of the educated classes, citizens of property in the
large towns and in the Gezira, and tribal leaders in the north and the South.’

On the other hand, the passage reveals how Sayyid Abd al-Rahman was provoked by
the ‘defection of a group whom he considered to be his personal followers’. This reac-
tion came as a result of his political calculation that the continuation of the SRP would
distort his political image and strengthen the influence of his archenemy, Sayyid Ali al-
Mirghani, who cautiously expressed his support to the party in private circles. He
therefore spared no effort to suppress the power of Socialist Republicans in the
areas of his traditional influence. In Darfur Province, for instance, the Sayyid
entered into direct confrontation with Ibrahim Musa Madibbu, the paramount
chief of the Rizayqat, and Ali al-Ghali of the Habaniyya. He tried to oust them
from power by supporting their tribal rivals and mobilising his followers against
their leadership. This confrontation gave a clear political message to other tribal
leaders who would hardly maintain full control in their territories without the
patronage of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman, such as Mirghani Husayn Zaki al-Din, and
those who had family relations with the leadership of the Ansar in Omdurman, like
Babu Nimr of Dar Missariyya. Mirghani Husayn Zaki al-Din, from the very beginning,
refused to support the tribal leaders in the Legislative Assembly, and Babu Nimr with-
drew his support after the press conference of 16 November 1951. The situation as a
whole indicated that the majority of tribal leaders were very cautious in giving full
sponsorship to the SRP, particularly when they realised that the political existence
of their British patrons in the country would not last for long.

The rise of the SRP also broke down the chain of collaboration between the
Khartoum government and Sayyid Abd al-Rahman, and paved the way for reconcilia-
tion between the Sayyid and the Egyptian government. The latter, for the first time in
Egyptian history, entered into direct negotiation with ‘Britain’s most consistent anti-
Egyptian ally, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi’. It accepted the Sudan’s right to self-
determination, provided the Sudanese agreed to accept King Faruq’s sovereignty until
they decided their future. This apparently tactical move on the part of the Egyptian
government was partially rejected by the Sayyid and his clients, but, at the same
time, it opened the door to further negotiations. The abolition of the Egyptian mon-
archy in 1952 greatly contributed to the success of the subsequent Egyptian-Sudanese
negotiations that resulted in the agreement of 12 February 1953. Sudanese politicians
and political parties of all shades participated in these negotiations, and the process of
the endorsement of the agreement included Britain’s latest collaborator, the SRP.
negotiations focused on the amendments to the Self-Government Statute with particular reference to the governor-general’s special responsibilities for the southern provinces, the mode of elections (direct or indirect) and Sudanisation. The SRP opposed the abolition of the governor-general’s special responsibilities for the southern provinces on the grounds that they were necessary to secure the unity of the country and satisfy the expectations of southern politicians who had no confidence in their northern counterparts. The party called for indirect elections in the rural areas where the vast majority of the voters were illiterate; and favoured a gradual Sudanisation of key administrative, professional and technical posts.

In the modified Self-Government Statute, the governor-general’s special responsibilities for southern provinces were rephrased as ‘a special responsibility to ensure fair and equitable treatment to all the inhabitants of the various provinces of the Sudan’. An international Electoral Commission, consisting of three Sudanese, an Egyptian, a Briton, an American and an Indian as chairman, was set up with wide terms of reference to prepare and organise the general elections. The Electoral Commission made important modifications to the electoral rules. It increased the number of direct-election constituencies from thirty-five to sixty-eight out of a total of ninety-two, and those of the graduates (i.e. those who had completed education to secondary standard) from three to five. As Holt argues, both modifications showed that ‘the tide was now flowing for the urban politicians against the old tribal authorities’.

As mentioned earlier, the split in the unionist parties on the eve of the general elections was temporarily healed by Egyptian intervention, and the parties were united under the banner of the National Unionist Party (NUP). However, in June 1953, a rift between Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani and the Egyptian government triggered the Sayyid to withdraw his support from the NUP, and it was generally assumed that he would support the SRP or the Independent Khatmiyya candidates in the parliamentary elections, thus ‘leaving the pro-Egyptian faction in isolation’. By this temporary withdrawal, the Sayyid seems to have tried tactically to achieve two objectives: first, to give a threatening gesture to the Egyptians not to support the Umma Party; and, second, to secure a greater say in the naming of NUP candidates for the parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, this political manoeuvre was misinterpreted by the secretary general of the SRP, Ibrahim Bardi, who proclaimed that he had received ‘secret assurances’ from al-Mirghani that the Khatmiyya would support the Socialist Republicans in the parliamentary elections. He also assumed that the deterioration of the Egyptian-Mirghani relations would encourage the pro-Egyptian elements to boycott the elections, a development that would offer the Socialist Republicans a handsome opportunity to get a large part of the Khatmi vote. Relying on these political speculations, Bardi refused to enter into a political alliance with the Umma Party against the National Unionists and Egyptian elements, assuming that such an alliance would frustrate the party support among independent Khatmiyyas. In due course, the presumably secret assurances of al-Mirghani had evaporated, and Bardi realised that the SRP was ‘caught between the strength of the Umma Party as the strongest “Independence” party and that of the N.U.P. as the stronghold of opposition to
Mahdist rule. To deal with this political reality, he directed his attention towards the South, where he had personal contacts. His commitment to the southern problem led him to sign the agreement of October 1952 with the Egyptian government, supporting the governor-general’s special responsibilities in the southern provinces. This move gave the party short-lived support in the South, but discredited it in the North, where this agreement was heavily criticised and branded as a backward step in Egyptian-Sudanese negotiations for self-determination. A few months later, Bardi refused to sign the Egyptian-inspired declaration of 10 January 1953 on the grounds that it was not in harmony with the previous agreement signed by the party. This negative response put him in direct conflict with the two committee members, al-Dardiri Nuqud and Zayn al-Abdin Salih, who signed the declaration on behalf of the Socialist Republicans. Their decision seemed to have been taken on the understanding that the Socialist Republicans had no future in the South. In the North, the party also suffered the fate of being in the middle, where it faced the heat of the two competing political forces (the Umma and the Unionist parties) that did not tolerate its political existence. The lack of funds was another challenge that weakened the position of the party in its struggle with the National Unionists, who were fully supported by the Egyptian government, and the Umma Party, supported by Sayyid Abd al-Rahman and his political clients. The party was then squeezed into insignificance in comparison to the Umma and the Unionists, and ended up by fielding only sixteen candidates, three of whom were returned largely on a personal vote, while the NUP obtained an overall majority in the House of Representatives (fifty-one seats out of ninety-seven) and the Senate (thirty-two seats out of 50). In the House of Representatives, the Umma Party won twenty-two; and the remaining twenty-four seats were divided between the Southern Party (nine), SRP (three), the Anti-Imperialist Front (one) and independent members (eleven). In the Senate House, the Umma Party got seven; and the remaining eleven seats were divided between the Southern Party (four), SRP (one) and independent members (six) (see Table 1). This large majority enabled the NUP to form a unionist government chaired by Ismail al-Azhari as the first Sudanese prime minister.

The 1953 elections showed that the SRP, which had been hailed by British officials as a major breakthrough in the familiar pattern of Sudanese politics, did not have enough political credibility to mobilise independent political power on the national level. Therefore, the crushing defeat of the party in the first parliamentary elections was expected, while the loss of the Umma was surprisingly far from what the party had anticipated. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman considered the election results as ‘a severe blow to his personal prestige and pride’, and informed D. M. H. Riches, a Foreign Office official at the United Kingdom Trade Commission in Khartoum, that ‘he could not face being present at the opening of Parliament’ and instead he would leave for Aba Island before the end of the year. Consequently, the party denounced the validity of the elections, crossly condemned the Egyptian intervention in favour of the National Unionists and promised to take necessary measures that would secure the independence of the Sudan. After recovering its balance, the Umma Party had, however, decided to ‘continue its struggle for independence or at least for influence against
Sayid Ali’s ring-leaders were advised by the British ‘to reorganise themselves on a broad political basis and not on a restricted sectarian one, to try to form a strong and coherent independence front, and to be vigilant and resist openly and courageously Egyptian propaganda and Egyptian or Unionist attempts to go beyond the agreement both in Parliament or outside’. Accordingly, the Umma Party declared its intention to organise an independent front composed of themselves, southerners, the SRP and northern independents, together with any independent Khatmiyya who could be detached from the National Unionists. Emissaries were sent to the South to concert an arrangement with the southerners, and in Khartoum Sayyid Siddiq al-Mahdi, president of the Umma Party, approached the secretary general of the SRP, Ibrahim Bardi, and had ‘a satisfactory conversation’ with him, but the latter wished to ‘keep the intention to co-operate closely a secret for fear of frightening off the handful of N.U.P members’ whom they were hoping to detach. In early 1954, there was some progress in the establishment of the ‘Independence Bloc’, which the Umma appeared to have decided to sponsor wholeheartedly. However, the secretary general of the SRP did not publicly announce his support for the Independence Front on the grounds that his party would ‘adopt an open-minded attitude in Parliament’, voting with the NUP on occasions when the NUP’s proposals were in the interests of the country and against them when they were not. This hesitant attitude seemed to have been a tactical one, because the three members of the SRP in parliament eventually declared their support to the opposition. In the debate of 16 August 1955 for self-determination in Parliament, nazir Yusuf al-Ajab seconded the opposition proposal and claimed that ‘the Sudanese people would never again consent to live under foreign rule . . . and asked for the replacement of the flag of

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<th>By nomination</th>
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<td><strong>House of Representatives</strong></td>
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<td>Umma Party</td>
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<td>Southern Party</td>
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<td>Independents (north)</td>
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<td>Socialist Republican Party</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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| **Senate**               |               |             |       |
| National Unionist Party  | 10            | 22          | 32    |
| Umma Party               | 04            | 03          | 07    |
| Southern Party           | 01            | 03          | 04    |
| Independents (north)     | 02            | 01          | 03    |
| Independents (south)     | 02            | 01          | 03    |
| Socialist Republican Party| 01            | 00          | 01    |
| **Total**                | 20            | 30          | 50    |
the Condomini by a Sudanese national flag. This motion was later adopted by the ruling party and passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate on 19 December 1955. Thus the first day of January 1956 marked the end of the old order and the birth of a new era in the modern history of the Sudan. The Union Jack and the stars and crescent of Egypt were hauled down, and the blue, yellow and green flag of the new Republic of the Sudan was flown for the first time over the former palace of the governor-general.

V

The above discussion highlights the gradual breakdown of the collaboration mechanism set up by the Anglo-Egyptian colonial administration, and examines the rise of the Sudanese political parties and their drive towards independence. The three major collaborators who controlled the political landscape during this period were the modern educated elite, the sectarian leaders and the tribal figures, who organised themselves in the form of modern political parties. On the eve of independence, these political parties functioned under the close supervision of the central colonial authority, which organised their political rotation in preordained orbits. With independence, the balance was upset, the sun (central authority) disappeared, the planets (political parties/sectoral forces) found themselves free from its pull and there was no substitute sun. In other words, the central authority of the post-independence ‘state had become weak, and power itself had become a weapon in the hands of sectoral forces that used it to further their interests’. Thus, the practice of the first democracy was marked by factional struggles and divisive personal conflict that made it virtually impossible to establish an effective political leadership in the country. This complex situation brought in a military regime (1958–64) that banned political parties and suspended the electoral system altogether. The coup was welcomed by Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, and, with some more reservations, by Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, but the firm opposition of the urban-based political activists had forced the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to step down on 21 October 1964. As a result, the intelligentsia formed a body known as the Professional Front and many hoped that under its leadership, ‘rather than that of the discredited politicians of the earlier period, vigorous efforts to solve the country’s social, political and economic problems would be initiated’. A transitional government (1964–65), backed by the Communist Party, was formed, which declared its intention to restore the multi-party system and dissolve the system of native administration in the rural areas. To strengthen the power of the modern forces and weaken that of the traditional parties, numerous occupational constituencies were suggested, and a decision was passed for the dissolution of native administration in the northern Sudan. The first proposal was immediately rejected by the Umma and National Unionist parties in favour of territorial representation, and the second was opposed by tribal leaders who delayed its implementation until the transitional government resigned from office in favour of a new coalition government chaired by an Umma premier, Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub. The second parliamentary era (1964–69) also failed
to offer a unifying ideology or a charismatic leadership that would evolve practical programmes for national development. The outcome was tension and conflict between political parties and the civil service, the executive authority and the judiciary, and among the contradictory and competing sectoral interests. This state of confusion and chaos left everyone dreaming of salvation that would sweep all the chaos away and unite the people of the country. On 25 May 1969, the democratic coalition government was overthrown by a military coup led by General Ja'afar Nimayri and backed by many intellectuals and left-wing politicians. The new leaders banned the political parties right away, dismissed the democratic system and abolished native administration. Instead, they set up a ‘socialist government’ and subordinate institutions in various fields of life on the grounds that these institutions would widen the scope of popular participation in local government, break down the tribal and sectarian centres of power and pave the way for a new social order that would satisfy the expectations of the ordinary people in the country. All these illusory promises did not come true, and in April 1985, the Nimayrè regime was overthrown by a popular uprising that reinstated democracy and a multi-party system. The members of the former triple (sectarian-tribal-educated) alliance renewed their clientelistic ties and entered the 1986 general elections against the new modern forces such as the national Islamic Front and the Sudan Communist Party. The traditional forces (the Umma and the Unionists) again won the general elections and formed what proved to be a weak coalition government under the premiership of Sayyid al-Sadiq al-Mahdi (1986–89). After three years of factional struggles and political rivalries, the democratic government was once more toppled by a military coup organised and executed by the National Islamic Front. In short, this historical survey highlights the failure of the national political parties and post-independent governments (civilian and military), and shows how they fell short of creating structures and consensus to overcome factionalism and personal enmities that characterised Sudanese politics. Thus, the country as a whole ‘seems endlessly trapped in a cycle of ineffective civilian and military regimes, with neither form of rule apparently capable of breaking out the vicious circle of decay.’

Notes

[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., 120.
[4] Ibid., 117.
[5] Ibid., 139.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., 134.
[9] Ibid., 133.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Horatio Herbert Kitchener (1850–1916), the first governor-general of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1898–99). He was born in Ireland in 1850 and commissioned to the Royal Engineers in 1870. He spent much of his early career surveying Palestine and Cyprus for the Palestine
Exportation Fund. In 1882, he entered the Egyptian army and joined the unsuccessful Nile Expedition of 1884–85. A decade later, he was appointed as a sirdar of the Egyptian army and given command of the forces launched for the ‘reconquest’ of the Sudan. After the defeat of the Mahdist armies at the battle of Omdurman (Karari) in 1898, Kitchener was appointed as governor-general of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, but his appointment came to a premature end in December 1899, when he was transferred to South Africa to serve as a chief-of-staff to Lord Roberts. He spent the rest of his career in the British army serving in various administrative and military capacities and working in different parts of the British colonies until his death in 1916. For details, see Hill, Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan, 203–05.

[12] Memorandum to Mudirs, 1899, PRO, FO 78/5022/13244. For more details on the implementation of this memorandum, see Abushouk and Bjørkelo, eds, The Principle of Native Administration.

[13] For further details on Turco-Egyptian Egyptian local administration, see Hill, Egypt in the Sudan.

[14] For further details, see Abushouk, ‘Dar Bidayriyya Nazirate’.


[16] Memorandum to Mudirs, 1899, PRO, FO 78/5022/13244. The term faqî (or fikî) is a Sudanese colloquial rendition of faqîh: Muslim holy man; in the broadest sense, any individual known for religious propensities.


[18] Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani (1884–1968) was the head of one of the most influential Sufi orders in the Sudan, the Khatmiyya. His ancestors came to the Sudan from the Hijaz and claimed a holy descent from the Prophet Muhammad via his daughter Fatima, the wife of Ali ibn Abi Talib. His grandfather, Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani (1793–1853) came to the Sudan in 1817 and laid down the foundations of the Khatmiyya tariqa. When Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi revolted against the Turco-Egyptian regime Sayyid Ali was with his father in Kassala, where the Khatmiyya followers declared their opposition to the Mahdist cause. After the Mahdist maintained their control over the Sudan Sayyid Ali and his father left the country and took their political refuge in Cairo. After the overthrow of the Mahdist regime he returned to the Sudan and transferred the headquarters of the Khatmiyya tariqa from Kassala to Khartoum North. During this period he showed a certain degree of support to the colonial regime and later on his followers acted as grass-roots supporters of the Unionist Party and as traditional rivals of the Ansar (the Mahdists). For details, see Mohammad, ‘Contribution of Sayed Ali al-Mirghani’.


[21] For further details on Wingate’s religious policy, see Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate.

[22] Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi (1885–1959) was the posthumous son of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi (1844–85). He had inherited the allegiance of the thousands of Sudanese who had followed his father. He then utilised this support and his unique relationship with the British colonisers to establish his politico-religious career as Imam of the Ansar sect and patron of the Ummah Party. His followers designated him as the father of independence and architect of the Sudanese Nationalist Movement against the Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule. See Ibrahim, Al-Imam Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi.

[23] Ibid., 67.


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[26] Letter from C. Browne, Berber governor, to the Northern Governors’ Meeting, 1920, NRO, Civsec, 1/9/30, National Record Office (NRO), Khartoum.

[27] For details on the 1924 demonstrations, see Bakheit, ‘British Administration’, 64–112.

[28] The number of ma’mur and sub-mamur shrank from 222 in 1921 to only seventy by the end of 1939. See Newbold, ‘Note on Sub-Inspectors’, SAD, 716/1/32.

[29] Daud al-Khalifa Abdullahi to the Governor of Kordofan, 3 March 1935, NRO, Kordofan, 1/1/1.


[34] Bashir, Educational Development in the Sudan, 78.

[35] Lee Stack (1880–1924), British military officer and governor general of the Sudan. Seconded from the Egyptian army to the Sudan government in 1904. Acted as private secretary to the governor general (1904–07), Sudan agent and director of intelligence in Cairo (1908–14), acting governor general (1917) and governor general (1919–24). Assassinated in Cairo in 1924. MacMichael, The Sudan Political Service, 14.

[36] Daly, Imperial Sudan, 72, 77.


[39] Nawad, Native Administration, 151–79.


[43] For details, see Mohammed, ‘Contribution of Sayed Ali al-Mirghani’, 305–24; Deng and Daly, Bonds of Silk, 71–84; Taha, ed., Al-Sudan li al-Sudaniyyin, 61; Daly, Imperial Sudan, 159.


[45] Ordinary members representing province councils: Kordofan: Babu Uthman Nimr (Misiriyya), Yahya Ahmad Umar (Jawamana) and Khalil Akasha (merchant-al-Ubayyid). Kassala: Muhammad Abu Sinn (Shukriyya), Abdallah Bakr (Dar Bakr) and Muhammad Al-Amin Tirk (Hadandawa). Darfur: Ibrahim Musa Madibbu (Rizayqat), Muhammad Bahr al-Din (Masalit) and Maqdum Abd al-Rahman Adm Rijjal (southern magumate). Northern: Ayuba Abd al-Majid (native administrator-Berber), al-Zubayr Hamad al-Malik (native administrator-Dongola) and Uthman Abd al-Qadir (merchant—Halfa). Blue Nile: Makk Hasan Adlan (makk—Funj district), Idris Abd al-Qadir Habbani (Hasaniyya) and Ahmad al-Hajj Yusuf Adam (native administrator—central district, Gazira). Khartoum: Mirghani Hamza (engineer), Muhammad Ali Shawqi (assistant registrar of land), Sarur Muhammad Ramli (native administrator-Khartoum north).

Ordinary appointed: E. A. Turner (manager of Barclays Bank-Khartoum), Mustafa Abu Illa (merchant-Omdurman), Abu Shamma Abd al-Mahmud (Omdurman notable), Ali Badri (Sudan medical service), Ahmad Uthman al-Qadi (Omdurman notable), Yaqub Ali Hilu Q21 (Omdurman notable), Ahmad Sayyid al-Fil (Omdurman notable), Abd al-Karim Muhammad, (Omdurman notable), Abdallah Khalil (military officer) and Nuh Abdullah Hamza, (ex-m’amur). See Proceedings of the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan.


James Robertson to C. E. Fouracres, 8 April 1945, PRO, FO 141/1024, no. 3. For details on al-Sayyid Abd al-Rahman’s ambition for a Mahdist monarchy in the Sudan see R. A. Bence-Pembroke, Darfur governor (1925–27), ‘A Note on the Sayyid’s Ultimate Ambition to be King of the Sudan’, where he used the term ‘Malek El-Sudan’, NRO, Kordofan, 1/1/1; Taha, ‘Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi’, 53–60.

In one of the letters dated 8 April 1945 to C. E. Fouracres, James Robertson wrote: ‘The party is a revival in a new form of group which in about 1926, centering round the then editor of the Hadara (the late Hussein Khalifa Sherif) adopted as its slogan “the Sudan for the Sudanese.” This group was thrown up as part of the direct reaction to Egyptian fiasco in 1924. It was a moderate pro-government party, though the government had no hand in its appearance. It was not an active party, and indeed in those years, when Egypt and all things Egyptian were thoroughly discredited, there was no need for any active or organised opposition to Egyptian claims’. See PRO, FO, 141/1024, no. 3.


First Report of the Sudan Administration Conference, 1.

Robertson, Transition in Africa, 113, 118–19.

Al-Khalifah, Mudhakirat, 19–20; Abd al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, 184.


Ibid., 594–95.

Ibid., 594–95.

Ibid.

Ibid., 608–09.

Ibid., 609–10.

Ibid. On the issue of voting, Babo Nimr, a member of the Legislative Assembly, said: ‘When we came to the issue of self-rule, some problems developed. We were 96 in the Assembly. Those who signed the proposal for self-rule were over seventy . . . The very people among the British who had taken our side and worked with us for self-rule reversed their position and turned against us. We had gone too far. We refused to turn back. But some of us withdrew so that from 70 members, we were left only 39 in support of self-rule. When we came to voting, 38 were opposed and we, who supported the motion, were 39. There was one person who, if he had voted would have made the vote 39 to 39, and the motion would have failed . . . That one man was outside the meeting hall. We went outside to where he was and said to someone: “Hold this man!” He held him. And immediately, the bell for the voting rang. We entered the hall. By the time he let go of the man, the doors had been locked. He knocked at the doors, “Bang, bang, bang!” He kept knocking for a whole minute, but could not enter. And we voted 39 to 38.’ Deng, ed., Recollections of Babo Nimir, 40–41.


[70] The northern tribal leaders and southern members of the Legislative Assembly who attended the press conference were: Yusuf al-Ajab (nazir of Rafa’a East); Babu Uthman Nimr (nazir of Dar Misiriyya); Mun’im Mansur (nazir of Dar Hamar); Muhammad Hilmi Abu Sinn (Deputy nazir of Shukriyya); Rihaymat Allah Mahmud (native administrator-al-Fashir); Abd al-Hamud Abu Bakr (native administrator-western Darfur); Ibrahim Yusuf al-Hindi (religious notable); Ibrahim Musa Madibbu (deputy nazir of Dar Rizayqat), Muhammad Bahr al-Din (Masalit), Sarur Muhammad Ramli (nazir, Khartoum north); Buth Diu, government official-Upper Nile Province; Edward Odok Dedigo, government official-Upper Nile Province; Andrea Gore, a chief of the Bari-Equatoria Province; Benjamin Lwoki, school headmaster-Equatoria Province; Cyer Rihan, government officer-Bahr al-Ghazal Province; Stanislaus Paysama, government official-Bahr al-Ghazal Province. The press conference was attended by foreign reporters representing Daily Telegraph; Picture Post; Express; Times; United Press; and the Arab News Agency. See Al-Sudan al-Jadid, Khartoum, Issue no. 1461, 11 November 1951, NRO.

[71] Al-Sudan al-Jadid, no. 1461, 14 Nov. 1951, 1–2; Times, 17 Nov. 1951, 5, NRO.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] The meeting was attended by distinguished tribal leaders, government officials and notables, including: Yusuf al-Ajab; Mun’im Mansur; Muhammad Hilmi Abu Sinn; Rihaymat Allah Mahmud; Ibrahim Yusuf al-Hindi; Buth Diu; Edward Odok Dedigo; Andrea Gore; Benjamin Lwoki; Cyer Rihan; Stanislaus Paysama; Surur Muhammad Ramli; Ahmad Hamad Abu Sinn; Muhammad Nasr; Muhammad Tumsah al-Kadaru; Muhammad Taha Surij; Mahmoud Karrur; Ahmad Yusuf Alqam; Ibrahim Yusuf al-Hindi; Buth Diu; Uthman Ali; al-Sa’id Ali Matar; Nawway Muhammad Rahhal; al-Amin Ali Isa; Ahmad al-Hashimi Dafa’allah; al-Hajj Muhammad Abdalllah; Ibrahim Daw al-Bayt, Muhammad Ahmad Abu Sinn. See Al-Sudan al-Jadid, Khartoum, 13 December 1951, NRO.


[76] Ibid., 113–14.


[85] Ibid.


For further details on the terms of the agreement of 12 February 1953 and its political consequences, see Taha, *Kayf Nal al-Sudan Istiglalahu*.

Ibid.


Members of the Commission: J. C. Penny (UK); Abd al-Salam al-Khalifa (Sudan); Khalafalla Khalid (Sudan); Gordon Bulli (Sudan); Abd al-Fatah Hasan (Egypt); Warwick Perkins (USA); Sukumar Sen (India). For further details, see *Sudan Elections for Self-Government*, 1953, 8.


'Sudan: A Note on the Local Political Situation with Especial Reference to Relations between the Khatmia and the National Unionist Party', in Salih, ed., *British Documents on the Sudan*, vol. 8, 1953, 109–11.

Ibid.


Woodward, *Sudan*, 1898–1989, 70. The three candidates of the SRP were Abd al-Hamid Musa Madibbu, brother of the nazir of the Rizayqat, accountant for the Rizayqat administration (constituency of Nyala Baqqara East); Muiammad Aimad Abê Sinn, nazir of Shukiryya Ru affairs (constistency of Ru affairs); and Yusuf al-Ajab, nazir of Ru affairs (constistency of the Funj Nazirates). For details, see *Directory of the Republic of the Sudan*, 145–62.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Al-Siddiq al-Mahdi is the Mahdi’s grandson. He graduated at the Gordon Memorial College in 1933. After his graduation he was in charge of the management of his father’s business and active in politics. In 1947, he led the delegation of the Independence Front to New York to table the case of the Sudan at the Security Council, and two years later was elected as president of the Umma Party. On his father’s death he was appointed as Imam of the Ansar. He held the two posts until his death on 2 October 1961.


Ibid., 116.


Ibid.


References


